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Studies in political behavior, when attempting to explain certain 
types of behavior, often concentrate upon those behaviors in the belief 
that other possible behaviors are irrelevant. This dissertation examines 
several forms of political behavior in American national elections with the 
intent of including or examing relevant alternatives which have an effect 
upon the primary behavior of interest . Three areas selected for 
examination are the question of political participation in American 
national elections (turnout) , the influence of a race for one office upon 
the race for another office in American national elections (coattails), and 
the relationship between three forms of expression of political desire, one 
of which is the voting decision itself. Furthermore, an alternative model 
of describing decision making in human beings is discussed. 
The results of these three examinations of political behavior may 
briefiy be described as follows. With respect to turnout, by using a model 
which combines the voting decision with the decision to turnout, we show 
that the decline in turnout from 1960 to 1980 is strongly related to the 
way in which individuals translate their thoughts about politics into 
voting, rather than the changes which may have occured in their 
thoughts themselves. With respect to coattails, we posit that individuals 
tend to associate their vote for president and congressman in order to to 
overcome the separation of powers implicit in the American federal 
system, and provide strong evidence to support that hypothesis. With 
respect to the forms of expression of political desire, we show that the 
v 
variables known as feeling thermometers, the sums of open-ended 
evaluations of the candidates, and the voting decision itself are, in a well-
defined and empirically verifiable manner, the same variable. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The behavioral "revolution" in the social sciences has left behind it a 
legacy of conflict, and no more apparent is this conflict than in political 
science. It has been a long time since psychology students were expected 
to read Aquinas, but an understanding of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau 
and their theories of the state are expected to be juxtaposed with game 
theory in a political scientist's lexicon of professional knowledge. In 
practice, of course, no such thing occurs-those who understand the 
states of nature political philosophers presuppose are ignorant of the 
competitive solution, and vice versa. Nevertheless, such ignorance does 
not keep those of the various theoretical perspective from proclaiming 
the superiority of their approach and castigating alternative 
approaches. 1 "Never the 'twain shall meet" seems to be the order of the 
day, and what is of interest to one school will not be of interest to 
another. What then is the relevance of this thesis to any but the most 
dedicated behaviorist, since it is a work which many would say lies firmly 
in the behavioral tradition with which political science has such 
difficulties? 
To be honest, I'm not sure . It depends largely upon the desires and 
goals of the non-behavioral reader. It has the advantages of a behavioral 
work-well developed hypotheses which are testable and falsifiable, 
statistical methodology which has its roots in recently developed methods 
of dealing with data which are of the type political scientists most 
1. Fo:r an account of .ome of these phenomenon, .ee Parenti (1983) . 
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commonly face, and communicability to other scientists.2 Does it have 
the disadvantages: ignoring content and substance, addressing problems 
which are narrow, insignificant, and non-controversial? I will attempt in 
this chapter to defend the view that it does not . In doing so, I will define 
the interests I believe a non-behavioral reader would need in order to find 
this work of use to him. 
The title of this thesis is 1he 5lructure of lnd.ividual Decisions in 
American Elections: 1he Influence of Relevant Alterna.ti:ues. The primary 
concern is with modelling the individual's behavior in a manner which 
refiects the actual process of his decision making, and in doing so, taking 
into account alternatives usually discarded by political scientists when 
undertaking analyses . An example of this is the voting decision. The 
usual method of analysis is to look at one race for an office by itself and 
attempt to discern why the individual chose between two candidates 
running for that office. Two immediate extensions suggest themselves: 
first, to look at the reason for voting for either candidate for that office 
at all (the decision to turnout), and to look at the intluence that races for 
other offices have upon the decision to vote for a candidate for that 
particular office. 
The first extension, that of analyzing the addition of the decision to 
turnout to the decision of voting for candidates, is done by means of a 
2. By this I mean simply that an astrcrphys:icist can understand the methods and tech:rrlques 
that I use to test a hypothesis, even as I can understand his. Furthe:rmo:re, he is capable of 
making judgment upon the methodology involved, even tho'U8h the theories may be foreign 
to him, just as I am capable of understanding his methodology. Thus a standard technique 
of science which allows an easy achan&e of new concepts and ideas is possible. 
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model which unifies the decision to turnout and the decision to vote in a 
parsimonious fashion, and does so with good predictive power. The model 
is known as the conditional motivational probit model. It is developed by 
postulating that individuals who face a situation in which they have the 
option of performing one of two opposite and mutually exclusive actions 
or of doing nothing have an underlying dimension of motivation which 
dictates the choice of their decision. Presumably, as the motivation for 
performing one action increases, the probability of an indivdiaul 
performing that action increases . Thus the term motivational in 
conditional motivational model. The term conditional comes from the 
fact that the model is estimated conditionally upon ditrerent costs (both 
economic and psychic) that the individual faces and upon d.itierent 
attitudes and personality traits that the individual possesses which may 
affect motivation. Finally, the term pro bit comes from the fact that if the 
estimation is made without the conditional part of the model. the 
estimation reduces to that of an n-chotomous probit (McKelvey and 
Zavoina (1975)). The full development of this inodel (which may be called 
an individual response model or a behavioral response model. since it 
takes the attributes of an individual and attempts to predict his behavior 
from those attributes), with justification and comparision with more 
traditional forms of individual response models (such as random utility 
maximization), is found in Chapter 5. 
The substantive use to which this model is put, however, is found in 
Chapter 2, where it is used to address the puzzle of the decline of 
4 
turnout. The focus of this investigation is the results from the Abramson 
and Aldrich piece in the September, 1982 American Political Science 
Review. There, the finding is that the decline in political efficacy and 
strength of partisanship over the last twenty years accounts for 
approximately 75 percent of the decline in white turnout for those years. 
With the use of the conditional motivational probit model. I conduct my 
own empirical analysis and conclude that the decline in political efficacy 
and strength of partisanship have had almost no eft'ect upon the decline 
in turnout; rather, that there has been what I (and econometricians) 
refer to as structural change in the American citizen's decision process 
on how to vote and whether to vote . The exact nature of what I refer to 
as structural change has a technical meaning, but there is a simple way 
of explaining the nature of this change, one which is of interest both to 
the behavioral and non-behavioral reader. 
I presume that each individual has a certain manner of organizing 
and acting upon the information, attitudes, and values which he 
possesses. I also presume that it is possible to reconstruct the 
individual's organization method from observed actions, and the method 
I use to do this is the model I have developed. What I do not presume, 
however, is that the individual's method of organizing the attributes he 
possesses stays constant over time. What I have referred to as structural 
change, then, merely refers to changes in the organization and action 
structure of the individual. His attitudes, information and whatnot are 
inputs to that process, whereas the process itself is heavily dependent 
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upon the context of the society in which the individual is operating. If 
behavioral research is often said to ignore the context, here is an 
example for our non-behavioral reader where the presence of context can 
be detected by behavioral means . The context of the period 1960 to 1980, 
contains, of course, as Kousser ( 1983) has noted, "enough special 
circumstances to account for nearly any political phenomenon." 
Behavioral models do not operate in a vacuum, either, and, if properly 
specified and interpreted, can pick up the context of a decision as well as 
the process. Identifying exactly the manner in which the context of a 
decision can af!ect the process is a very difficult question; some work has 
recently been done in econometrics and the question is discussed briefly 
in Chapter 2. I do not think the objection, however, to behavioral 
research as ignoring context and emphasizing process is necessarily 
valid. Much research may exhibit such failings, but it is not a sine qua 
nan on behavioral research. 
The other extension to voting behavior deals with the addition to the 
analysis of an individual's voting behavior additional races, so that the 
ef!ects of one race on another may be discerned. In national races, this is 
popularly known as a coattails efiect, and it is usually assumed to occur 
because the personal attraction of the presidential candidate sways the 
voter to ~upport the candidacy of other members of his party. If it is put 
that way, this is a very dangerous behavioral tendency for the American 
public to possess, as personal attraction may lead the crowd to support 
fuehrers and other such individuals. Even in its less extreme forms, 
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personal attraction is, to someone raised in the behavioral school with its 
emphasis on goal-oriented behavior, an odd motivational force. Suppose 
instead we posit that an individual has a behavioral tendency to overcome 
the separation of powers inherent in the American federal system by 
associating his vote for the various national offices? 
In some ways this is a provocative thesis, for on the face of it it 
seemingly requires that individuals have a scholar's view of the American 
constitutional system. I do not think, however, that the informational 
content needed is all that much greater than that usually presupposed by 
a rational-choice perspective . After all. for policy voting, it is necessary 
that one believe that the individual running for an office have some 
ability to implement that policy. If one policy votes for President, and 
one policy votes for Congressman, then one would have some inkling that 
both candidates have some influence over whatever policies one is basing 
one's vote on, and that thus they would have to cooperate to some extent 
to implement this policy. The only question then remains the extent of 
policy voting in the American electorate, particularly for congressional 
races . This is an empirical question. 
Another way it is thought to be a provocative question is that the 
question of justification for an individual associating his votes in this 
manner arises. This can be reduced to a form similar to another 
question, that of whether an individual votes rationally at all in national 
races, by the following method. Suppose an individual wants to choose 
two objects, each object coming from a different class. Say there are two 
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classes, food and attire, so that the class of food includes, say, Mexican 
and French, and the class of attire, formal and informal. One would think 
there would be an interaction between the two choices, so that if one 
chose French food, one would be more likely to choose formal attire. Now 
suppose the individual had to vote, simultaneously, on both choices of 
food and attire. If we assume that there is no strategizing,3 we would 
expect him to consider the interaction before voting. As the size of the 
group gets larger, we continue to assume that he acts as if his vote 
matters, just as we assume when analyzing a presidential or 
congressional race by itself. 
In Chapter 3 I give technical meaning to the concepts of personal 
charm and a behavioral tendency to overcome the separation of powers. 
The empirical evidence I examine supports the hypothesis I have posited 
and rejects the personal charm hypothesis. Furthermore, further 
hypotheses from the hypothesis I have posited are generated and tested. 
This is once more an indication of the strength of the behavioral method, 
yet the results must be of interest to even the non-behaviorally inclined, 
for they indicate a source of strength and consolidation of power in a 
system of government which was deliberately designed not to allow such 
con so lida ti on. 
The last substantive essay deals with the choices an individual makes 
in a different context, not directly relevant to the election results, 
perhaps, but important to policital scientists. I refer here to the various 
3. Strategic voting and an application is defined in Cain (1978). 
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intruments an individual is asked to respond to on the American National 
Election Studies (ANES). In particular. I ask the question "When are two 
variables the same variable?", for three very important variables to many 
election studies undertaken in the last thirty years: feeling 
thermometers, the open-ended evaluations of the candidates, and the 
voting decision itself . Each of these variables has been used in many 
different contexts and with many different claims as to their meaning. By 
the methodology I use (called random utility maximization in economics), 
I determine that each one of these variables is actually the same variable . 
There is a sensible way of viewing the open-ended evaluations of the 
candidates, the vote, and feeling thermometers. An individual is sampled 
in several different ways about his attitudes and intentions towards the 
candidates, and at different times. While the instruments are somewhat 
different, all allow for a great deal of leeway in answering. Thermometers 
allow for a continous mark, CAND for an open-ended responding, and the 
vote for a one-zero binary decision on one's evaluation of the candidate. 
It is therefore not surprising that the individual displays a great deal of 
consistency in answering all three types of instruments. 
The main advantage of this finding is that empirical researchers are 
now able to have a clear idea of what those variables mean when they 
attempt to make operational their conceptual models. The non-
behavioral reader will not benefit directly from reading this piece, 
perhaps, but in the long run he should benefit from superior research 
generating from the behavioral side of the profession. Both behaviorists 
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and non-behaviorists need to place their house in order before going 
naked to the world . 
Chapter 6 is a chapter intended to bring an old technique to the 
attention of both political scientists and all other who use applied 
statistics. It primarily exposits on the distribution of two estimators 
derived by the method of maximum likelihood, demonstrates how simple 
it is to obtain consistent estimators of relevant variances and 
covariances, and demonstrates the theoretical usefulness of this method 
by developing a test of consistency for the n-chotomous probit model. 
The usefulness of this method is demonstrated by the fact that many of 
the statistical analyses in this dissertation were calculated using its 
results , saving myself many hours of programming time. It can save 
others many hours also. 
This thesis represents the best that I could do in analyzing a number 
of problems of interest to the researcher who is behaviorally trained. The 
motivation for examing turnout was the previously mentioned Abramson 
and Aldrich article, for which I thought the results were artifactual and 
would not stand up under a more rigorous analysis. The motivation for 
examing the coattails phenomenon was my belief that the American 
voters are, to an amazing extent given the nature of their political 
system, able to judge their own interests and not allow the personal 
charm of a presidential candidate to overcome their interests. The 
motivation for studying the relationships between thermometers, the 
open-ended evaluations and the vote came from a remark in Mo Fiorina's 
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Retrospective Voting in American .Elections, in which he explained his 
intuition about the nature of feeling thermometers and the vote. The 
motivation for the conditional motivational probit carne from a desire to 
provide a unified theory of behavior which was closer to what I. trained in 
psychology, understood as actually occurring when a human being makes 
a decision, than economic theories such as random utility maximization. 
In all, I hope that the nature of the analysis here, which attempts to use 
methodological rigorous methods to explore important questions of 
political behavior, will be of some use to fellow researchers in political 
science . 
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Chapter D: The Decline in Electoral Participation in Recent 
American Elections: A Reexamination 
The analysis of turnout in post World War Two American National 
Elections has consistently centered upon the presumed continuous 
decline 1 in participation from 1960 to 1980 (Ferejohn and Fiorina (1979), 
Abramson and Aldrich (1982), Shafer (1981), Brody (1978), Boyd (1981), 
Cassel and Hill (1981)). For a profession which cannot agree upon a 
theoretical structure for turnout,2 it may seem somewhat presumptuous 
to examine the decline of participation, but scholarly attention continues 
to be riveted on what Kousser ( 1983) calls "the smallest and perhaps least 
permanent change [in turnout]-the decrease in non-southern 
participation since 1960." Aside from the natural interest of political 
behaviorists into what is, after all, the most common political act (Verba 
and Nie, 1972), a substantive reason often cited for interest in the decline 
of turnout is that American democracy is in some type of danger from 
non-participation.3 
1. While it is clear t."tat the percent of individuals of votine age voting in 1960 is greater 
than those in 1980, evidence will be presented later indicating that the assumption of a con-
tinuous decline may be in error. 
2. A point we will return to later. It is crucial to any e%planation of decline in participation 
which will withstand critical scrutiny. It should be noted that the lack of an accepted 
theoretical structure has not prevented a voluminous descriptive literature on the corre-
lates of turnout. It is not that theoretical models have not been proposed (see Aldrich 
(19?6), for a test of several models), it is more that the evidence iB sufficiently indecisive to 
differentiate among models. 
3. Abramson and Aldrich (p 502 )state that the "dall8ers of electoral nonparticipation for 
American democracy have been pointed out by both journalists and scholars; in his 'crisis of 
oonfidence' speech, President Carter lamented that 'Two-thirds of our people do not even 
vote."' The citing from that particular Carter speech is perhaps unfortunate, as aome pun-
dits (George Will in particular), have observed that the "crisis of confidence," retiected more 
Jimmy Carter's state of mind than any crisis of the American people. 
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We find the motivation from the standpoint of understanding 
political behavior sufficient, which is fortunate, for we remain 
unconvinced that a decline in participc..tion in late twentieth century 
America has had any impact upon the nature of public policy. In this 
chapter, then, we will present a model which uses the concept of 
motivatian to analyze turnout, and within the context of that model we 
will examine the decline of turnout in American National Elections, 1960 
to 1980. In the next section we examine some elementary notions of how 
to measure change in the context of behavioral response models, and 
identify some errors which have been made in the literature with regards 
to that type of model. In light of that discussion, we then examine data 
from the 1960 and 1980 elections in an efi'ort to understand why turnout 
declined between those two elections. Specifically, we present evidence 
rejecting the thesis that the decline in turnout is in any way related to 
the decline in partisan identification. We end by suggesting that the 
decline of turnout, as Kousser speculates, probably cannot be isolated 
from the "special circumstances" of 1960 to 1980. 
2.1 1he Analysis of Ol.ange over '11m2 
Suppose we wish to examine the change in a variable over time. This 
variable (call it y) is assumed for all time periods to follow the 
behavioral relationship (which we will call an individual response model) 
(2.1.1) 
where the it indexes the variables and coefficients for the i"' case in the 
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tUl year. The usual interpretations apply: .:rv is a vector of variables 
which are assumed to be uncorrelated with the disturbance term Uu, and 
p, are vectors (conformable to x) which are the parameters in the 
problem to be estimated. The question of interest then becomes: if y • is 
changing over time, what is the relation of that change to changes in the 
x and fJ? 
A glance at equation (2 .1.1) indicates there are two main types of 
change, if we assume ~ = u for all time periods. The first type we will 
refer to as structural change and the second type we will refer to as 
distributional change. Considering the second type first, if we suppose 
p, = P for all time periods, it is obvious that the distribution of at least 
some of the variables making up the :x vector must change. Structural 
change indicates that the weights p, are different in some time periods 
than in other time periods, so that if r and t are different time periods, 
Pr ~ Pt . It is clear that both types of change may be taking place 
simultaneously. 
Some researchers apparently do not believe in structural change, 
Abramson and Aldrich being a good example, for they state (p 504) "We 
are guided by two fundamental facts . First. political attitudes that have 
not changed in the aggregate cannot account for change in the behavior 
of the electorate." The acceptance of this "fact" implies that structural 
change cannot take place, only distributional change. The methodology 
we have outlined above is standard in econometrics. incidentally, going 
under such names as "tests of stability of statistical regimes" or "tests of 
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structural change" (see Maddala (p 460)). Structural change can take 
place even though an exogenous variable (such as a political attitude) has 
not changed and can fully account for a change in behavior in the 
population under study (such as the electorate).4 
Structural change in individual response mechanisms has not 
obtained the same type of attention that changes in the distribution of 
exogenous variables in an individual response mechanism have. One 
problem is, of course, that to study this type of change one has to first 
postulate an individual response mechanism.5 Assuming that a 
mechanism has been specified, it is much simpler to analyze the change 
in a distribution of exogenous variables than it is to examine structural 
change, since the number of cases collected in any one time period t is 
typically much larger than the number of time periods . 
A simple example will suffice to make this concept clear. Suppose a 
researcher in the year 2084 is interested in studying the effects of a 
presidential resignation on the structural weight of feelings of political 
efficacy in an individual response mechanism for turnout in an election. 
Suppose that the individual researcher posits a mechanism of the form of 
4. We shall return to the Abramson and Aldrich article frequently, for aevereJ reasons. First, 
it is one of the latest articles to treat the subject of decline of turnout, and hence incor--
pora tes to a large extent the findings of previous researchen. Second, and more important-
ly, it is also a classic example of an approach which is completely oblivious to the difference 
between what we have termed behavioral response models and correlational analysis. 
5. The most common type of individual response mechanism familar to political scientists 
is that generated by utility maximization. Given the existence of a ut ility function, an indi-
vidual will make choices as if he were maximizin8 this function. O!ten this function is 
parametrized by certain weights, or what we have called the structural parameters of the 
individual response mechanism. Some work has been done in econometrics on lft.ructural 
ch6.!l8e in individual response mechanism models, (see Heckman (1981)), but it is much too 
complicated t o present here. 
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(2 .1.1), and that he has data for elections from 1952 to 2080.6 Let 
Vf3, = f3t - f3t -I· Then the researcher tests the equation 
where Rt is a dummy with a value of one if a president resigned in the last 
four years and zero otherwise. While this example is simplistic 
(presumably a researcher would use other methods to analyze structural 
change), it is clear that the analysis of structural change is a) possible 
and b) virtually unused in political science. For comparisions over time, 
however, structural change must be taken into account. Furthermore, 
the individual response mechanism must be correctly specified to make 
correct inferences, as the following example makes clear. 
Suppose (2.1.1) is the true relationship between y~ and xit. f1t and 
11.u, but under the impression that we do not need to explain all variation 
in y~ but only some part of it. we estimate 
(2 .1.2) 
instead of (2 .1.1 ). Then the relationship between the expectations of it 
and f3t when (2.1 .1) and (2.1.2) are estimated by ordinary least squares is 
well-known (see Maddala, 1981. p 461, for example), and is simply 
where A is the matrix with entries made up of Cov(zlkt•z-w). and B is the 
matrix with entries made up of Cov (zikt .x-w ), where the double subscripts 
6. Given the present level of commitment to funcl.iJ18 of the American National Election Stu-
dies, a non-zero probability must be assigned to this event. 
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iJc and i1 indicate particular elements of the z and x vectors.? A simple 
example with two variables will indicate the nature of the results we may 
expect with estimating (2.1.2) instead of (2.1.1). For two time periods 
t = 1~2~ let x, = (xu~x2,) and z, =(xu). Then we have 
and 
Thus a change between 7\ and r2 may occur because of several reasons. 
First, the f3il may have changed (and this is presumably what the 
researcher who wants to examine only change in turnout would wish to 
Cov (x, 1 ,x,2) claim) . Second, the P22 may have changed. Third, VI ( ) may have a.r l:.t2 
also changed; that is, the relationship between the predictor variables 
may have changed. The lesson we may infer from this is clear: If we a.re 
examining change over time it is im:portant that we specify the model 
completely or offer convincing evidence that the omitted variables are 
independent of the variables in the estimatian. 
Unfortunately, researchers such as Abramson and Aldrich do not 
heed this lesson. Specifically, they state (footnote 20) 
7. We are assui'I'ling the t the vectors ( y,;; ,.:rv I Zv I Uv) are independently and identically dis-
tributed for all obseTVations and all i, a common assumption when data is obtained by sam-
pling instead of e:zperimental control (see White, ( 1982)). If the X and z are assumed to be 
non-random, the matrices of population moments would replace the matrices of covari-
e.nces. 
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ln examining these trends over time, we do not present change 
among each efficacy level with controls for level of education. 
Cassel ( 1981), in a discussion an earlier version of this article 
(Abramson and Aldrich (1981)), argues that by not including 
level of education in our analysis we have not specified our 
model adequately. We disagree. lncluding education would be 
necessary if our goal were to explain all variations in turnout 
during the postwar years, but our goal is to account for the 
decline [their emphasis] of turnout . 
But as we have seen in the above simple example, one cannot drop 
variables and then justify that procedure as an analysis of change rather 
than all variation. Unless Abramson and Aldrich sincerely believe that 
turnout is simply a function of partisan identification and efficacy (and 
that footnote indicates the contrary), they will not be able to sort out the 
effects of distributional change of one particular variable from, among 
other things, distributional change in other variables, a change in 
structural weights, or a change in the population covariances between 
two set of variables . 
As an indication of how these changes can be confounded, consider 
Abramson and Aldrich 's Table 2 (p 509). They fit the equivalent of the 
equation (their equation (3)) 
to all white respondents for each election year between 1960 and 1980. 
Here, Yv is one if the ith respondent in the tth year voted, zero if he did 
not, J.l..t is the constant, Pv is a variable coded two if the i&h respondent in 
the tth year is a strong identifier with some party, one if he identifies 
weakly with a party or leans towards a party, and 0 if he is an 
independent. p, is then the structural or behavioral weight of the effects 
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of partisanship upon turnout . Their results for this equation are 
presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Probit Estimates of the Relationship between Strength 
of Party Identification and Turnout, 1960-1980 
(taken from Abramson and Aldrich, Table 2) 
Constant in Election Year 
Slope in year 
• •• p < .05. p < .01. 
•• . 670 • 
. 385 • 
. 366 •• 
. 127 •• 
. 119 •• 
. 113 
. 240 •• 
.368 
.363 • 
. 442 •• 
. 481 •• 
. 478 
388.8 ( Xf1 ) •• 
9386 
( Significance measured for J.L's from J.Leo 
for J.L64 to J.Lao 
and for {J's from f36o 
for f!e4 to f3ao) 
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As Abramson and Aldrich put it (p 509), "the strength of partisan 
affiliation is strongly and positively related to turnout in each election, 
and this relationship has grown over time ." Examining Table 2.1, though, 
can any political scientist really believe that partisan identification was 
twice as important for turnout in 1980 as in 1960 (a coefficient of .478 as 
opposed to .240)? If we accept these structural weights as summaries of 
the behavioral propensities of certain sub-groups in the population to 
engage in a behavior, this is basically what is being claimed here. Another 
interpretation, aside from the claim of an increasing strength of 
relationship between partisan identification and turnout, is that a third 
variable, correlated with both the constant term and partisan 
identification, has been changing over time, and that this has produced 
the change in the structural coefficients. With the model we will 
introduce in the next section, we will see that the strength of partisan 
identification and its relationship to turnout, in the model we use, has 
undergone almost no change. 
2 . 2 1he Cand:iiional Motivational .Pro bit Model 
Consider the individual who is faced with the following situation. 
First, there are two sides or choices of actions available to the individual 
associated with this situation, with the two actions being opposed to one 
another. Furthermore, the individual's motivation to engage in one 
action or the other lies along an underlying dimension of motivation to 
help one side or another, with neutrality lying at the zero point of 
motivation. Also. there are thresholds that must be passed by each 
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individual if his underlying motivation is to be translated into action. 
An example of this would be a civil war, in which the diametrically 
opposite actions are fighting with the rebels or fighting with the 
government forces. An individual would lie along the underlying 
dimension, either towards the side of joining the rebels or joining the 
government forces. The thresholds that the individual would have to pass 
indicates the point that motivation is turned into action. It is presumed 
that this threshold effect occurs because at the point where action is 
chosen over no action the cost to the individual (and here cost is used in 
a broad sense, encompassing such things as psychic cost), between 
choosing the action and not choosing the action is the same. 
For our general exposition, then, we assume there exists an 
underlying dimension of motivation, and that an individual's motivation, 
y •, is distributed along this dimension. We assume that the form of the 
relationship between y •, the individual's motivation, and a set of 
exogenous variables x and their weights (:J may be written as 
y•=x(:J+u, 
where 
fJ = {J(z ,7'), 
where 1 is some set of weights indexing z. The set z can be thought of as 
variables which have an effect on an individual's motivation, by either 
depressing or increasing the effects of the exogenous variables x. Such 
attributes as feelings or personality states would be prime candidates for 
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such variables . In the case which we will use for our empirical estimation, 
we will let 
(J(z ,;) = (z ;){3. 
The rule for motivation being translated into behavior is as follows . 
We assume there are three possible actions ; A, B and do nothing. If the 
underlying level of motivation y • is greater than some point a 2 , A is 
performed, if it is less than a 1, B is performed, and if it is at or between 
those two points, nothing is done . It is also presumed that the subset of 
z afiecting a 1 and a 2 is w, indexed by')', so that 
and 
or, in the usual case of a linear effect, 
and 
The interpretation of the a's may be made in terms of cost-such an 
interpretation is made in Chapter 5. 
The likelihood function for the conditional motivational probit model 
is easily written down, under our assumptions. There are three 
categories where an individual might be classified .8 For ease of notation, 
8. There may be more than tlu-ee categories, and the extension is immediate and obvious. 
For examp]e, in our civil war example, there couJd be five categories, ordered aa follows: 
fight with the rebels, provide material aid to the rebels, do not.h.ing, provide material aid to 
the government, fight with the government. The concept of orderi.ng might well be con-
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let cx3 = +oc and ao = -oo. Let y = 1 if action A is taken, y = 2 if no action 
is taken, and y = 3 if action B is taken. Let Fa be the cumulative 
distribution function of the error term u (we assume F has a continuous 
distribution). Then the probability of any action y, for y = 1 ,2,3. is 
simply 
Pr ( y = c l.:r ,z ,p,;) = Pr ( ac > y > ac-l j.:r ,z ,p,; ), 
= Pr [ ac(w,)') > .:rp(z ,;) + u 
-Pr [ .:rp(z,;) +u > ac(w,)') ]. 
(2.2.1) 
We will assume the simpler linear interactive specification for the efiects 
of the zi 's, as given above . In this case, then, 
Pr ( y = c j.:r ,z ,p,;) =Fa[ (w)')CXc - (z ;)x P] 
let 
Zjc = 1, Y = C 
llidered to e:z:ist here, and be conwtiona] upon the same variables as the three category 
modeL 
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= o. y # c 
The likelihood may thus be written as 
L(y ,X ,z ,{3,1) = fi fi 
i=l c=l 
{F.[ (wy)o.. - (z-r):z:{J] 
The log of the likelihood function is then 
- F0 [ (wy)O..-t - (z-r):z:fJ ]l (2.2.2) 
Due to the multiplicative nature of the z 1 upon the x 's and the w-y upon 
the a's, we put a constant one, with weight one, in both the z 's and the 
w's. 
2.3 Selection of Data and Outline of Analysis 
Most scholars who have attempted to analyze the decline in turnout 
in American national elections have used the American National Election 
Studies (ANES) from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center 
(SRC) . The main reason for doing this. of course, is that the ANES provide 
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the only source for examining the attitudinal correlates of turnout at the 
individual level. and implicit in most political behavior research is the 
presumption that a change in attitudes (particularly the increase in 
cynicism towards and disillusionment in government and the decline in 
partisanship) have resulted in the decline in turnout.9 In order to address 
the same issues which other researchers have, we will also use the ANES. 
Four types of variables need to be specified for the motivational 
probit model which we outlined in the proceeding section. The first 
variable we need to specify is the dependent variable. For our 
motivational model, we need two actions which lie on ~pposite ends of a 
motivational continuum, with no action lying between the thresholds 
which motivation needs to surpass for any action to take place. The 
obvious actions, then, are a Republican vote at the negative end of the 
continuum of motivation and a Democratic vote at the positive end of the 
continuum, with no action lying between those two actions . Theoretically, 
we should have an axis of motivation for each particular office for which 
the individual is casting a ballot, and an approach for this method 1s 
worked out in Chapter 5.10 In this examination, though, we will use the 
9. One exception is the Ferejohn and Fiorina study (1979), which concludes that the decline 
in turnout closely tracks the decline in concern ("Generally speak:i.ng, would you say that 
JIOU persona1L11 care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that 
you don't care very much which party wins?"). Still, it can be claimed (see Abramson and Al-
drich, p 519), that the concern variable and partisanship are closely intertwined, and hence 
the true decline is in attitudinal variables. While our analysis does not look at concern per 
se, it looks at another variable which one would expect to play much the same role, the vari-
able we will caD CAND. 
10. The main difficulty with estimating multiple offices is that treatment of the cost (which 
is represented in our model by t.he a's) becomes quite complicated, as the voter who turns 
out to vote for one office suddenly finds it much cheaper to vote for another office. Ou:r u.e 
of the presidential vote onJy amounts to an assumption that an individual's vote for 
president represents the most important reason for his decision to turn out, and that the 
model is not biased by the motivations for other races. 
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presidential vote as the object of motivation which produces turnout. 
The next set of variables which we need to specify are the variables 
which produce motivation. We use an adaptation of the decision rule first 
postulated by Kelly and Mirer ( 1974), utilizing the sum of the open-ended 
questions as to the likes and dislikes (or reasons for voting for or against) 
the presidential candidates to create a variable called CAND. The CAND 
variable was first used in Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954). It is 
constructed by using responses to the question "Is there anything in 
particular about (candidate) for president) that might make you want to 
vote (for/against) him?". The number of responses (there may be up to 
five in all SRC's survey's during an on-year except 1972, when there were 
three) for liking the Democratic candidate are added to the number of 
responses for disliking the Republican candidate, and then the number 
for disliking the Democratic candidate and liking the Republican 
candidate are added together and this number subtract from the first 
number. The number may thus run from -10 to 10. 
Having obtained CAND, we then code the seven-point partisan 
identification scale into seven zero-one dummy variables (called strong 
Democrat, weak Democrat, independent Democrat, independent, 
independent Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican), with 
strong Democrat being a one if the individual indicates (through the ANES 
questions) that his partisan affiliation is strongly Democratic (on the 
seven-point scale), and if the value of CAND is zero (the same is done for 
the other six dummy variables also) . The reasons for doing this are 
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several-fold. First, as Kelly and Mirer suggested, an excellent pattern of 
prediction is achieved if one looks at the sign of the CAND variable and, if 
that is zero, then use the individuals partisan affiliation to bFeak ties . 
The second reason is explicated in some detail in chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. and that is the observation that CAND and the vote are, in 
some sense, the same variable.11 
Of course. CAND is obtained prior to the election. whereas one's vote 
choice is obtained after the election. Thus , CAND is causally antecedent 
to the vote, and should not be correlated with the disturbance term for 
the vote. A sensible way of viewing CAND and the vote (and feeling 
thermometers, for that matter-see Chapter 4). is that an individual is 
sampled in several different ways about his attitudes and intentions 
towards the candidates, and at different times . While the instruments are 
somewhat different. all allow for a great deal of leeway in answering. 
Thermometers allow for a continous mark, CAND for an open-ended 
responding, and the vote for a one-zero binary decision on one's 
evaluation of the candidate. It is not surprising that the individual 
displays a great deal of consistency in answering all three types of 
instruments. 
The reason for including CAND. then, is that as a casually antecedent 
variable it satisfies the statistical requirements of our model and as the 
11 . The technice.] result from che.pter 4 is the.t i!, as in e. random utility rn.uimize.tion 
model, the vote is assumed to represent an underlying ve.rie.ble which represents the 
difference in utility in voting for two ce.ndide.tes, the continous varie.ble represented by 
CAND e.nd the underlyill8 ve.rie.ble for the vote are produced by the 11e.me random utility 
Inllximize.tion model. Thus, CAND e.nd the underlying variable which is presumed to ae~ 
ere.te the vote are the same ve.riable under this framework. 
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sum of open-ended responses it allows a determination of how the 
distribution of reasons for voting for or against the presidential 
candidates has changed. Presumably CAND is generated in part by 
partisanship, yet it must also be generated in part by the individual's 
assessment of reality (which is no doubt influenced by his partisan 
commitment). We lmow partisanship has declined, but the distribution of 
the CAND variable need not have changed, for instead of partisanship 
being the impetus behind the CAND variable, a concern over issues (as 
postulated by many writers, most specifically Nie, Verba and Petrocik 
( 1976)) may have replaced it. On the other hand, the decline of 
partisanship may have resulted in a decline of the CAND variable, and we 
may also test for that. The other measure of partisanship we have 
affecting motivation are the dummy variables, and effects on the decline 
in partisanship may be also be obtained from them. 
The next set of variables that we need to specify are the variables 
(which we have referred to as z) modifying the variables (the % 's) which 
are assumed to create the underlying motivation. These are variables 
which are assumed to affect all motivational variables. The one clear 
choice, since it is one of the main two choices of Abramson and Aldrich 
and we wish to test their analysis under a model which we feel is more 
correctly specified, is the variable derived from the two questions which 
are sometimes referred to as external political efficiency.12 Two one-zero 
dummies were created out of these two questions, with the variable low 
12. The two questions are "I don't think public officials care much what people lilce me 
think" and "People like me don't have much say about what the government does." 
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efficacy being coded as a one if the individual responded with a low 
efficacy response (agreement is a low efficacy response) scored on both 
questions and the variable medium efficacy being coded as a one if the 
individual responded with a low efficacy response on one question and a 
high efficacy question on another variable. The reference category was 
thus high efficacy responses on both questions, or a high efficacy person. 
The last set of variables we need to specify are the variables which 
modify the thresholds at which motivation is translated into action. The 
obvious choice for this is the variable which has the greatest zero-order 
correlation with voting, the variable derived from the questions which 
make up attitude toward the voting process. 13 The usual (see Campbell, 
Converse, Miller and Stokes ( 1960), p 1 05) four-point scale was created 
from these questions (zero being the highest duty and four being the 
lowest), and dummy variables were created. High duty was coded one if 
an individual had a score of one on the duty scale, medium duty was 
coded one if an individual had a score of two on the duty score, and low 
duty was coded one if an individual had a score of three or four on the 
duty scale (due to the small number of individuals having scores of three 
or four). The reference category was thus those individuals having very 
high duty. The rational behind using duty is that it would seem that its 
operation embodies psychic cost--an individual who has a strong sense of 
13. The questions used are 1) "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party 
doesn't have a chance," 2) "So many other people vote in the national elections that it 
doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not," 3) "I! a person doesn't ca:re how an elec-
tion comes out he shouldn't vote in it," 4) "A good many local elections lll"en't important 
enough to bother with." 
31 
"citizen duty" pays a high cost for not turning out in an election, whereas 
one with a weak sense pays little cost. 
These are the variables, then, which are used to analyze turnout for 
each year, being estimated according to equation (2.2.1). There remains 
the matter of estimating the amount of change which has occurred from 
year to year, and separating out what we have called structural and 
distributional change. There are several ways to do this . First, to 
separate out structural from distributional change, we may do the 
following. We may take the distributions of exogenous variables from one 
year, say 1960, and place them in the conditional motivational probit 
from another year, say 1980. We then obtain predictions for turnout for 
each individual voter in 1960 based on the conditional motivational 
probit weights for 1980.14 The di.t!erence in these two predictions is the 
amount of structural change which has taken place (which can either be 
positive or negative) . The remaining amount of change is distributional. 
and it may be calculated as follows . First, we may take the entire 
distribution from one year (say 1980), and then change the distribution 
of one variable from that distribution to that of another year (such as 
1960). We then calculate the predicted actions of the individuals with 
that distribution, and compare it with the old one. In that manner, we 
can obtain estimates for each individual variable for distributional 
14. These predictions are made usin8 the maximum likelihood estimators obtained from 
maximizing equation (2 .2.2) and then using them in equation (2.2.1), which gives the proba-
bility of any particular individual with a certain set of (z ,z) voting for a Democratic 
presidential candidate, a Republican presidential candidate, or not voting. Two methods are 
then available for rna~ predictions. The first is classifying the individual accordin& to the 
action with the maximum probability. The second is averfi8in& the probability for each ac-
tion over aTI groups. We will use both methods. 
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change, under the new structural regime. 
A word might be made here about the method of prediction used by 
Abramson and Aldrich. They basically estimate three different models for 
examining the effect of partisanship on turnout. 15 
.Pr ( Yu = 1) = ~(J.L + fJPu) (2 .3.1) 
.Pr ( Yu = 1) = ~(J.Lt + fJPit) (2.3 .2) 
.Pr ( Yu = 1) = ~(J.Lt + fJtPv) (2 .3.3) 
Here Yv is once again one if the i"' individual in the tth year voted (while 
P-u is his partisan strength), while J.Lt and Pt are year specific constants, 
with Pt constrained to be fJ in (2.3.2) for all years and both Pt and J.Lt 
constrained to be fJ and J.L for all years in (2.3.1) . The simplicity of even 
the most general model for relating partisanship and turnout has its 
drawbacks: to quote Abramson and Aldrich (footnote 15). 
Since the estimates reported here predict that citizens in all 
categories of the independent variable in each election year 
have a higher probability of voting than abstaining, all are 
predicted to vote . Thus, such measures as the percentage of 
case predicted correctly are irrelevant. 
We will not comment on the irrelevancy of the percentage of cases 
predicted correctly as a means of measuring change between years, but 
rather will look at the procedure they use. Their choice for predicting the 
proportion of cases is to use the proportion predicted in each category of 
15. And similar models for efficacy and a set of similar models for both together, but since 
our point can be made with this one set of models we restrict ourselves to it. 
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the independent variable for equation (2 .3.1) times the number of 
observations in that category. Equation (2.3.1), when using their 
estimates of the (3 , gives proportions of 60 percent of the independents 
vote, 75 percent of the weak or independent partisans vote, and 86 
percent of the strong partisans vote. From putting in the distributions 
from each year, they graph predicted turnout against actual reported 
turnout from the ANES from 1960 to 1980, and (in their Figure 1), obtain 
a drop in predicted turnout of only 2.3 percent. As actual reported 
turnout drops 10.2 percent between 1960 and 1980, this implies to them 
that "approximately 30 percent of the drop in voting can be attributed to 
the decline in Pv ." 
Taking their method one step further, however, suppose we use 
model (2.3 .3) to obtain our predictions from, a model which Abramson 
and Aldrich state (footnote 1 7) is a significant improvement over model 
(2 .3.1) (a x 2 of 68.0 (ex> 0.999), by Aldrich's test) . If we use (2.3.3), and 
use Abramson and Aldrich's proportion method, we find that predicted 
turnout exactly matches actual turnout, so that by their methodology, 
their best model explains exactly 100 percent of the decline in turnout . 
Naturally, there is a problem, since if the counterpart of (2.3.3) for 
efficacy is used, it too predicts the decline in turnout 100 percent. The 
only justification Abramson and Aldrich give for using .equation (2.3 .1) 
"Equation (1) [(2 .3.1)] is the most direct test of the hypothesis ." Perhaps 
it is. It does seem strange, however, to use a method of prediction, which, 
when used with a statistically superior model. gives results which are 
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nonsense. 
2.4 A Corn.parision of Selected Elections from 1960 thrrrugh 1980 
Given the basic set of variables discussed in the last section, we 
estimated the equation (2.2.1) using the ANES data for each of the years 
1960, 1972, 1976 and 1980. The years 1964 and 1968 were omitted, as the 
questions used to derive the duty scale were not asked in those two years. 
The method of estimation was by maximum likelihood; a modified 
Newton-Ralphson algorithm was used.16 All analyses on the conditional 
motivational probit models were done with unweighted data. Cases were 
excluded on the basis of missing data on the duty, efficacy, open-ended 
questions regardi.ng likes and dislikes of the presidential candidates, 
partisan affiliation, and missing information on votes for presidential 
candidate (which could include refusals to give answers to who the 
respondent voted for). "Don't knows" on duty and efficacy were coded as 
providing a low duty or low efficacious response. Voters for third party 
candidates were also excluded, including voters for Anderson in 1980. 
16. It is possible to think of the procedure as l"Uil.Iting 8 probit of a dependent variable on a 
vector of exogenous variables :r, and then modifying this probit by a set of exogenous vari-
ables z. For 1960, 8 probjt program was run on the X variables, and upon convergence of 
that procedure (whlch is well-behaved-see Pratt (1981), for a proof of the concavity of the 
log likelihood of an n-chotomous probit), the Newton-Ralphson algorithm was expanded to 
both the X and z variables. This then converged in several more iterations. For 1960, 1972 
and 1976, the Newton-Ralphson procedure on both the X and z variables was run starti!J8 
from the 1960 coefficients. Convergence was achleved in several iterations for both 1972 
and 1976, but for 1972 the algorithm ''blew up." The 1972 program was rerun with slightly 
different coefficients and this time it converged in several iterations. The problem seems to 
be on an unconstrained Newton-Ralphson the coefficients can become too large for the pro-
gram to handle with numerical integrity. In general, several of the coefficients will become 
much larger in magnitude than their :final value, but usually the numerical accuracy of the 
computer is not exceeded and they return to a reasonable size after one errant iteration. If 
the numerical accuracy is exceeded, then the program can "blow up". 
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The results of the analyses are given in Table 2.2. The cases for 
analyses include both whites and blacks, as we have no a priori reason to 
expect blacks and whites to have different individual response 
mechanisms . As a check on this assumption, however, analyses for whites 
only were run for 1960 and 1980 and those results are presented in Table 
2.3. As can be seen from perusing both tables, there is essentially no 
structural difference between the two groups. 
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The coefficients in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are of the sign and magnitude 
that we might expect. 17 The shift in the duty coefficients has been the 
most pronounced, with the coefficient for high duty gradually increasing 
over time, plus the thresholds o: 1 and ~ increasing (since the very high 
duty individuals are the reference category, we would expect changes in 
the behavior of those individuals to be picked up in a shift away from 
zero by the thresholds) . Low duty has actually decreased over time, but 
given the small number of individuals in that category, this has little 
effect on the predicted number of individuals voting. The effects of the 
efficacy variables is also generally what one would expect, with medium 
efficacy reducing turnout less than low efficacy (except in 1960, when the 
order of magnitude is reversed, but the difference of the two coefficients 
is not statistically significant, having an asymptotic t-ratio of less than 
one) . Partisanship bounces around quite a bit, but given the small 
proportion of the sample, has little effect on final predictions . Certain 
anomalies which one might expect from historical knowledge of various 
campaigns crop up--one example being the nearly zero coefficient on 
those professing a weak Democratic allegiance in 1972. Finally, CAND 
takes on exactly the same weight in all four election years .18 
17. The Wald statistic is distributed as x2 with 15 degrees of freedom fo:r the overall Wald , 8 
degrees of freedom fo:r the {! Wald, 2 degrees of freedom to:r the T WaJd, and 3 degrees of 
f:reedo:rr. fo:r the 1 Wald. As indicated, each Wald is the X value fo:r a test of the null hy-
pothesis that fo:r the particular set of coefBs;ients, all coefficients a:re ze:ro. They a:re all 
.-ignificant at the .01 level o:r g:reate:r. The Jr' is a generalization of the McKelvey-Zavoina 
(1975) statistic of the same name, and if the conditional motivational p:robit model is es-
timated without the condtional variables (the ones associated with the T and the {j), 
reduces to that statistic . 
18. As mentioned before, in 1972 only th:ree :responses on the open-ended likes and dislikes 
were coded. Thus, the CAND variable in 1972 only varies from -6 to 6. As we will see late:r, 
however, nearly all of the CAND :responses fall between -6 and 6 in any case, so the airrrilarity 
of 1972 to the othe:r th:ree years is not unexpected. 
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What then may we say about the amount of structural change 
between 1960 and 1980? The easiest manner in which to address this 
question is to take the 1960 sample and examine the percent of 
individuals who would have turned out if they had had the 1960 
exogenous variables and the later years individual response functions . 
This is done in Figure 2.1 for the weighted 1960 sample, restricted to 
whites. The two methods of prediction mentioned before were utilized, 
the first method being classification on the basis of the action with the 
maximum probability and the second one being the average of the 
probabilities for each action. Both types of prediction show a drop of 
about fifteen percentage points for the 1960 white weighted sample. As 
the actual reported turnout from our sample is 81.47 percent,19 it can be 
seen that this method overestimates turnout quite a bit for the first type 
of prediction and overestimates it by a small amount for the second type . 
Thus, while it is not possible to get an exact estimate of the structural 
change, it is evident that it is quite extensive and probably accounts for 
almost all of the drop in turnout. Confirmation for that conclusion may 
be obtained by examining the efiects of the distributional change of the 
exogenous variables between 1960 and 1980, as the total change should 
be the sum of distributional and structural change. 
19. This differs slightly from the Abramson and Aldrich fi&ure (which was 83.3 percent), 
since we included the don't knows on the duty and efficacy questions and also becauae we 
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In our model we may look at change in four sets of variables: the 
variables dealing with attitudes of political efficacy, the variables dealing 
with attitudes towards the voting process (citizen duty), the variables 
dealing directly with the effects of partisan identification on the voting 
and turnout decision, and the variable which measures the respondent's 
attitudes directly on the presidential candidate, which probably is to 
some extent a function of partisan identification, but also is a function of 
other things . We are interested here in exploring distributional change; 
that is, change in the distribution of these variables which we have 
assumed to be exogenous to the voting decision and how they affect the 
decision to vote. We will continue with our weighted white sample from 
1960, and when using 1980 data, use only the white sample there, keeping 
once more in line with the Abramson-Aldrich results. 
We may look at duty first. The distribution of duty in 1960 among 
whites is as follows . The percent at the very highest level of duty was 
51.85 (zero on our scale of citizen duty), the percent at a high level of 
duty was 36.83 (one on our scale), the percent at a medium level of duty 
was 6.69 (two on our scale), and the percent at the lowest levels was 4.63 
(three to four on our scale). For 1980, the distribution was 50.92 percent 
at the highest level, 35.93 percent at the next highest level, 8.15 percent 
at a medium level, and 5.00 percent at the lowest levels . It seems 
manifestly clear that the distribution of duty, as noted many times 
before, has not changed. Thus there is no distributional change from a 
change in duty. 
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The next variable we look at is partisan identification, both through 
its direct effects in our seven dummy variables and its indirect effects 
through CAND. In Table 2.4 we present the distribution of partisan 
identification for those individuals who have a zero score on CAND for 
both 1960 and 1980 samples. The distributional differences between 
these two samples is once again minimal, so we may look for little change 
in voting and turnout patterns as a result of the direct changes in 
partisanship. As for indirect changes in partisanship, as refiected in the 
distribution of the CAND variable, we have plotted a frequency 
distribution or the 1960 CAND variable and the 1980 CAND variable in 
Figure 2.2. As can be seen, the distributions are once again very close. 
So the distribution of CAND has remained the same, even though the 
partisan content may have gone down.20 
20. Wattenberg ( 198 1) has given a good account of the increasing irrelevance of political 
parties in America; see also Killer and Miller (1976). Determ.i.nin8 the exact nature of the 
partisan content of the candidate evaluations is beyond the scope of this chapter! 
43 
Table 2.4 Partisan Identification for Those Scoring Zero on CAND, 1960 and 1980 
Variable Name Percent in 1960 
Stroll8 Democrat 2.3 
Weak Democrat 3.8 
Independent Democrat 1.2 
Independent 1.1 
Independent Republican 0.2 
Weak Republican 1.3 
Strong Republican 0.7 
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This leaves the variable efficacy as the only variable for which there 
may be distributional change. In 1960, according to our weighted sample 
of whites, 63.2 percent were at the highest level of external efficacy, 22.9 
percent were at a medium level of efficacy, and 13.7 percent were at the 
lowest level of efficacy. In 1980, only 34.7 percent were at the highest 
level. 33.9 percent were at a medium level, and 31.4 percent were at the 
lowest level. This is quite a difference in the distribution of this 
exogenous variable. To measure the effect of this distributional change, 
then, we need to estimate the predicted vote in 1980 with the distribution 
of efficacy in 1960, and subtract the predicted vote with the actual 
distribution of efficacy in 1980. This procedure, then, will give us a rough 
estimate of the effect of the change of efficacy on the change in vote. 
We would be less than honest if we did not mention some problems 
with this procedure. The main problem is what cases is one to change the 
efficacy variable on? Presumably efficacy is related to other variables in 
our sample and this new distribution should retain those relations. This 
is a difficult problem to solve and we will not attempt to do so here. 
Rather, we take the cases in the sequence as they appear, setting the 
efficacy variables until the frequencies in 1980 emulate the frequencies in 
1980. We also will estimate turnout with all values of efficacy set to their 
highest level. This will give us a maximum for the increase in turnout due 
to an increase in efficacy, and we can have perfect confidence in that 
figure as representing the maximum possible change in turnout due to 
distributional change of the efficacy. 
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When we do this, we obtain the following results. Call the method of 
classifying observations by predicting the behavior for which their is the 
greatest probability method one, and call the method of making 
predictions on the basis of probability averages method two. Then our 
baseline (predictions for 1980 using 1980 data) is 75.4 percent for 
method one and 68.1 percent for method two. When we set the efficacy 
frequencies equal to the 1960 figures, we get predictions of 77.6 percent 
by method one and 69.5 percent by method two, or an increase of around 
1.3 percent by each method ( 1.2 percent and 1.4 percent by method one 
and two, respectively). When we set all efficacy to the maximum amount 
possible, we obtain a prediction of 78.5 percent for method one and 71.0 
percent for method two, or around 3 percent. Given the nature of these 
figures. we are confident in concluding that the actual change in turnout 
given the change in the distribution of external political efficacy is 
considerably under 2 percent. 
2. 5 Conclusions 
The results of the previous sections seem clear, but deserve 
restating: the decline in turnout in the American public from 1960 to 
1980 has little or nothing to do with the distributional changes of 
different attributes but instead reflects structural changes in the manner 
in which citizens act with respect to those attributes . No attempt is made 
to explain the causality behind this strucutural change, and it may very 
well be related to the change in distributions of such variables as political 
efficacy, strength of partisanship, and more general attitudes such as 
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cynicism and generalized disaffection. The period under study has also 
been tumultuous. To quote Kousser, 
The period since 1960 also contains enough special 
circumstances to account for nearly any political phenomenon. 
The assassinations of the two Kennedys at times when both were 
popular and very likely to be nominated by the Democratic 
party; the profound dislocations caused by the most sustained 
attack on racisms in America's history; the travail of the 
country's least popular and least successful war since 1815 and 
its longest war ever; the deliberate subterfuge of presidents and 
their advisers about Indochina and Watergate and their later 
open defiance of large segments of informed and intense public 
sentiment; and the two huge spurts in energy prices and the 
extreme economic consequences of the OPEC cartel's actions-
no era of American history can match this one for a series of 
wrenching shocks to the national political consciousness. 
Is there any doubt that the manner in which individual's make decisions 
over political acts such as voting would change in such an environment? 
We mentioned earlier that we would provide some evidence that the 
decline in turnout has not been continuous from 1960 to 1980, and we 
Will use this to indicate some areas of future research. It is true that 
Table 801 ("Participation in Elections for President and U.S. 
Representatives: 1932 to 1980") of the 1982 United States Sta1istical 
Abstract indicates a decline in turnout steadily from 1960 to 1980. Table 
806, however, ("Participation in National Elections, 1964 to 1980"), asks 
individuals to self-report whether they voted or not, and according to 
this, there was no decrease or increase between 1976 and 1980. 
Furthermore, we now know there was an increase in turnout in 1982. The 
pattern of the decreases and increase from Table 801 is more interesting-
-there was a full 10.5 percent increase from the 1948 to the 1952 election, 
for example, and perhaps more importantly for the ANES period, the 
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largest decreases were from 1968 to 1972 and 1972 to 1976 (the ANES 
data show an increase from 1972 to 1976 among whites). both on self-
report (Table 806) and estimated proportion from the population (Table 
801). These two periods were the periods when some of the most brutal 
of the events described by Kousser occurred-that there is a correlation 
seems obvious . It is to the etiects of external political events on the 
methods by which voters make decisions that those interested in political 
behavior should turn, which, as indicated in the text. will not be a simple 
matter. It is one well worth the undertaking , however. 
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Chapter m: Presidential Coattails: A StructuralllotiYation 
The supposed recent disappearance of coattails in American Federal 
elections, (Cook, 1976), 1 and its reappearance in the 1980 elections 
(Buchanan, 1980),2 is a political mystery of the first order. For scholars 
writing before the 1980 election, the decline of what is considered 
"coattail" voting has either elicited no explanation from political 
scientists (Kritzer and Eubank (1979)), or been blamed as a consequence 
of the increase insulation of incumbents from electoral effects (Burnham, 
1975) . While it has been shown that the connection of the presidential 
and congressional vote has been decreasing over time, with the lowest 
I 
level of connection in the post-war period (Calvert and Ferejohn (1980)), 
the relationship of this fact to the behavior of the individual voter is not 
at all clear. In this paper, then, we will show that previously offered 
explanations for the motivations for coattail voting are not supported by 
the evidence from the 1980 election and that the dirnunition of "coattail" 
voting has, in all probability, not occurred. Rather, we will show that the 
motivation of the individual voter includes a desire by the voter to 
increase the chances of obtaining the policy goals he desires , and that 
this motivation creates what is usually referred to as "coattail" voting. 
There exist in the literature at least three suggested motivations 
behind the individual voter's propensity to engage in coattail voting, 
1. "There were no coattails to speak of in the 1976 presidential elections." (p 3135). 
2. "The apparent national shi!t to the right combined with a variety of scandals, compla-
cency by 110me incumbents and unwrua1ly strong coattails from Ronald Reagan gave the 
Democrats a net loss of 33 House seats." (p 3317) . 
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which may be roughly characterized as the personal charm, the interest, 
and the candidate evaluations motivations.3 The personal appeal, or, as it 
is sometimes referred to, the personal charm motivation, has been 
summarized by Miller (1955), as "the magnetism of the presidential 
candidate which can be translated into the sort of allegiance which 
commands the voter to do his bidding and gives support to his cohorts 
who follow him on the ballot". 
It must be said, though, that there are problems with the notion of 
"personal charm". By anyone's casual observation, the most charming 
and charismatic presidential candidate of the post World War Two years, 
John F. Kennedy, provided no coattails for his party (and, in fact, he ran 
behind the Democratic congressional vote):' Miller also uses "appeal", 
which is certainly more fitting, as we can easily convince ourselves that a 
candidate's appeal is a function of the criteria that political scientists 
usually associate with a decision to vote for a candidate-issue positions, 
candidate characteristics, long-term partisan dispositions. Appeal is also 
very close to the definition of coattails motivation referred to as 
candidate evaluations, so it may be that one cannot think of charm, 
interest and candidate evaluations separately.5 
3. Another theory, that of Kritzer and Eubank (1979), can be thoU&ht of as a mo<lliication 
of the interest, or "surge and decline" theory. They suggest that "very few party identifiers 
will vote for the other party's presidential candidate", whereas independents will, because of 
the low salience of presidential elections, vote for CoD&Tessman the way they voted for 
President. As they conclude that the data do not support this theory, we will not consider it 
specifically in what follows. 
4. This may be a subjective opinion, but Kritzer and Eubank, based on their own wbjective 
rank:ings of N~on , Johnson and Carter, also conclude "the magnetism explanation faila to 
account for recent electoral trends." 
5. We will endeavor, however, to test the presidential candidate charm theory in a way 
which dilfti.nguishes it from the interest and candidate evaluation theory. 
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The next suggestion for the individual's motivation for coattail voting 
is what we will call "interest" coattails, or those coattails produced by the 
fact that in a presidential campaign, the focus of the media is 
predominantly put upon the presidential candidates of both parties. 
Miller ( 1955, p 359) states it as follows, 
"In addition to measuring motivations relevant to the 
presidential and congressional elections, a third problem thus 
arises from the necessity to determine whether any of the 
motivations found to be focused on the congressional elections 
were in fact stimulated, activated or, if you will, produced by the 
presidential campaign. People exhibiting congressionally 
oriented motivations of this type, motivations which owe their 
existence to the presidential candidate, are just as clearly 
coattails voters as are their cohorts who give no evidence of 
motivations uniquely related to voting for congressional 
candidates." 
This theory has, on the surface, a plausibility which is missing from the 
personal charm theory. It is obvious that in an on-year election, the 
great bulk of the media attention and voter interest is directed towards 
the presidential race, to the detriment of coverage and interest in other 
races . Thus it would seem possible that motivations excited by the 
presidential race would affect the congressional race.6 
6. One point that seems to have been missed by political scientists is that if eJ.l of the atten-
tion is placed upon the presidential campaign, then the presidential candidates have greater 
control of the agenda of national politics, ao to speak. Thus the presidential candidates of 
both parties have an opportunity to place a large range of issues on the national agenda 
which could have an impact upon coll8ressional contests. Indeed, when one thinks back to 
the campaigns since the end of the war, the surface plausibility of this type of motivation 
~teems stroll8, since one would e:z:peci the BtroD8est coattails effect when the individual was 
either strongly identified with a party or ran a campaign which was }righly partisan. Both 
the 1946 and 1960 elections were very close, but e:z:clucliJ18 them. the two elections which on 
ce.sua1 observation had large coattail effects involved Johnson. who was a loiJ8time Demo-
cratic Senator, and Reagan, who ran a highly partisan campaign. Eisenhower, on the other 
hand, was soU&ht after to be the nominee of both parties, Nixon allowed the Democrats to 
fiBht amo!l8 themselves in 1966 without raising the one issue which would have had lri&hlY 
partisan content, ran completely independently of his party in 1972, and Carter ran as an 
outsider and, indeed, captured the nomination completely independently of the Democratic 
Party's elite. The problem with such Qd hoc theorizing, of course, is that one needa to look 
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The third type of motivation, apparently first suggested by Moreland 
(1973) (though very similar to the appeal theory posited earlier). is that 
of positive candidate evaluations creating a coattails effect. As Moreland 
puts it, "the coattails phenomenon appears when the positive 
identification with a presidential candidate is carried over in the 
evaluation of other candidates of the same party, with the assumed result 
that these candidates gain votes they would not otherwise receive" (p 
171). Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) phrase it in the following manner, 
"Of course, this dependence [of the congressional vote on the 
presidential vote] might be based on factors directly 
attributable to the presidential campaign or on factors more or 
less extraneous to it. For example, partisan affiliations and 
reactions to the general economic situation could induce a 
certain correlation between the electoral results at the 
presidential and congressional levels, having little to do with the 
candidates for presidential office. On the other hand, 
evaluations of the attributes of the presidential candidates 
(including their issue positions) might have a direct effect on 
voting for congressional candidates independently of the effects 
of party, the general economic situation or other factors. It is 
this direct effect which is sometimes called the 'coattail' vote." 
This motivation, then, focuses on the voter's evaluation of the 
presidential candidate and assumes that it directly affects the 
congressional vote in the case of coattails. 
We can classify all three of these hypotheses of motivation as 
magnitude motivations, i.e ., the more the person feels about a 
presidential candidate or candidacy (charmed, interested or having a 
for date to back up one's assertions, and arguments could be made with all of the 
classifications made above. Still, we will present evidence later on in this paper that the 
effect we have proposed in this :footnote may indeed be present. 
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positive evaluation), the greater is his motivation to support the 
congressional candidate of the party for which he casts his presidential 
vote. 1t is not clear why any of these motivations should have an effect on 
the voting behavior of the individual. Certainly, from the standpoint of a 
government which is able to enact effective policies in a timely manner, it 
is desirable to have a legislative and executive branch under the control 
of the same party. Why should the individual be concerned about this, 
however? One immediate answer is that when the different branches are 
under the control or ditrerent parties, those effective and timely policies 
become much less likely. Thus. if the individual values the 
implementation of effective policies, he will have a desire to see that both 
the legislative and executive branches are under the control or the same 
party. One way tor him to implement his desire is to associate his vote 
for the different offices. This explanation, of course, has nothing to do 
with the magnitude for a presidential candidate; rather, it is a motivation 
related to his choice of presidential candidate (or congressional 
candidate. for it is clear this type of motivation is symmetric). 
In addition to the three hypotheses of motivation suggested in the 
literature, then, we suggest a fourth hypothesis, that of the desire of the 
individual to achieve desired policies by associating his vote for one office 
with another in order to overcome the lack of cooperation implicit in the 
Federal system. We thus posit the existence of a tendency for the voter 
to associate votes for different Federal offices in order to increase 
cooperation by office-holders of the same party. It is this tendency that 
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we will refer to as the structural motivation of coattails. The suggestion 
of the voter's cognizance of the separated nature of the Federal system 
as being the motivation behind coattails is new, and we need to offer some 
motivation as to why it might be a reasonable criteria for a elector to 
consider in his voting decision. 
Any discussion of coattails must acknowledge the separation of 
powers with which the Federal government was created and still 
maintains, to an amazing degree, today. The reason for this deliberate 
effort was perhaps best stated by Alexander Hamilton ( 1he Federalist, 
Number 60) 
The dissimilarity in the ingrediants which will compose the 
national government, and still more in the manner in which 
they will be brought into action in its various branches, must 
form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial 
scheme of elections ... the House of Representatives being to be 
elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State 
legislatures, the President by elector chosen for that purpose by 
the people, there would be little probability of a common 
interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for 
any particular class of electors. 
As is evident from the passage, one of the main concerns of the authors 
of 1he Federalist Papers was separating the influence of the three classes 
of electors by providing each one with a different office of the Federal 
system to vote for . Only in this way, was it thought, would one class of 
electors (with one set of interests) be prevented from dominating the 
government and produce the tyranny of the majority which was so feared . 
Actual history, of course, has taken a different turn from the system 
envisioned by the constitutional convention; not only do the common 
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voters participate directly in voting for President, Senator and 
Congressman, but there exists that other anathema of the authors of 1he 
Federalist Papers. parties, to guide the electors in their voting decision. 
The voter now has the choice, when entering the voting booth, to vote for 
an entire slate of individuals dedicated, to some degree or another, to 
cooperating in passing legislative programs. It is self-evident that if he 
votes for a President of one party and a Congressman of another party, 
he is lowering the amount of cooperation on a legislative program that 
those two, if elected, will engage in than if he votes for a President of one 
party and a Congressman of the opposite party.? Thus, even if a voter 
decides that a President of one party and a Congressman of another 
party are both more preferred by whatever criteria he employs in making 
his decisions, he may still vote for a President of one party and a 
Congressman of the same party simply because of the cooperation that 
the candidates for different offices may engage in.8 
7. This implicitly assumes that party is a valid label on whlch to judge cooperation with i~ 
d.ividuals of the other branches of the Federal government. While the decline of party dis-
cipline has been much lamented in recent years, this assumption is probably still accurate, 
though not to the degree that it once was (see Cumrn.i.n&s. (1966), pege 2 for a similar argu-
ment). Another possible objection is that the individu.al needs to take into account the 
composition of the House, say, when maki.ng his voting decision. It is obvious, tholJ&h, that 
even if the House was heavily Democratic and the voter desired to vote for a Republican 
President, this Republican President would have greater opportunity with an additional 
Republican Congressman than without one. 
8. This is not the place to enter into the debate over why people vote or whether it matters 
how they do vote. It should be noted, though, that there are a whole host of studies which 
indicate that people vote not only in accordance with what they perceive their own ~ 
terests, but perhaps more importantly, vote in accordance with what political scientists see 
as the voters' own interests. Thus, even if their reasons for going to the polls is a result of 
~me sociological or psychological process, there is ample reason to believe that they 
behave "rationally" once they are there. Another problem which we do not discuss is that of 
"strategic voting" {see Cain (1979)) for a discussion of this phenomenon). Strategic votil18 
ia votill8 against one's preferred candidate in favor of a less preferred candidate for reasons 
(usually) hav:in8 to do with the conte:zt that the election is held in (more than two candi-
dates, for e:zample). As will presently become c1ear, though, strategic voting, if it does exist, 
will not be a problem for our e:zamination. 
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We have set up the broad outlines of our research strategy, then. 
There exist four theories which purport to explain the motivation behind 
coattail voting, three of them very familiar, one of them new to this 
article. To examine the incidence of these four motivations we turn to 
the one complete data set dealing with both presidential and 
congressional elections, the 1980 American National Election Study. It is 
the task of developing the research strategy which will allow the 
examination of these four competing theories of coattails that we turn to 
in the next section. 
3.1 A 3im:ultaneous .lJBcision System. for Examining Coattail Voting 
In this section we consider a statistical model for coattails votizli 
which will allow us to test the four theories of the motivation behind 
coattails examined in the previous section. The advantages of the model 
we consider include the ability to distinguish between the various 
hypotheses of motivation for coattails voting while allowing the 
specification of voting models which are consistent with what is known 
about voting in congressional and presidential races. The only 
disadvantage is that it does not allow simultaneous estimation of turnout, 
but this is immaterial to the testing of hypotheses of the motivations 
behind coattail voting .9 
We consider a simultaneous equation system involving two 
9. As opposed to the overall effect of coattail votin£, where as Killer notes (p 388n.), TOten 
may be mobilized to go to the polls by a particularly attractive candidate. Thoae YOtera (the 
number of which one would guess would be low in the post World War Two period), are a• 
wmed to behave in the ~~ame manner as othu voten once they reach the polls. 
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underlying variables observed only discretely.10 Let y; and !/; be 
unobserved continuous variables and let y 1 and y 2 be observed if 
Y1 = 1 y; > a1 
=0 .< Y1 - a1, 
and 
Y2 = 1 • Y2 > a2 
=0 .< Y2 - a2. 
This is of course the probit specification (usually a 1 and ~ are set equal 
to zero) . Consider perhaps the most general simultaneous linear model 
with these probit variables, 
and 
As Schmidt (1981) shows, the model is internally consistent only if the 
following conditions hold: 
and 
10. Calvert and Fe:rejohn (1983) also considered a a simulataneous decision .,stem. but 
they assumed that the coattails effect was a resuJt of presidentJal evaluations . Our .,stem 
ia somewhat different in order to allow the testing of the four motivation hypotbeaea. 
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121/'12 = 0. 
Internally consistent in this context means that a given set of exogenous 
variables and disturbances yield a unique solution for the endogenous 
variables . Demonstration of these conditions in this set of equations 
depends upon a theorem of Schmidt, but the reason for such internal 
consistency conditions can be easily demonstrated with a simpler set of 
equations. l.et 
y~ = 12tY; + Xd31 + Et 
and 
y; = 11aY 1 + X2f12 + t2. 
Putting the expression for y; from equation (5.1.10) into the expression 
for y; in equation (5.1.11), we have that 
y; = 12t112Y1 + Xtf11 + 121X2f12 + 12tE2 + Et· 
Then, noting that y 1 = 0 if y 1 ~ a 1, we have 
Y 1 = 0 if 121t2 + t1 ~ a1 - XtfJt + 121X2f32 
and 
'111 = 1 if 121t2 + t1 > a1 - X1f31 + 121X2f32 + 721712• 
Clearly 721712 must equal zero for this to have a unique solution, and this 
condition is then the internal consistency condition for (5 .1.10) and 
(5.1.11) . 
Consider what (5.1.5) and (5.1.6) mean in a voting choice context. 
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Interpreting the underlying variable as the utility of a voting choice or as 
the desire to vote for one candidate, it is clear that there is no political 
interpretation for the underlying utility of a vote for a candidate to be a 
function of that actual vote itself .11 Thus 1u and 122 should be equated to 
zero. Once having done that, we are left with the three conditions to be 
satisfied: cS 1)'12 = 0, cS2121 = 0, and 1 12121 = 0. Before we attempt to decide 
how to satisfy these conditions, let us consider the interpretation of the 
endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the model. 
Consider the underlying variable y; first. Its usual interpretation is 
that of the desire to perform some dichotomous action (in this case, vote 
for one candidate). When y: is above a certain point (called a cutpoint), 
the action is observed (voting for a Democratic congressional candidate, 
tor example) . When y: is below that point, the action is not observed 
(not voting for a Democratic congressional candidate, which, if one 
restricts oneself to voters who voted and had only a choice of a 
Democratic or Republican congressional candidate, is equivalent to voting 
for a Republican congressional candidate). The interpretation of the 
value of y ~ as utility (or desire to perform an action) comes from the 
interpretation of the probit model as a random utility maximizer.12 While 
11. There are theories (see Hinich, 1981 in particular) which posit that the utility of a vote 
choice comes partia1Jy from voting for the winning can<Ddate, but that iB different from util-
ity for a can<Ddate being derived from a vote for that candidate . 
12. An individual is a random utility maximizer if he maximizes his utility subject to l!llOme 
random error term. In the probit case, let the utility of alternative one be 
u(llz,f!) = x~1 + e1 and that of alternative two be u(2lz.~) = zf32 + t2. Then u(l z ,fJ) - u (~ lz ,p) = z (~1 - {J2) + t 1 - t2 = z{J + u. This is, of course, the 
usual probh model. when we observe only indicators of utility (the choice or lack of choice) 
of.,l.he individual. Then the difference in u~ty between the two actions may be estimated by 
Z (J, which is a consistent estimator of y 1 . Thus the interpretation of the underlyin& vari-
able as utility. 
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y: is not observed, it may be consistently estimated from the pro bit 
equation. 
We will, in this paper, assume that the values of the underlying 
variables correspond to the magnitude of motivation for a candidate. If 
the equation is well specified, one would expect the values of the 
underlying variable to reflect what Moos (p 5) calls "the strong 
momentum generated by the presidential campaign". Whether one thinks 
of it as being generated by personal charm, interest, candidate 
evaluations or whatever, it is implicit in the formulation of either 
hypothesis that it is a magnitude effect, that is, the larger the magnitude 
of the motivation of the individual voter in the presidential race to vote 
for one candidate or the other, the larger the coattails effect. If we find 
that a large magnitude in a presidential race at!ects the choice of a 
congressional candidate, we will then need to inquire as to whether it is 
the appeal of the presidential candidate or the additional interest of the 
presidential campaign which is the motivation behind coattails voting. On 
the other hand, a small or non-existent effect will cast doubt on the whole 
hypothesis of any type of "momentum" generating coattails effects. 
Now consider the observed value of the underlying variable, ll 1, 
presumed to have been generated by the underlying variable y; in the 
manner described above. The interpretation of this variable is simply 
that of choice. If the effect of y 1 is significantly related to the choice of 
y 2 , this would be a.n indication of the validity of the assumption of the 
structural motivation for coattails, for then it would be the final choice 
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itself, which directs the coattail vote. In other words, independently of 
the motivation to vote for a presidential candidate (say), the fact of a 
choice for the presidential candidate resulting in a direct influence on 
the choice of a congressional candidate would be a a substantiation of 
the structural theory. 
Naturally, both or neither theory may be working in the electorate. 
Suppose neither was present. This would say, basically, that there were 
no coattails . If a strong effect was found of the effect of personal appeal 
on the votes for other offices but not on the actual choice, then this 
would indicate the appeal motivation was predominant and that the 
structural motivation was low or non-existent. A reversal of these results 
would indicate a reversal of the conclusion, whereas a strong effect from 
both would indicate that both theories would hold. They are not mutually 
exclusive, conceptually. 
To make operational the test of the theories we have proposed, 
however, we need to consider once again the constraints 61712 = 0, 
62121 = 0, and 7 12721 = 0. First, it is clear that either 721 = 0 or 712 = 0 (or 
both). Thus, intuitively enough, one cannot have a chain where one 
discrete choice predicts the other discrete choice which predicts the first 
discrete choice, etc. Set 721 = 0 and let 712 be non-zero. Then the 
condition 617 12 = 0 implies that 61 = 0. We have thus imposed a 
recursitivity on the system, which looks like the following : 
'II~ =XdJ1 + £1 
and 
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where both 62 and 1 12 may be non-zero. We will call this the structural 
model, since it is the only model which allows the presence of a discrete 
choice on the right-hand side of an equation and still satisfies the 
internal consistency conditions of Schmidt. 
Now, suppose we set 1 12 and 121 to zero. This then allows both 61 and 
~2 to be non-zero, making the formulas given in (5.1.5) and (5.1.6) to be 
and 
We will call this the momentum or motivational model, following the 
discussions in the proceeding paragraphs . Testing of these two models 
will thus allow us to determine which theory or theories, if any, best fit 
the behavior of voters in American Federal elections. 
3.2 1he Test of the 1hscrries: the 1980 ANES 
To test the theories proposed in the last section we turn to the 1980 
ANES. In the last section we proposed two basic models of possible 
congressional behavior, the momentum model and the structural model. 
The models differ in that the endogenous variables are assumed to enter 
in a different fashion in each, but both assume the entry of a number of 
exogenous variables in each . These exogenous variables are assumed to 
be related to the voting decision but not to be correlated with the error 
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term, playing the role of causal precursors which allow the calculation of 
the underlying desire to vote for a candidate for any individual voter. 
ln order to estimate a model such as (3 .1.15) and (3.1.16), or (3.1.17) 
and (3.1.18), the system needs to be identified. Identification of a system 
of simultaneous equations can be made by either covariance restrictions 
or linear (usually exclusion) restrictions, or a combination of both. Both 
type of restrictions work on the assumption that the researcher has prior 
knowledge on the nature of the problem which allows him to make the 
restrictions . In general, without a very well formulated theory, 
covariance restrictions are contraindicated, so we will not consider those 
here. Rather, we will use restrictions on the inclusion of exogenous 
variables . This requires that we know a) the set of variables which are 
assumed to be in both equations, b) the set of variables which are 
assumed to be in only the presidential race equation, and c) the set of 
variables which are assumed to be in only the congressional equation. 
Dealing with the presidential campaign first, then, in the context of 
one election, it is clear that in order to test "whether any of the 
motivations found to be focused on the congressional elections were in 
fact stimulated, activated, or, if you will, produced by the presidential 
campaign", we will need to decide upon a method of classifying those 
issues which are in some way stimulated by the presidential campaign 
and decide upon some way of letting them affect congressional races. We 
Will gain some help if we consider the fact that in every election except 
one since 1928, the President or Vice-president of the administration in 
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power at the time of that election was running for President (and in 1952, 
"Communism, Corruption and Korea" certainly related to the Truman 
administration). This ensures that the campaign will focus on the 
activities of the previous administration, and it is likely that most of it 
will focus on three factors of great importance in American politics, 
unemployment, inflation and war. Thus for issues facing the public which 
can be considered to induce motivations on congressional races from 
presidential races, these three and the public's perception of the 
incumbent administration's policy on them can be considered to be 
issues which have an indirect effect on congressional races through the 
presidential campaign, rather than a direct effect. For our estimation, 
then. we will use as variables unique to the presidential race the voter's 
judgment of the previous administration's policy on those three items, as 
evidenced by the voter's responses to the questions on whether the voter 
approves or disapproves of Jimmy Carter's performance on inflation, 
unemployment and the Iranian crisis (Iran was used because it dealt with 
a situation which was the closest to a war that the US was involved in 
during the Carter administration).13 
13. Questions were used as follows to create dummy variables used in the analyses. A typi-
cal question was the one on in1lation, question 197, "In general, do you approve or disap-
prove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling inflation'?" There would then be foUl" cateories of 
answer-approve, disapprove, don't know and not applicable. Two dummy variables would 
then be created, the first coded one i! the individual approved, zero otherwise, the other one 
if the individual disapproved and zero otherwise. The reference category would then be 
don't know. Analyses were run with both miss:i.ng data (the not applicable) included in the 
reference category (and hence those cases were left in the analyms), and with ce.aes with 
missing data e:zcluded. The results were comparable under both procedures, 110 that the 
analyses with the missing data included in the reference category are reported in th.ia paper. 
It would be e:zpected in any case that this type of procedure would reduce the me of the 
coefficient for the dummy variable with a reference category which included l1lissi.n& data. 
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The 1980 study is also unique in that it contains a number of 
questions about congressional races which had previously only been 
asked in the 1978 study, questions about such things as casework and 
issues in House races. The view of House races as largely party-oriented 
affairs (Stokes and Miller ( 1962)) has fallen by the wayside, thanks in 
particular to the 1978 ANES (Mann and Wolfinger (1980), Fiorina (1981), 
Yiannakis (198 1), Abramowitz (1980)). Instead, it is generally realized 
that casework in particular makes a difference, and may actually explain 
most of the phenomenon of the overwhelming advantage of incumbent 
congressmen in reelection contests ( see Erikson (1971) or Hinckley 
(1981) for a description of the incumbency advantage, Fiorina (1977) for 
a particularly strong argument that casework was responsible). For our 
purposes, this previous research indicates that variables such as 
casework and issues are important for a well-specified model of 
congressional elections . Therefore, variables such as contacts with the 
candidates and preference between candidates based on an issue in the 
congressional race were used. Dummy variables were also used for 
satisfaction with a contact with the incumbent candidate (a contact to 
express an opinion, inquire after information. or request help) and a 
dummy for incumbency. These then were the variables which were 
decided were unique to the congressional race. 
That leaves the variables which are assumed to influence both races . 
Immediately one thinks of long-term partisan identification, represented 
by the respondent's self-identified partisan identification. These were 
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coded as one-zero dummies for a strong Democrat, weak Democrat, and 
independent Democrat, and as one-zero dummies for strong Republican, 
weak Republican and independent Republican, the reference category 
being independent. Also, going back to the themes of inflation, 
unemployment and war, dummies were created for the questions relating 
to the respondent's beliefs as to which party was better on each of these 
themes, the reference category in each case being those who supposed no 
difierence or claimed not to know. Finally, sex and race were included in 
each equation, the former to pick up any of the much-remarked sex 
difference (see Public Opinion, (1981)), the latter to pick up any results of 
race .14 
Having chosen our variables, then, we turn to testing the momentum 
model, the results of which are shown in Table 3.1. Some explanation 
needs to be made for those unfamiliar with the simultaneous equation 
methods, particularly those involving probit estimation. Such a method 
requires estimation in more than one step, unless one is doing full 
information maximum likelihood. In this procedure, we use Amem.iya's 
principle ( 197 8), which requires a first stage estimation of the reduced 
form (the endogenous variable regressed on all of the exogenous 
variables). and then uses these reduced form parameters to solve for the 
parameters of the structural form (or, in this model, simply (3.1.17} and 
14. It is l.ilcely that the significant tendency of blacks to favor Democratic candidates (re-
ported later), even controlling for all the other factors that we have mentioned, pro:z:ies the 
fact that blacks as a group receive much greater benefits under Democratic adm.iniart.rations 
than Repubbcan ones. Thus, we are really pickin& up an economic effect by -.peci!yi:IJi 
blacks. 
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(3.1 .1 B)) by the method of linear regression. This method gives 
consistent estimates of the reduced form parameters and these 
estimates will be more efficient than the usual two-stage method (see 
Heckman ( 1978) for a description of those methods) if generalized least 
squares is used with Amemiya's principle. Therefore, there are none or 
the usual summary statistics available for the estimation of the 
structural equations (as there would be in a two-stage procedure), so we 
report the first stage statistics. For tests of significance of the 
coefficients, we use the usual procedure of dividing the coefficient by its 
asymptotic standard error to obtain what is called an asymptotic t-ratio 
(though it is asymptotically normally distributed). 
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The first conclusion we may draw from the data in Table 3.1 is that 
the momentwn model has no support. The coefficient for the underlying 
desire to vote for a Democratic President has no effect on the decision to 
vote for a Democratic Congressman, similarly, the coefficient for the 
underlying desire to vote for a Democratic Congressman has no effect 
upon the decision to vote for a Democratic President. Both of these 
coefficients are statistically insignificant (indeed, their asymptotic t-
ratio's are both one or less), but even if they were statistically significant, 
the size of the coefficients would indicate that they would not play much 
effect in changing the probability of a voter voting for one candidate or 
another. 15 
Another conclusion to be drawn from table 3.1 is that the model fits 
the data very well. The ffl is close to .8 in both models, and the rate of 
predicition is around 87% for the presidential race and 83% for 
congressional races (with misclassifications falling about equally between 
Democratic voters being classified as Republican voters and Repbublican 
voters being classified as Democratic voters, for both types of race). The 
importance of the model fitting well for the purposes of testing the 
momentum model is that if the model does fit well, in terms of prediction, 
16. Obviously, not only the size of the coefficients but also the re.Il8e of the exogenous vari-
able must be considered. Calculation of the effect of an independent variable on the che.Il8e 
in probability in e. probit model is perhaps most eas:ily accessible in Wol.fin8er and Rosen-
8't.one (1980, p 121-123). Bas:ically, to obtain the overall increase in probability from the 
effect of one variable, they suggest usi.n8 the weights calculated in the probit to estimate the 
probability of an individual voting with the lowest possible category of the e:zogenous vari-
able, then his actual probability, and subtracting the former from the latter. Thia &ives a 
ch8118e in probability for every member of the population for that e:zogenous 'fllriable. 
Aggregation can then be made for any particular sub-group or the whole population. if one 
wishes. 
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we can have some confidence that we are really picking up the underlying 
desire to vote for a Democratic, President or Democratic Congressman16. 
That being the case. we can then be assured that we have given the 
momentum model a reasonable test. 
Other conclusions that might be drawn from the data and the 
estimations will not be pursued here, for the reason that we are 
attempting to test two competing theories of coattails .rather than 
examine the voter's decision calculus. We might note that in our sample, 
though, which excludes uncontested seats, Republican candidates for 
Congress actually gathered more votes than Democratic candidates for 
Congress (there were no seats with a Republican unopposed which were in 
the sample). Also. there is an asymmetric role of long-term partisan 
attachments in the voting for Congress and voting for President, with 
Democratic attachments playing a much greater role in voting for 
President and Republican attachments a much greater role in voting for 
Congress. Finally, both issues, contacts and (successful) casework make 
a difference in House races, substantiating the research quoted above. 
We turn next to testing the structural motivation model, given in 
equations (3.1.15) and (3.1.16). For this model, we are allowed to have 
only one endogenous variable on the right-hand side, which we will 
assume to be the presidential. This is in accord with the usual definition 
of the "choice of candidate for a major office [tending] to decide his final 
16. A voter is predicted to vote Democratic if ~ Xj Pj is greater than the cutpoint, and to 
vote Republican i! it is less than or equal to u{e cutpoint. These scores are, however, the 
lame ones which make up the underlyil)8 desire to vote instruments. 
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choices for minor offices" (Meyer, p 53) . Given the results of the previous 
model. we also set the coefficient on the underlying desire to vote for a 
Democratic President to zero. This leaves us with a model to estimate of 
the following form; 
y; =XdJ1 + &1 
and 
Y: = i'u~Y 1 + X2P2 + &2, 
where y ~ is the underlying desire to vote for a Democratic President, y 1 
is coded one if the respondent voted for Carter and zero if the 
respondent voted for Reagan, yi is the underlying desire to vote for a 
Democratic Congressman, and X 1 and X2 are the exogenous variables 
used above. 
The natural impulse in a case like this is to put in the vote for 
President in (3 .2.2) and estimate the model using a probit model. 
Unfortunately, y 1 may be correlated with the error term £2, so a direct 
substitution may result in biased estimates . The suggestion in the 
literature (Heckman) is to use an instrument, t(X1P1), for y 1, where t is 
the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. The 
problems with using an instrument is that one can lose a large amount of 
efficiency. The problem is resolved for us if we estimate (3.2.2) twice, 
once using y 1 and once using the instrument t(X1P1>· These results are 
reported in Table 3.2. 
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!'a'ble 3.2 Structura1 Model for Pres:identiaJ Coattails 
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The results of Table 3.2 makes it clear that y 1 is not correlated with 
the error term for (3 .2.2). as the coefficients for both y 1 and t(X1P1) are 
nearly identical. as are all other coefficients. This implies that inferences 
we draw from using the presidential vote in the (3.2.2) are as valid as 
those drawn from using the instrument (the instrument itself is nearly 
significant at the .1 0 level, having an asymptotic t-ratio of 1.5. With a 
one-tailed rather than a two-tailed test, it would be significant at the .1 0 
level) . This, then, is strong support for the hypothesis of a structural 
motivation for coattail voting . 
We can also test the hypothesis that individuals tend to associate 
votes because they see the parties as representing. to some extent at 
least, entities which have particular policy goals which they will work 
together in order to carry out. In 1980, five questions were asked with 
regard to individuals attitudes towards the political parties. While all 
bear on some degree or another on this concept, the one which bears the 
closest resemblence is question 359, "The parties do more to confuse the 
issues than to provide a clear choice on the issues ." It follows that if an 
individual thinks that the parties do provide a clear choice, he will believe 
that their is a certain congruence of goals between the members of the 
party in the legislative and executive branch (this does not necessarily 
mean he thinks they will work together, but it is a necessary 
precondition) . On the other hand, if he feels that the parties do not 
provide a clear choice on the issus, there is less reason for him to 
associate his vote.17 
17. A question (number 360) such as "It wou1d be better, i:f, in all elections, we put no party 
lftbels on the ballot." could very well have a completely different response pattern from qu~ 
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We carry out such an estimation as follows. The question on the 
coherence of the party system has seven categories, and (given the way 
the question is phrased), those disagreeing with the question support the 
idea of party coherence the most and those agreeing with it least support 
that concept. Therefore, we broke the responses down into three 
categories; one category for those who thought the parties provided a 
clear choice on the issues, one for those who were exactly in the middle, 
and one for those who did not think the parties provided a clear choice.18 
These dummy variables were then multiplied by the actual presidential 
vote (one if a vote for Carter, zero if a vote for Reagan), and entered into 
the probit estimation of (3.2.2). The same equation was then estimated 
with presidential vote coded as one if the respondent voted for Reagan 
and zero if he voted for Carter. This was done so both voters for Carter 
and for Reagan could be included in the analysis. 
The results are given in Table 3.3. 
tion 359, since simp]y because one thinks that the parties do offer a clear choice on the i~ 
wes does not mean that one thinks the labels should be on the ballot (one may fee] that ci-
tizens should inform onesel! on the positions of each canclidate before the election, for e:z-
amp1e, and not allow poor candidates to "hide" behind a party label). Similar objections ap-
ply to the othe:r three questions of attitudes towards the parties. 
18. A ~ecial category was created for those who were in the middle of the .even-point 
8Cale, i.e., those who responded four, primarily because of suspicions that theae individuala 
might include not only those who were halfway on the matter but others who bad no real 
opinion but were merely answerin& the question. 
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The results are supportive of the hypothesis, namely, people who see 
party's as offering a choice are more likely to associate their vote for 
President and Congressman. The signs on the coefficients for the "parties 
otTer choice" dummy times the presidential vote is the largest in 
magnitude, decreasing for the "maybe offer choice" category and having 
its smallest value for the "parties don't offer choice" category. A test of 
the differences of the coefficients between the "parties offer choice" and 
"parties don't offer choice" gives an asymptotic t-ratio of about 1.2 for 
both voters for Carter and for Reagan. Since we are imposing this test on 
top of partisan affiliations already being controlled for in the probit 
equation, it is likely that the effect we are attempting to identify is very 
small. One does have more confidence in it since the sign pattern that is 
expected shows up in both equations and the t 's in both are close to 
significance. 
Finally, we may attempt a direct test of two of the three motivations 
suggested for coattails voting. The two are whether a presidential 
candidate's charm is an important part of the decision process of a voter, 
and whether one's evaluation of the presidential candidate has a coattail 
effect. For the charm motivation, we turn to the questions in the 1980 
ANES on candidate qualities . Questions are asked on such qualities as 
"moral", "dishonest", "weak", "knowledgable", "power-hungry'', 
''inspiring", "he would solve our economic problems", "he would provide 
strong leadership", and "he would develop good relations with other 
countries". Of these qualities, the one that best seems to fit the 
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traditional theory of coattails as personal appeal or charm was that of 
"inspiring". Therefore, the variables inquiring as to whether the 
particular candidate was inspiring were made into dummy variables and 
added to the structural motivation model. For the question of whether 
the candidate evaluations are a significant part of the decision process, 
we construct Calvert and Ferejohn's (1983) CAND variable and estimate 
the structural model with it included. 19 
The results of these two direct tests of suggested motivations are 
given in Table 3.4. For the charm test, none of the inspiration variables 
were near to significant (some had the wrong signs), and the coefficients 
on the other exogenous variables in the model did not change 
significantly. For the candidate evaluation test, the coefficient was 
insignificant for CAND and quite small, and the coefficients on the other 
exogenous variables remained comparable to previous specifications . In 
all cases, presidential vote remained significant.20 We therefore see these 
results as confirming our previous rejection of the magnitude hypotheses 
of coattails . 
19. The CAND variable was first used in Campbell, Gurin, and lliller (1954) . It is constructed 
by us:i.n8 responses to the question "Is there anything in particular about (candidate) for 
president) that m.i8ht make you want to vote (for/against) him?". The number of responses 
(there may be up to five in all SRC's !rW"Vey's during a on-year except 1972, when there were 
t.hree) for liking the Democratic candidate are added to the number of responses for dislik-
in& the Republican candidate, and then the number for disliking the Democratic candidate 
and 1ilring the Republican candidate are added together and this number subtract from the 
first number. The number may thus :run from -10 to 10. Calvert and Ferejohn truncate this 
at -6 or +6, but we allow it to :run over the tull range. 
20. Though the standard error on presidential vote did increase a good deal when CAND waa 
entered, indicatin8 that they do share some common factor . Given the results of Chapter 6, 
which indicates that CAND may be considered an endogenous proxy for vote, thia would not 
be au:rprisin&. 
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Table 3.4 Structural Yodel lrith Presidential Charm 
Dependent variable-Congressional Vote 
Independent variable 
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3. 3 1he Coattails Effect and American Elections 
We have demonstrated with some degree of plausibility the existence 
of another motivation for coattail voting by individuals in the American 
electorate; that of a motivation to overcome the separation of powers in 
the American Federal system. Hamilton, among others, saw the possiblity 
of one electorate controlling all representative functions, both legislative 
and executive, and the Constitutional Convention took steps to prevent 
the occurence. lf one group of electors did obtain control of the election 
of both the legislative and executive branches, in contravention of the 
plans of the Constitutional Convention, is it likely that they would dilute 
their voting power by voting for representatives with differing policy goals 
for different branches without good reason? 
Hamilton feared that they would not, certainly, yet the amount of 
split ticket voting is today at an all-time high. Before we remark upon 
this, we might consider Miller's conditions for an analysis of coattail 
voting-"(a) those straight ticket [that is, those who voted for a President 
and Congressman of the same party] voters whose presidential voting 
motivations (b) included an attraction for the presidential candidate, and 
whose congressional motivations either (c) did not include a 
preponderance of factors uniquely related to the congressional race ar 
(d) did include only factors impelled by the existence of the presidential 
candidate and his campaign." Looking at these conditions, we would 
claim that we have fulfilled them, something Miller was unable to do at 
the time ( 1955) he wrote his article, since the technology did not exist 
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then. What we have shown is that attraction does not matter-rather, 
choice is what produces the association of presidential and congressional 
vote. As this association tends to increase as one perceives the parties 
offering a clear choice on the issues, we then conclude that the 
individuals do take into account the Federal nature of the American 
system when making their voting choice. 
They take account of much more, though, as our congressional 
specification makes clear. Issues are very important, but only 16% of our 
sample prefers one candidate or another because of the issues (it might 
be pointed out that that almost all of the voters who had a candidate 
preference because of an issue in the House race voted for the President 
of the same party as that preference in the House race). This means that 
the other 84/o of the voters in our sample must get along with criteria 
such as contacts, partisan cues, and perceptions of the abilities of the 
parties to bring about desirable states of the world. Contacts become a 
very important feature, for if one is helped by a Democratic incumbent, 
one is almost certain to vote for the Democratic incumbent. The 
incumbency effect itself, while still significant for Democratic incumbents, 
does not have a large sign for either Democratic or Republican 
incumbents. We would expect that in a completely specified model the 
coefficients on incumbency would go to zero. 
From the viewpoint of political science as a science, it might be 
interesting to speculate on why it is believed, both among political 
professionals and political scientists, that magnitude is the basis of 
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coattails voting. It would be difficult to perceive of a policy-oriented 
reason for allowing one's perhaps overwhelming attraction to one 
candidate to influence one's vote for another. A reason might be 
proposed on the basis of some social psychological dissonance theory, but 
it should be remembered that cognitive dissonance depends above all on 
choice, not underlying motivation. The association of the vote that we 
have found in American Federal elections should, in any case, have at 
least the possibility of existing in all types of elections where there is 
more than one office to be filled at any one time. We are aware of no 
theoretical work, nor empirical work aside from the work on coattails, 
which even addresses this problem. It would seem to be a useful field in 
political science to examine. 
We spoke earlier (footnote 6) of the ability of the presidential 
candidates to put issues on the national agenda, given that the large 
majority of attention of the media is placed upon them. If the 
presidental candidate and his supporters emphasize the partisan nature 
of the contest, it would be expected that the number who see significant 
differences between the parties would increase. This would increase, 
then, the coattails efiect, through the process examined in Table 3.3 . If 
the presidential candidates chose to ignore the partisan aspects of the 
campaign and instead ran on a campaign devoted to personalities, one 
would expect the number seeing significant differences in the parties to 
decrease. The change in campaign styles , along with the insularity of 
congressmen from national trends noted by Burnham, has probably 
89 
contributed in the change in coattails . It should be noted that while in 
1964, 37 Republican incumbents were defeated, in 1980, 27 Democratic 
incumbents were defeated. Not as many, perhaps, but still a considerable 
number. The evidence given in this paper indicates that it is likely that 
the nature of the campaign increased the saliency of party differences 
and helped bring about a slight increase in "structural" voting through 
increased perceptions of differences in the parties. 
Another point relating to the saliency of the campaign and the issues 
within it is the degree to which issues become incorporated in partisan 
attachments . In Table 3.1, disapproval of Jimmy Carter's performance on 
both unemployment and Iran and perceptions of the Republicans being 
better on inflation and unemployment all had highly significant 
coefficients which would increase the probability of vot.i.ng for Reagan. On 
the other hand, the only coefficient which was positive and significant on 
the Jimmy Carter approval and Democrats better was the Democrats 
being better on unemployment . Rather, the coefficients for long-term 
partisan attachments (self-placement as a strong Republican, weak 
Republican, etc.) were much greater for Democrats in the presidential 
campaign than in the congressional campaign, where the coefficients on 
long-term partisan attachments were shifted to the Republican favor . 
Are different things happening? It seems unlikely; rather, individuals just 
had so many avenues to express their dissatisfactions on the Carter 
presidency that they associated their discontent with particular issues 
when voting for President. In the congressional case, that dissatisfaction 
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did not express itself in particular issue positions but rather in partisan 
attachments, with the coefficients on the long-term partisan attachments 
favoring the Republicans much more than in the presidential races. If we 
recall Miller's definition of coattails as including those who had 
congressional motivations which were produced by the presidential 
campaign, we cannot rule out that individuals have been afiected in their 
general orientations by that campaign. This is obviously a subject 
requiring more study, though it is difficult to see how one would 
differentiate these efi'ects, given the broad nature of Miller's hypothesis . 
What we have done here is rule out several other hypotheses of the nature 
of coattail voting, but this one still stands as one in need of further study. 
While obviously this analysis, as it stands now, cannot be extended 
back across time, we can perhaps engage in some informed speculation. 
First, it is clear that structural motivation efiect, as we have called it, is 
not insignificant. Say a voter was an independent Republican who took 
on no other values on the other exogenous variables . Then the probabilty 
that this voter casts a ballot for a Republican Congressman, given that he 
has voted for Reagan, is simply Pr [ -.43 + u < .11] (where .11 is the 
cutpoint), or around .7. On the other hand, if this elector cast a ballot 
for Carter, the probability would be only around .48. Given a large 
electorate, this type of behavior will add up. On the other hand, if this 
individual has been helped by a Democratic incumbent and he voted for 
Reagan, the probability of his voting for a Republican Congressman is 
only around 97o . Even contact with a Democratic Congressman or 
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candidate without a corresponding contact with the Republican candidate 
means that our independent Republican, having voted for Reagan, will 
have only a 16% probability of voting for a Republican Congressman. 
So it is not that the basis of coattails has vanished, though it has 
probably been decreasing over time. We can easily envision a vicious 
cycle where voters see party not as important in presenting alternatives 
simply because it isn't, given that Congressmen are concentrating on 
enhancing their chances for reelection through casework. Thus their 
propensity to associate their congressional vote with their presidential 
vote will decrease over time, creating a Congress even more independent 
of government policy, leading voters to view the parties as even less 
meaningful in presenting clear choices. As of this moment, though, there 
is still a strong and meaningful tendency for voters to associate their 
Congressional and Presidential votes . The problem is that it is so easily 
overwhelmed by other factors unrelated to policies under which the 
country is run. 
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Chapter IV: The Relationship of Thermometers and Open~nded 
Evaluations to the Vote 
The selection of variables with which to test a model in political 
science is always among the most difficult problems a researcher faces. 
One must decide which are to be the endogenous (or dependent) 
variables. what are to be the exogenous (or independent) variables, and 
the statistical regime by which these variables are related. The only 
aspect of the situation which makes the venture possible at all is that 
presumably there is a model, generated by theory. with which one wishes 
to test certain hypotheses. 1 There are often aspects of this model which 
may be exploited in order to obtain some insight into the central problem 
raised above, that of variable selection. It is the pupose of this chapter to 
introduce a general technique for examining the relationship of variables 
to one another within the context of some commonly used models in 
political science. Specifically. it is a technique for testing whether one 
variable which is assumed to be endogenous may be used as a proxy for 
another variable which is assumed also to be endogenous. The word 
proxy is used here in the sense of substitute.2 With this technique, an 
1. One may argue convincin&1Y that there can be no demonstration of causality without a-
perimenta1 control but it wouJd seem to be indicative of causa1ity il one were to hypothesize 
a model, apply the statistica1 analyses which are indicated by that model, and obsene that 
the results of those ana1yses are consonant with that model. 
2. Another possible term is an instrument, but ordinarily in econometrics, an instrumental 
variable is an "independent" variable which is highly col"l"elated with another "independent" 
variable but uncorre1ated with the residual term. Two-stage least square theory may be 
developed using this concept, for e:zample. A pro:zy variable is alao usually taken to meAD 
an "independent" variable also (one that can be correlated with the error-see Waddala, p 
156), but it does not seem an abuse of nomenclature to refer to such variables as pro:zy 
variables. It is certainly less objectable than instrument, which has a specific econometric 
Inee.nin8 . 
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examination will be conducted as to whether certain variables in the 
American National Election Survey (ANES) may be considered proxies for 
others, specifically, as to whether suitable functional forms of feeling 
thermometers and the open-ended questions relating the candidates may 
be considered as proxies for the voting decision. The results of such an 
investigation should prove to be worthwhile for the simple reason that 
researchers have used the aforementioned variables both as proxies and 
as independent variables in linear regressions, and as should be obvious 
and will be demonstrated later on, they cannot be both. 
"No one knows what thermometer scores measure" states Fiorina 
(1981,p154) .3 As may be, but this has not kept researchers from using 
such variables. The 1968 ANES was the first such survey to introduce the 
social psychological tool known as a "feeling thermometer". Since then, 
feeling thermometers have been used as a measure of affect (Miller and 
Miller (1976)), as a proxy for candidate evaluations (Repass, (1976)), as a 
proxy for candidate preference (Brody (1976)), Black (1976), Kiewiet 
(1980) , Adkison (1982)), and as a proxy for the vote in a simultaneous 
equation system (Page and Jones (1977)). Similarly, the open-ended 
questions have also seen yeoman's duty, being used in various manners; 
as a measure of candidate evalutaions by Repass (1976), as independent 
3. The actual context: "Some collea&ues have susgested, in p8l"'ticula:r, that addition of the 
CPS the:rmomete:r sco:res to the vote equations that follow would p:rovide an ext:ra cont:rol 
fo:r uncaptu.:red :references :relating to candidate personality. No doubt it would. It would 
elso p:rovide an extra cont:rol for retrospective judgments, party influence, issue positions, 
and anything else that contributes to evaluations of candidates. No one know what th~ 
momete:r 9Cores measure. While they may be of use as continuous surrogates for vote 
choice o:r as measures of candidate preference, they raise grave difficulties when uaed as e:z-
planatory variables. Their contribution to explanations of votiJli behavior ia purely.t.atisti-
cal, not substantive." 
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variables (as the basis of the SRC's famous six-factor model of voting 
behavior, see Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960)), as functions 
of underlying unobserved variables which determine the vote (Miller and 
Miller (1976)) , and as a measure of presidential candidate attractiveness 
in house races (Calvert and Ferejohn (1982)). Clearly, the use of such 
variables is extremely popular-the question remains, which uses are valid 
and which are not? 
To answer that question, one must examine the following. First, a 
discussion of what a proxy is and how one endogenous variable may be 
tested as a proxy for another endogenous variable is pursued. It is 
intuitively clear that in some sense a proxy must contain no d.ifierent 
information than the original variable, and th~s intuition is given 
statistical meaning. Given this definition, then, difierent methods of 
hypothesis testing are examined. One type of test, based on the results of 
Cox (1961) and White (1982), are derived in this paper for the first time 
and it is argued that this type of test is more versatile than other types of 
tests. 
Second, the voting decision and the assumptions implicit when it is 
modelled by political researchers must be examined. Frequently, 
however, individual researchers do not bother to exposit the underlying 
theoretical model which their work assumes, or their exposition is such 
that other scholars are less than sanguine about correctly interpreting 
it.4 This problem is handled by assuming a model which is consistent with 
4. Popkin, et. al. (1976, p 779, ft 1) quote Burnham to the effect that '"it is fair to aay that 
there is no single ple.ce in e.ny of this immense (SRC) corpus of work where a comprehensive 
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practically all of the research on voting behavior which uses the general 
linear model or some variant of it (such as probit analysis). Emprical 
estimation is then carried out using the methods of estimation chosen 
and the statistical tests applied. 
Third, given the results of the tests carried out in this chapter, 
recommendations are made to the researcher using the ANES data sets. 
These recommendations can be summarized in one sentence: the use of 
certain functional forms of variables such as thermometers and the 
open-ended questions as exogenous variables is contraindicated. This is 
because they behave so much like the vote that any substantive 
interpretation of their etiect is impossible. An examination of previous 
research which has used the questionable functional forms of such 
variables is examined, with an eye to interpretation in light of these 
results. 
4.1 Comparisions of Presther and Zca.nd with the Vote {1980}--the Zero-
order Story 
In this chapter an examination is made as to the relationship 
between feeling thermometers, zcand and the voting decision in the 1980 
aet of theoretical propositions concerning voting behavior is laid down, with each proposi-
tion linked with the nat in a closed analytical framework. The problem therefore arises 
that any effort by an outside scholar to provide an appro%im.e.tion to such a summary is 
likely to be challe!l8ed as misleading or incomplete' (Burnham ms. pp. 4-5)." Popkin et. al.'s 
strategy is obviou~-they are trying to avoid this challenge by observing that other scholars 
have had the same problem that they have in reconstructing the SRC work (from the aame 
footnote, ''In citing this and other works from the SRC corpus, we are attemptin£ to outline 
the c•ntral W?"bal mtJdMl underlying the work.") Incidentally, it didn't work. See lliller and 
Willer (1976, p833) , "This claim is someth.i.ng of a misrepresentation of the facta and it cer-
tainly ignores the original version of "14a.jority Party" as well as previously published CPS 
research on the 1972 election." 
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election. An analysis file of the 1980 ANES survey created by Mo Fiorina 
was used. Voters for Anderson were excluded from the analysis, as were 
non-voters. Presther is defined throughout as the difference of the two 
thermometer scores for president, Carter minus Reagan, so the 
maximum score possible was one hundred and the minimum score was 
minus one hundred. Ninety-seven percent of the sample fell between the 
maximum and the minimum. 
The third variable, zcand, is seemingly less familiar and deserves a 
more detailed examination. Zcand is a variable constructed from the 
likes and dislikes questions asked about the presidential candidates. The 
sum of likes for the democratic candidate and dislikes for the republican 
candidate, minus the sum of likes for the republican candidate and 
dislikes for the democratic candidate, is zcand. What is being referred to 
here as zcand has also served in some forms as the basis for the 
candidate evaluation variable in the famous SRC six-factor model of 
voting behavior. A description is given in Miller and Miller 
(1976,Rejoinder. ft 8) 
"The candidate and party affect measures used in the 
regressions were based on a series of questions asking 
respondents what they liked and disliked about each party and 
candidate. The positive and negative comments about each 
party and again for each candidate were summed to provide two 
indices, one for the parties and the other for the candidates. 
The final indices are 'net' affect measures. that is, they indicate 
the preponderance of positive or negative attitudes toward the 
Republican candidate or party over those toward the 
Democratic candidate or party." 
This is also the candidate evaluation variable used in 'Jhe American 
101 
Voter .5 
As a means of preliminary examination, the proportion voting for 
Carter was graphed against the Carter minus Reagan thermometer and 
zcand. For presther, responses were coded into categories, with the first 
category consisting of all individuals scoring a minus 100, the second 
interval all those between and including minus 99 and minus 90, and so 
forth, with the last category all of those scoring 100. This graph is shown 
in Figure 4 . 1. As can be seen, the graph looks very much like the cdf of a 
symmetric distribution which has narrow tails (such as a normal cdf). 
Similarly, the proportion voting for Carter was graphed against 
zcand, as is shown in Figure 4.2 . Here, as zcand takes on only twenty-one 
possible values, each category was simply the value of zcand. The graph 
of this looks even more like a normal cdf, with fewer deviations from the 
curve. Finally, in Figure 4.3, presther is plotted against zcand in a 
scattergram. The scatter of these points is nearly perfectly symmetrical 
around the regression line, the only deviations coming where there are 
large values of the thermometer but the zcand score score is not quite as 
large. In Figure 4.4, the standardized presther (standardized here means 
an observation has the mean of the observations subtracted from the 
observation and this figure is divided by the standard deviation of the 
observations) is subtracted from the standardized zcand and plotted 
against zcand. The symmetry of these "residuals" is once again evident . 
6. By inference, anyway. See Chapter 3 and 4 on "Perceptions of Parties and Candidates'' 
and "Pe.rtiaan Choice". 
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but the fact that zcand and presther are both bounded means that for 
large positive values of zcand, negative values of the "residuals" are 
impossible, while for large negative values of zcand, positive values of the 
"residuals" are not possible. If one merely looks at the "residuals" for 
values of zcand between and including -3 and 3, it can be seen the values 
of the "residuals" are nearly uncorrelated with zcand (pearson r equal to 
.30 for all zcand (n=832), -.10 for zcand between and including -3 and 3 
(n=505)). 
From the figures presented in this section, then, it is simple to see 
that there is a great deal of similarity between the vote, presther, and 
zcand. The question then becomes what is the nature of that similarity 
and what conclusions may be drawn from that similarity? To answer 
those questions, it is necessary to define what is meant by a proxy when 
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4.2 1he Definitian of an EJndogenous Proxy 
Ordinarily a proxy is an independent variable which is highly 
correlated with another independent variable but uncorrelated with the 
error term. Furthermore, the proxy variable (call it z) and the true 
variable x are related by 
z =:r + t (4.2.1) 
The measurement error (t) on the proxy variable is uncorrelated with the 
true value of the variable. For this purpose the independent variable is 
considered to be exogenous, or at least non-random in the context of the 
model. It is of course possible to empirically examine whether z is a 
proxy for x if one has a sample which includes both variables. Let~. Z(, 
and ti = Zj - :ri be from a sample of size n and define :r, z and t as 
vectors of the observations xi, zi and the difference of z and x. Then a 
simple test to see whether a z is a proxy for x is to examine the inner 
:r'(z -:r) :r't 
product = -and see whether it is close to zero. 
n n 
For two endogenous variables, one may define a proxy in a more 
general way for which the value of the inner product above being zero 
does not indicate that one variable is a proxy for another. This definition 
is motivated as follows . Consider the following two equations 
(4.2.2) 
and 
tJ - % ptl = u, . (4.2.3) 
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where x is a 1 by k vector, and p, and Pv are k by 1. Call t a proxy for v if 
fit = {J11 • This is the definition used in this paper to test whether one 
variable may be considered an endogenous proxy for another. The 
selection of this criteria can be defended by noting that this is what 
reseachers actually assume when they replace one endogenous variable 
by another, i.e., they are assuming that the inferences they draw from the 
effect of the exogenous variables upon the endogenous proxy is the same 
as the effect of the exogenous variables upon the endogenous variable 
itself. lt will be shown that the method demonstrated above of the testing 
whether one variable may be used as a proxy for another is not sufficient 
for testing whether one variable is an endogenous proxy for another. 
Define t by 
t = v - t = % (PIJ - Pt) + 'U.v - Ut. 
Now, 
v'e -= 
[xp" + u, ]·[x(p" - p,) + u, - u,] 
n n 
u' X U 1 ,, 
+ ---;;-(p" -p,) + ~""'"\1 n 
Under the assumption that plirn X'Uv = 0 n I 
u I ut u I Uv x·x 
plim -"- = plim " , and plim -- = 'b, one has 
n n n 
l . X'u, 0 pun--= , 
n 
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If this expression is equated to zero, then, assuming fJv fixed, one has a 
solution set of the form 
This set includes the point f:Je = f:Jv and has dimensionality k-1. 
In general, then, plim "''E = 0 will be necessary but not sufficient to 
n 
test whether a variable may be used as a endogenous proxy for another. 
The independent variables z 1, .. . ,z~. however, will be correlated with the 
residuals £,, since 
or 
as the second plim on the right hand side may be expected to go to zero. 
Thus, aother method of discerning whether one variable may be used as a 
proxy for another is to examine the correlations between the indepedent 
variables and £. 
There are problems with that method. An independent variable, 
while it may have an identical coefficient in both equations, will still. 
unless it is uncorrelated with every other variable in the equation, will 
still be correlated with the residuals if the null hypothesis is false . Or, the 
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pattern of correlations with the residuals may be such that an 
independent variable which has different coefficients in the two models 
might still have a zero correlation with the independent variabless. Also, 
a variable z which does not belong in either of the two equations will, if it 
is correlated with any variable (call it xj) in the equation for which 
{1111 pt f3ti' be correlated with the residuals. Thus examining the residuals, 
while allowing detection of falsity of the null hypothesis, has two main 
drawbacks: they do not allow determination as to which coefficients are 
identical between the two equations, and they do not allow determination 
as to which variables should be in the equation. 
The obvious way around this problem is to run the two regressions 
and compare the coefficients . Then the step of determining whether the 
null hypothesis should be rejected or accepted can be tested with this 
step as well, thus, one may as well run this test originally without 
examining the residuals . Consider the case of a correctly specified model 
first. Then 
and 
,.,. ( X)-1 Pt = p, + X' X'ut . 
so, under the assumption that u, = Uv + t and Cov (u,,t) = 0, one has 
111 
or the same as the covariance of Pv· which anyone familiar with the 
results of Cox (1961) or Hausman (1978) would not find surprising. Thus 
the covariance matrix of the two estimators together is 
Thus the simple application of a Wald-type statistic (see Appendix I1 for 
definitions of and derivations of Wald statistics used in this chapter) will 
provide a statistical test about the probability of null hypothesis of 
fJv = fJe being true. 
What about the case of misspecification'? Supposing one estimates 
the models 
and 
t = zit + v, 
insteaad of the true models given by (4.2.2) and (4.2.3). 'Iben one has 
and 
so one may construct a covariance matrix the same as the one above. 
The problem with this covariance matrix is that this method of 
estimating it requires an unbiased estimator of r111 and a,, for which, as is 
well-known, the usual estimators 
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and 
will produce (upward biased) estimators. This will result in erroneously 
larger confidence intervals than the true ones, which means in practical 
terms that one will not reject the null hypothesis when it is false. For 
most research in political science, one would rather not reject the null 
hypothesis than reject it erroneously. For the present line of inquiry, one 
would prefer a consistent estimator of the covariance of the two 
estimators (and also the respective covariances matrices of the 
estimators themselves) . The general distribution of two maximum 
liklihood estimators is derived in Appendix I. Using these results, one 
may obtain a consistent estimator of the covariance of r., and :r, by using 
the expression (the details of this derivation are given in the appendix) 
where Aut is a diagonal matrix with elements along the diagonal 
Similarly, the covariance matrices of the two estimators T" and rc are 
where Auv is a diagonal matrix with elements along the diagonal 
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and 
Cov(9t,9t) = (Z'Z)- 1Z'AttZ(Z'Z)- 1, 
where Act is a diagonal matrix with elements along the diagonal 
~ = (t, - z,:9,)2 . 
Note that these matrices do not depend upon the unobserved parameters 
u: or Ut2 · 
Thus for the case of continuous variables, it can be seen that it is 
fairly simple to derive the joint covariance matrix of the estimators for 
the two statistical regimes . A Wald-type test may then be applied to 
derive a statistic to test the hypothesis {J, = Pt. As is shown in Appendix I. 
the same method may be used for non-continuous variables, such as vote, 
and the same general type of Wald statistic may be used to test fJ, = Pt· 
The advantages of this method are plain. First, it allows the 
development of one statistic to test whether one variable may be used as 
an endogenous proxy for another. Second, if the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients in the two linear models is rejected, it allows the 
determination of which coefficients lead to the rejection of this model. 
The alternative method is to examine the residuals and construct tests 
based upon the residuals. As pointed out before, however, that method 
does not allow a determination of which coefficients are different between 
the two regimes, whereas confidence intervals for the differences of the 
two coefficients may be easily derived from the covariance structure, thus 
allowing a determination over which coefficients have changed if the null 
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hypothesis is rejected. For these reasons, this is the approach used in 
this chapter to examine whether certain functional forms of 
thermometers and the open-ended questions may be used as endogenous 
proxies for the vote. 
4.3 A Util:ity-marim:izi:ng Model of the Voting Decision 
As noted before, discerning what individual researchers have 
intended when they model the voting decision is a difficult task. For the 
purposes of this exploration, then, a model is developed which previous 
modelling (which has used the general linear model or some variant of it) 
may be interpreted. The introduction of such an underlying model 
should allow a common framework of reference within which the results 
of this chapter may be interpreted. 
What follows, then, is a fairly standard method of creating a model of 
utility maximizing behavior when a choice between two objects must be 
made (see Fischer and Nagin (1981) for a description of this type of 
model. some extensions, and more extensive references). First, if there 
are two candidates in the race, and one is Republican and one is 
Democratic, the utility (as a linear function of exogenous variables) for a 
Democratic vote may be written as 
Vtt : z{jd + Utt, (4.3.1) 
whereas the desire for a Republican vote may be written as . 
Vr = zPr + u,. . (4.3.2) 
Taken together, then, one obtains 
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V 0 - Vr = z (f3o - fJr) + Ua - U,. · (4.3.3) 
Under the assumption that u.a and u,. are distributed normally and 
serially independently (though not necessarily independently across 
equations), the term u.a - u,. is distributed normally with variance 
lilr ('LLG) + Var (u,.) - Cov (u.a.u,.) . 
The variable "a - Vr is the utility difference between a vote for a 
Democratic candidate and a vote for a Republican candidate. If a 
Democratic vote is coded as a one and a Republican vote as a two, say, 
then a probit procedure may be utilized to estimate (4.3.3). Note that 
knowledge of the voting decision does not allow estimation of (4.3.1) or 
(4.3.2) . To do that, one needs knowledge of the utility one holds for the 
Democratic candidate and the Republican candidate. This is what 
thermometers are purported to do. Several researchers have used 
thermometers just as that-indicators of the utility an individual has for 
a particular candidate . This formulation has been made explicit by 
Kiewiet (1980), and Black (1978).5 
There is an conceptual problem here which it is important to 
delineate. When the vote is observed, it is assumed that the individual 
has made his utility-maximizing choice. This is what an economist would 
5. Both of these authors use the candidates thermometers to rank candldates in a three-
way :race. Obviously, i! one must choose one candldate, one may not obtain :rankings ove:r 
the candidates by observing the choice of one candldate. The cent:ra1 thesis of both the 
Kiewiet and Black works, incidentally, is that indlviduals sometimes make "strategic" 
choices in their voting behavior, a phenomenon which is discussed empirically in Cain (1978) 
and theoretically in Farquharson (1969) (under the name sincere votin&). In the conte%t of 
this discumon, a choice would be strategic if it is not the choice which would provide the 
geatest utility. As the contests in this paper a:re restricted to two choices, the problem of 
l't:rategic voting does not arise. 
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call revealed preference, that is, an individual. when he chooses between 
two objects, chooses the one which provides him with the highest utility. 
If one accepts the principle of revealed preference, then the best 
indication of utility is the choice itself. Other measures (such as 
thermometers), being rankings of utility rather than the choice behavior 
itself, must necessarily be more prone to error than the choice itself.6 
Following the general notion of revealed preference, it will be 
assumed in this chapter that the "best" measure of the utility difference 
between two candidates is. indeed, the actual voting decision. Under the 
null hypothesis of thermometers indeed being a proxy for the utility 
difference between two candidates, it will be assumed that the difference 
in thermometer scores is the poorer measure of that utility difference. 
All tests will be conducted under these assumptions, though lt will be 
shown that the statistical tests themselves are somewhat robust to the 
above assumptions . 
4.4 Com.parisions of Presther and Zcand with the Vote {1980}--a Mare 
&phisticated Look 
In this section an examination is made as to the relationship 
between feeling thermometers, zcand and the voting decision in the 1980 
election, using the theoretical framework which has been developed in the 
6. It is important to distinguish between two types of errors, the error from usi.n& an proxy 
and the error term of the linear model. The error term of the linear model ia presumed to 
occur simply because one is unable to track down all infiuences on the decision. If one has 
knowledge of more influences, one has less error . The error from the proxy occlll"8 a:imply 
because it is an proxy--it is impossible to measure a phenomenon better than that actual 
phenomenon itself and in aD likelihood one has mec.sured it wone. 
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preceding part of this chapter. The method of analysis is as follows : each 
of these three variables is used as the dependent variable in the 
fundamental model. 
v =:x{J+u 
Using the covariance matrix derived in the appendix, the coefficients of 
the independent variables from the regressions of zcand and the 
difference in feeling thermometers are then compared with the 
coefficients of the independent variables from the probit with vote 
dependent. 
The sample used needs to be examined. As mentioned before, an 
analysis file of the 1980 ANES survey created by Mo Fiorina was used. 
Sixteen independent variables were chosen, with a thought towards 
capturing ditiering dimensions of the voters choice. First, party 
identification was coded into six zero-one dummy variables, using the 
familiar ANES seven-point scale. The six were strong democratic, weak 
democratic, independent democratic, independent republican, weak 
republican, and strong republican, with independents being the reference 
category. Attitudes towards inflation and unemployment were measured 
by the question dealing with which party was better able to handle the 
unemployment problem and a similar question dealing with infiation ("Do 
you think that infiation would be handled better ... "). There were four 
possible responses to this question, the republicans, the democrats, don't 
know, or no difference, . Of these, the first three were made into zero-one 
dummy variables leaving no difference as the reference category for both 
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inflation and unemployment . For a foreign policy issue, the question on 
lran was used, with the two categories made into zero-one for the Iranian 
crisis being handled well or poorly and the reference category being don't 
know. Finally, a dummy for an individual being a member of a union was 
used, as well as a dummy for whether an individual was male. 
The three dependent variables were vote, zcand, and presther. Vote 
was taken to be zero if a vote for Reagan and one if a vote for Carter. 
Voters for Anderson were excluded from the analysis, as were non-voters . 
Individuals with missing data on any of the above independent variables 
were also excluded.? 
The estimation procedure for this problem was done as follows . Both 
thermometers and zcand were treated as continuous ordinal variables 
and estimated by Ol.S. There are difficulties with this procedure. First, 
zcand takes on only 20. different values, so in reality a probit procedure 
should be used. On the other hand, that large a number of categories will 
tax any probit program.8 ln any case, it was considered that using an OLS 
procedure upon zcand when multichotomous probit was called for was, if 
?. Actually, tl data for them were miiJSin€ on a &et of mty-three variables, they were e%clud-
ed. A number of specifications were tried usiil8 the above and other exogenous variables, 
until finally the above were utilized. No Wald tests were :run except on the variables chosen 
above-all &election choices were made t:rom the probits with vote dependent. The logic of 
this procedure is discussed in more detail later. 
8. In actual fact, an attempt was made to use a probit procedure on the problem. with no 
.access. Two multichotomous pro bit programs were available, the (by now) ste.ndard McKel-
vey one, and one written by the author. The main conceptual difference between the two 
programs is that the l&cKelvey program uses a constrained maximization proceudre, 
whereas the author's program uses a the Newton-Ralphson algorithim. The reason a 
Newton-Ralphson algorithim should converge is that Pratt (1981) o1'1e:ra a .p:roof that the 
likelihood function is concave no matter what the number of categories. When both pro-
grams were run, the McKelvey program "blew up" on the first iteration, whereas the author's 
program did not converge but rather took o1'1 in a direction which made it .eem likely that it 
would not converge (though none of the. constraints on the cutpoints were violated for the 
90 iterations it was allowed to run). 
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anything , a conservative procedure, as one is in reality making an 
assumption of equal category size. This is also the assumption made in 
the literature when using zcand on the right-hand side, so this would be 
another reason for treating it as a continuous variable. For presther. the 
same problem presents itself. First, anyone who has perused a 
frequencies of a thermometer knows that most of the responses pile up 
at five point intervals (0,5,10,15, etc.) . Second, they are limited by zero to 
one hundred, so that presther is limited by minus one hundred and plus 
one hundred. Thus a two-limit pro bit is called for .9 
The results can be seen in Table 4.1. As is easily observed, the Wald 
test for the similarity of the coefficients is well below significance in both 
cases, indicating that the null hypothesis of both the d.ifJerence of 
thermometers and zcand as proxies for the vote cannot be rejected. Two 
important points should be discussed immediately: one, how does one 
interpret the results of such a test, and two, what occurs if a proxy 
variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation'? 
9. Two-limit probit (aee Rosset e.nd Nelson (1975) for e. description of this type of pro-
oedure) was run on the difference of thermometers, with negligible changes in the me of the 
coefficients. Since there e.re very few observations in either of the limit classes (roU&hly 
three percent) , there is little lost in using an OLS procedure . 
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The interpretation of a test of this sort is always difficult, for the 
simple reason that there is no well-defined alternative hypothesis. This 
type of test is sometimes labelled non-constructive, that is, the rejection 
of the test does not imply that the null hypothesis is false. 10 Rather, this 
is a test of the consistency of the assumption that a certain variable may 
be used as an endogenous proxy for another variable. This assumption 
implies certain things, one of which (and one which is testable) is that the 
coefficients of both regressions when estimated by the correct estimating 
procedure, should be similar. The statistical test that has been applied 
states that the hypothesis they are similar cannot be rejected on the data 
alone. In a practical sense, the non-rejection of the null hypothesis 
means that a researcher can use either of the three variables and derive 
much the same conclusion. Indeed, looking at Table 7.1, this is seen to be 
true. 11 
The question of what occurs when the proxy variable is used on the 
right-hand side is a question that is easily handled in the same manner 
that the problem of omitted variables usually is. Let the true model be 
and instead, 
10. The Hausman test (1978) is another example of this type of test. It is important to 
remember that the null hypothesis one wouJd like to test is that the difference of thermom-
eters can be used as a pro%y for the vote. A rejection of the null hypothesis of the test sim-
ply states that it is unlikely that the ratios of the coefficients are all equal to the same 
parameter, which couJd come about because the model was misspecified in some way (i.e., 
omitted variables, non-linearities, etc.) 
11. For the suspicious at heart {as I am), if one replaces the coefficient on Sdem with the 
negative of the coefficient, one obtains a chi-square .t.atistic which indicates the null hy-
pothesis shouJd be rejected at the .95 con1idence level. So one reversal in s:i&n on a hi&hlY 
Bign.i.ftcant variable wouJd be enoU&h to cause rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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v = z; + u'T 
is estimated. Then, if OLS is used, 
T = (Z'Z)-1Z'v 
= (Z'Z)-1Z'X{J + (Z'Z)-1Z'u,. 
Since the proxy variable is included in the z variables, that variable will 
be correlated with the residual term u,. so that the expectation of the 
term (Z'Z)-1 Z'u, will be non-zero. Thus, even if the other variables in the 
x and z are identical, so that the only additional variable in z is the proxy, 
all of the coefficients will be biased. 
4. 5 Compari.sians of Utility for Rtzagan and Ca.rter 
It was noted earlier in this chapter that the individual utility for 
each candidate, when expressed as a linear function of exogenous 
variables, was not estimable when one has only the voting decision with 
which to estimate it. Rather, in that case, one was estimating the 
difference of the utility functions, as in equation (4.3.3). Perforce, then, 
( 4.3.1) and ( 4.3.2) were non-estimable. 
With thermometers and zcands established as valid proxies for the 
voting decision, however, (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) may indeed be estimated with 
the additional assumption that the difference of the utilities displayed in 
(4.3.3) was derived from (4.3.1) and (4.3.2). As the validity of using 
thermometers for estimating ( 4.3.3) was established above, it seems 
natural to make the additional assumption that the desire for a vote for 
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Reagan may be expressed as the score on the feeling thermometer for 
Reagan and that the desire for a vote for Carter may be expressed as the 
score on the feeling thermometer for Carter. This is, in fact, the 
procedurethat~followed. 
The basic story for 1980 is told in table 4.2. In this table, the 
coefficients for the exogenous variables from the three regressions 
corresponding to equations (4.3.3), (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) are given, 
respectively, as well as the standard error and the ratio of the coefficient 
over the standard error. The results are for the individual utilities are 
somewhat surprising. 
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!able4.2 Regressions for thermometenr 1980 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables Presther Carter Reagan 
Stroll8 Democrat 23.63 ••• 15.82 ••• -7.8o•• 
Weak Democrat 17.54 ••• 12.14 ••• -5.39 
Independent Democrat 10.67 •• 8.63·· -2.03 
Independent Republican -1.15 2.26 3.42 
Weak Republican -3.80 5.89 7.69 .. 
Strong Republican -13.19 •• -o.82 12.37··· 
Inft.e.tion 
Democrats better 9.11 •• 6.82· -3.28 
Republicans better -24.18 ••• -16.96··· 7.21 ... 
Don't know which is better -0.45 -o.62 -o.16 
Unemployment 
Democrats better 10.65 ••• 0.528 -10.12 • •• 
Republicans better -15.67 ••• -8.854 ••• 6.82 • •• 
Don't know which is better -10.02 -2.88 7.14 
Iran 
Carter performance good 19.50 ... 9.993 •• -9.50 •• 
Carter performance bad -6.21 -7.24 -1.02 
Union member -0.37 -o.940 ..0.56 
Kale .. 3.21 -1.200 2.00 
F 59.01 54.67 23.46 
Jl2 .636 .491 .409 
(1 27.54 20.49 19.44 
n 588 588 588 
• •• 0. < .10. e. • •• < .05. 0. < .01. 
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One way to analyze the problem is to note that the coefficients for 
the individual thermometers are either fairly symmetrical or 
asymmetrical (note that the coefficient in the Carter column minus the 
coefficient in the Reagan column is equal to the coefficient in the 
difference column). The asymmetric variables are all of the party 
identification ones, the dummy for those who thought inflation was 
handled better by the republicans, the dummies for those who thought 
unemployment was better handled by the democrats or those who didn't 
know which party handled it better, and the dummy for those who 
thought Carter had handled Iran badly. The symmetric ones, on the 
other hand, are the dummies for those who thought inflation was handled 
better by the democrats, unemployment handled better by the 
republicans, and the dummy for male. Note that weak republican (and to 
some extent, independent republican) is the only variable which "cancels" 
out, that is, it is fairly important for both the individual utilities for 
Carter and Reagan but insignificant for the prediction of the difference. 
A party identification of of anything but strong republican increased the 
utility for Carter (and strong republican is insignificant), indicating that 
independents were particularly hard on Carter (which is not discernable 
from the regression of differences). 
Carter was burned badly on the inflation issue, as seen by the 
asymmetry on the by those who thought that the republicans handled 
infiation better, and Reagan was also hurt badly by those who thought 
that unemployment was handled better by the democrats, retaining a 
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nice symmetry between the parties which seems to bear out the 
contention of party asymmetry theorized by Fiorina (1981). 12 The Iranian 
issue broke perfectly symmetrically between those who thought a good 
job had been done handling the issue, with a marked asymmetry for 
those who felt that Carter had done a poor job. The male-female bias 
much remarked upon in the media presents itself as having a small and 
expected effect- even after controlling for the Iranian issue. 
A methodological question which may be worthwhile to explore is 
that of the effect of misspecification on the relationship between the 
estimates of the regression weights from the regressions of the individual 
thermometers and the estimates of the regression weights from the 
regression of the difference in thermometers. It is clear from the 
discussion dealing with equations (4.3.1), (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) that if the 
model is correctly specified, then Pt~. - fJr =fl. Suppose the model is 
misspecified. What can be said about the relationship between the 
estimators for the misspecified equations dealing with the individual 
candidates, and the estimator for the m.isspecified equation dealing with 
the difference of the thermometers? 
Not surprisingly, they are the same. Consider the following 
derivation . Let the true equations be as in (4.3.1), (4.3.2) and (4 .3.3). 
12. AB Fiorina puts it (p 107), "Inflation is up under a Republican administration. Would it 
have been even higher under a Democratic one'? National unemployment under a Democrat-
ic administration is running at 6 percent. Would it have been 8 pecent under a Republican 
administration'?" The fact that for those who think inflation is better handled by the Repbu-
lica.ns punish Carter badly whiJe those who think that inflation is better handled by the 
Democrats do not reward him equally (and there is a similar pattern for unemployment for 
Reagan, thogh not as much) would aeem to indirectly support this type of reasonin&. 
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Then for the misspecified equations, one is estimating 
Vf1 = Z T fl + Vrt 
and 
tJ = Z 7" + Vfl 
The least squares estimates (or maximum likelihood estimates, under the 
assumption of normality) are as follows 
and 
r~ = (Z'Z)- 1Z'(Xf3rt + v.-) 
7,. = (Z'Z)-1Z'(Xp,. + v,.) 
T = (Z'Z)-1Z'X(va -v,.) 
::: (Z'Z)-1Z'X(xp., -x(J,. + Ua -14), 
Thus the differences of the individual coefficients sum to the coefficient 
derived from estimating the difference of v., and v,., whether or not the 
model is correctly estimated or not, if, as is assumed in this paper, the 
function is taken to be linear in these arguments . 
4. 6 An Analysis of the Utility function of the Non-voter 
As indicated before in the discussion leading to (4.3.1) through 
(4.3.3), if one can find a valid proxy for the voting decision, and if this 
proxy is also available for non-voters, then it is possible to examine the 
decision "calculus" for the non-voter as well as for the voter. This then 
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has substantive interest as well as methodological interest, for it may 
shed some light upon some issues in voting behavior. 
The classical formulation of rational voting behavior is that of Downs 
(1957). with his model 
u =pb- c, 
where the utility from an individual's voting is a function of p (the 
probability of his vote affecting the race) times b (the benefit of the 
individual from a victory in that race), minus c, the cost of voting in that 
race (an extension of this model to a multi-candidate race is given in 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972)). This model has been through some 
reformulations, 13 but one (heretofore) untested assumption of this 
model as empirically estimated is that individuals have basically the same 
utility function, whether they are voters or not. Naturally, in the pristine 
formulation, for every voter i, one would have a utility function 
but empirical researchers of course lack the information to model the 
decision in that manner. Rather, empirical reasearchers who are 
modelling rational choice (see Repass (1971), Popkin et. al . (1976), 
Fi.orina (1978,1981)) assume a population utility function b which is a 
function of a number of exogenous variables .:r 1, . . . • xt, usually linear. 
For an argument that there is in fact a rational choice basis for 
13. The one that seems to have stuck is the one by Rilcer and Ordeshook, who added a "D" 
t.e:rm to the model foY" duty. Citizen duty is well-known to have the largest zel"'-order dect 
upon turnout (•ee Campbell, Converse, :MilleY", and Stokes (1960)) 
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voting (and in particular, turnout), this utility function should be the 
same for both voters and non-voters. Thus an essential piece of 
groundwork for the rational choice model to be established is that the 
model apply equally to both voters and non-voters. If lt can be 
demonstrated that thermometer differences in presidential races can 
indeed be taken in this manner, this provides another item of evidence 
for the rational choice modelling of voting in American presidential 
elections. 
The task, then, is to see whether the decision calculus of the voter 
may be taken to be the same as that of the non-voter. For this analysis, 
the following course of action was taking. In the initial analysis strategy, 
a large set of variables which could be assumed to be more or less 
exogenou.s14 was utilized. Naturally, with that large of number of cases, 
one woUld expect there to be a great many missing values, and as cases 
with missing values were excluded from the analysis, the result was that 
there were 558 cases in the analysis. This was the set that was used to 
run the equivalency tests between the ditferences of thermometers and 
the voting decision. As mentioned before, all preliminary model selection 
was done regressing the vote upon different subsets of these variables, 
and then a test was made of the use of the difierence of thermometers as 
a proxy for the vote using that subset. This was done in an effort to avoid 
bias. 15 
14. Naturally, many of these variables have been used as endogenous variables at one time 
or another, particularly the party identification variables (.ee Jackson (1974), Pqe and 
Jones (1977), and Fiorina (1981)). 
15. Such as using one Bet of variables, then observin& that the null hypothesis wa• rejected, 
then using another set of variables, and 110 forth, until finally success was achieved. 
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On the other hand, for an examination as to whether non-voters and 
voters have the same decision rules (i.e., the coefficients in the linear 
regression are identical), there seems to be no good reason not to use all 
individuals who do not have values missing on the sixteen independent 
variables and the two thermometers. When this is done. the number of 
cases available for voters is 817, and the number for non-voters is 651. 
This would seem to be a satisfying number to test the hypothesis that 
voters and non-voters utilize the same decision calculus.16 
The actual statistic that is used is the Chow test. Let y 1 be the 
vector of differences in thermometer scores for the voters and y 2 be the 
vetor of differences in thermometer scores for the non-voters. ut X1 be 
the matrix of of exogenous variables for voters and X2 be the matrix of 
exogenous variables for non-voters. Let (J1 be the vector of weights for 
the voters and (J2 be the vector of weights for non-voters. Then write the 
two systems of equations as 
where u 1 and u 2 are the error terms associated with the regime for 
voters and non-voters, respectively. Then the Chow test is simply to 
estimate the above system in two different manners: one, setting 
16. Wald statistics for the similarity of both thermometers and zcand for this a'U8mented 
data set were calculated. Both were non-s:ignilicant at weD under the .05 level, with 17.38 
tor thermometers and 13.36 for zcand bei.n& the values of the x2 variables. While thus both 
.tatistics are very fgr from bein& significant (a value of 25.0 is required for Jli&:rrificance at 
the .05 level for a ')(" variable with :ft!teen degrees of freedom), there is a notable "creep" up-
ward from the previous Wald statistics. The question of what this indicates for the Ylilidity 
of the test is discussed in the last part of this chapter, but a strong claim can be made that 
this type of phenomenon does not invalidate the test. 
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fJ 1 = P2 = P• (the restricted estimator), and two, allowing (J1 and fJ2 to vary 
freely (the unrestricted estimator) . Defining the various residual sum of 
squares as 
Then if n 1 is the number of elements (cases) in y 1, n 2 is the number of 
elements (cases) in y 2 and k is the number of elements in (J1 (which is 




is distributed as a ~-1,n 1+n2~ random variate (this fact is shown in 
Maddala, p460) under the null hypothesis that (J1 = (J2 . This then is the 
statistic that is used for testing whether or not the decision calculus for 
voters is the same as that for non-voters. 
The actual results of these Chow tests can be seen in Table 4.3. 
There, the different residual sum of squares are displayed and the F 
statistics are displayed. Both the F statistic for the thermometer 
difference and the F statistic for the Carter thermometer are not 
significant at the .05 level. The same, however, cannot be said of the 
Reagan thermometer. Rather, it is significant at the .01 level. How can 
these results be interpreted? 
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Ta"ble 4.3 Unrestricted and restricted sum of squared residuals 
Dependent variable 
Presther Carter Reajan 
URSS (n=1468) 1190218 623891 660699 
Voters (n=B 17) 623755 323351 309414 
Non-voters (n=651) 545965 294512 333998 
RRSS 1169720 617863 84S412 
RRSS- URSS 20498 6028 17287 
F 1.452 .851 2.207 
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The first and most important result is that the null hypothesis of the 
decision calculus based upon the differences of the thermometers cannot 
be rejected. In practical terms, the researcher may take them to be the 
same. This can be seen as a partial confirmation of the rational choice 
modelling of presidential elections. The proxy for the utility d.ifierence 
that it is assumed the vote is cast on the basis of extends in the manner 
that would be predicted to non-voters. Similarly for the Carter 
thermometer, it can be seen that the differences between voters and non-
voters is minimal, and they may also be taken to be the same. 
On the other hand, there is the Reagan thermometer. In it, the two 
regimes are different. The interpretation of this is perhaps best handled 
by a perusal of table 4.4. Inspecting this table, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the prediction for Ronald Reagan for those that do not 
vote is simply very poor. The only two variables which vary dramatically 
between voters and non-voters are the constant term and the uedembet 
variable. The J?2 is very poor, though, with a value of .174. The J?2 for the 
non-voters on the Carter equation is .337, or twice as great, whereas the 
Jtl for the voters on the Carter thermometer equation is .510, not all that 
much greater than the .414 for the Reagan thermometer equation 
restricted to voters . 
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ralale 4.4 Regressions for Reagan Thermomete:rs, VoteT and Non-voters 
Independent variable 
Constant 
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4. 7 Comparisians of 1herrrwmeters 'With the Vote fur the Hause and 
&nate (1978} 
A logical extension to the analysis presented so far is to attempt to 
discern whether the difference of thermometers, which have been seen to 
be a valid proxy for the presidential vote, can be considered a valid proxy 
for house and senatorial contests. The data set which was chosen for this 
was the 1978 ANES data set, in part because it offers a wider variety of 
information about senatorial and con,gressional races than most other 
ANES data sets.17 
The data is summarized in tables 4.5 (the congressional) and 4.6 (the 
senatorial) . The format of the data is similar to that in table 4.1. There 
are some obvious differences . First, there are two columns of coefficients 
for the probit with vote as the dependent variable. In the first column 
are the coefficients for the four category vote variable, in the second 
column the coefficients for the two category vote column. The four 
category vote variable was constructed by usin,g the strong and not 
strong preference questions in the 1978 survey.18 If an individual voted 
for a republican House candidate and his preference was strong, he was 
coded as being in the lowest category, if his preference was not strong, he 
was coded as being in the next highest category (category 2). On the 
other hand, if he voted for a democratic House candidate and his 
17. Once again this data set was designed by Mo Fiorina. (Tho"L18h I personally clid much of 
the computer work for both the 1980 data set and the 1978 data set while I was employed as 
a graduate research assistant at the California Institute of Technology). 
18. The question asked is ''Would you say that your preference for this HoUIIe canclidate 
<Respondent voted for> was strong or not strong"?" 
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preference was strong, he was placed in the highest category, whereas if 
his preference was not strong, he was placed in a category one lower 
(category 3). 
The other change is in the variable list. While some variables are the 
same (such as strong democrat, weak democrat, etc.), others have been 
changed to in order to more accurately describe house and senate races, 
as opposed to presidential races. The rating of Jimmy Carter was 
included, as were contacts with the candidates and the incumbency 
status of the candidates. Also, the inflation and unemployment variables 
now include the "don't knows" as part of the surpressed reference 
category. 
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Ya'ble 4.5 Regession and Pro bit Equations for Coll8ressional Votin& 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables Con.g vote 4 cat Coll& vote 2 cat Con&ther 
StrongDer.nocrat 1.121 ••• 1.136 ••• 18.57 • •• 
Weak Democrat 0.446. 0.73·· 16.80 ... 
Independent Democrat 0.431 0.319 14.26 •• 
Independent Republican -o.258 ..0.405 -4.39 
Weak Republican -0.226 -o.459 -2.90 
Stroll& Republican -o.602'' -1.128 ... -12.70' 
Inflation 
Democrats better -0.118 -o.l19 1.71 
Republicans better 0.001 -o.145 ..0.35 
Unemployment 
Democrats better 0.043 0.142 5.25 
Republicans better -0.065 0.109 -6.76 
Carter performance ratin& 
Good -o.038 0.062 -4.84 
Bad -0.561 ••• -o.527 .. -15.25··· 
Incumbency status of candidate 
Democrat 0.519 ... 0.688 •• 16.84··· 
Republican -0.712··· -o.754 ••• -7.97' 




Democratic 0.267 0.240 6.11 
Republican -o.305. -o.520 •• -9.37 •• 
IF .486 .803 
-2•LI..Ratio 203.9 195.4 
~ 15.96 .406 
Wald for two categories 15.2 




• •• • •• p < .1 0 . p < . 05. p < .0 1. 
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!'able 4.8 Regression and Pro bit Equations !or Senatorial Votin& 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables Sen vote 4 cat Sen vote 2 cat Senther 
Strong Democrat 0.882 ••• 1.085 ••• 18.15 • • 
Weak Democrat 0.525 •• 0.599 •• 5.42 
Independent Democrat 0.561 •• 0.603 •• 1.84 
Independent Republican .0.401 -().872 •• -11.94 
Weak Republican -().276 ..0.346 -8.33 
Strong Republican -o.T75··· -1.377 ••• -24.23 • •• 
Inflation 
Democrats better -().037 0.066 2.99 
Republicans better -().200 ..0.049 -9.04' 
Unemployment 
Democrats better 0.313' 0.374. 6.41 
Republicans better ..0.273 ..0.447 ..... 45 
Carter performance rating 
Good 0.038 0.112 6.89 
Bad 0.135 0.250 -2.06 
Incumbency status of candidate 
Democrat 0.181 0.308 3.52 
Republican ..0.138 -().511 14.98 
Union 0.157 0.199 1.726 
Candidate contacts 
Democratic 0.173 ..0.109 19.67' 
Republican 0.091 0.3338 1.59 
R .538 .491 
Rq .274 .253 
-2•U.Re.tio 129.9 155.3 
~ ?.24 .26 
Weld for two categories 18.27 
Wald for four categories 
d1 
n 







The results of the probits and regression are not surprising. 
Partisanship plays a strong role in the voting decision in both voting 
decisions . Opinions as to which party is the better handler of in.fiation 
and unemployment are insignificant in both cases, whereas union status 
directs an individual towards voting democratic. On the congressional 
side, contacts with the candidates, incumbency status and ratings of 
Carter's performance all had effects in the expected direction (with the 
exception that a good rating of his performance was insignificant), but on 
the senatorial side these variables were all insignificant (and sometimes 
of the wrong sign). The ~ for the congressional thermometer was quite a 
bit higher (.41) than that for the senatorial thermometer (.26), indicating 
that the fit for congressional races were quite a bit better than that for 
the senatorial races. Doubtlessly, given the greater salience of senatorial 
races, important indicators such as issue positions have been omitted.19 
A perusal of Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 raises another interesting 
question: are the four-category and two-category probits for both the 
congressional and senatorial races equivalent? This is not a frivolous 
question, as a glance at the tables indicates that there is a di.tference in 
the coefficients, the only question being, is there enough of a difterence 
for the researcher to conclude that the probits, when run with the four-
category or two-category dependent variable, are identical? One way to 
19. It mould be noted parenthetically that there are a large number of missing cases for 
these measures, particularly the thermomete:rs. The relevant missi.n& figures were for house 
and senate incumbents, 22 percent and 15 percent, respectively, for house and .enate 
democratic candidates who were not incumbents, 47 percent and 21 percent, and for house 
and senate republicans who were not incumbents, 60 percent and 33 percent. 
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answer that question from a statistical standpoint is to test the 
hypothesis Ho = lP• - fJ2 = OJ. 
The application of this test obviously requires knowledge of the 
covariance matrix of the statistic (J4 - {32 . The derivation of this matrix, 
when both parameters are estimated by the method of maximum 
likelihood, is given in Chapter II. As it turns out, it is simply the matrix 
covariance matrix of (J2 minus the covariance matrix of (J4 . Denote the 
difference of these covariance matrices as R. Then a Wald test of the 
difference of the two estimators is simply ((J. - (J2)'R((J4 - (J2), which, 
under the null hypothesis H0• will be distributed asymptotically 'JC with k-
1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of elements in the vector 
p,- fJ2· 
Such test was run for both the congressional and senate races. For 
the congressional races, the Wald statistic had a value of 23.69 with 
sixteen degrees of freedom. As the .05 significance level for a >f variable 
with sixteen degrees of freedom requires a value of 27 .5, one may not 
reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level. Similarly, for the senatorial 
races, the Wald statistic had a value of 24.553. This statistic, also, does 
not achieve a significant value and so may not be rejected at the .05 level. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This inquiry, which focuses upon the relationship of various variables 
to one another. is yet another indication of the importance of models in 
political science. Candidate evaluations, when summed in a crude 
manner, have been seen to give no different substantive results when 
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used as the endogenous variable in an equation than the vote itself. 
Thermometers too have this property, thus bearing out Fiorina's advice 
(see footnote 3) on the desirability of not utilizing such variables as 
exogenous variables. Doubtlessly other variables, or constructions bases 
upon other variables, have the property that they too may be used as a 
proxy for the vote. It is certainly not inconsistent with many 
psychological theories (such as cognitive consistency or dissonance 
reduction theories) that individuals will have one central cognition or 
attitude and reexpress it in ditterent manners under a variety of 
prompts. Should it be so surprising that individuals would do the same 
with the voting decision? 
Whether or not this is what is happening, it is clear that, given the 
specifications in this paper, the difference of thermometers or the sum of 
the likes and dislikes, when treated as the endogenous variable, produce 
beta weights which are similar to those produced by using the voting 
decision itself as the voting decision. It has been argued that the results 
are fairly robust to the choice of voting decision, but there is also 
another argument, one based on the fact that there was no well-defined 
alternative hypothesis in the tests that were presented in this paper. If, 
it is claimed, thermometers (or zcand) measure some aspect of the voting 
decision which is unique from the decision itself, then surely there must 
be some exogenous predictor of that difference which would not matter in 
the voting decision but would matter in, say, the thermometer score. In 
that case, that variable or set of variables could easily be placed in the 
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specification and the similarity of the weight or weights associated with it 
tested, in the same manner that they were tested here. This would 
provide, incidentally, the well-defined alternative hypothesis which was 
lacking before. 
It would seem that the results presented in this paper can be seen as 
giving a vote of confidence to previous research which has used zcand or 
thermometers as endogenous variables, or as predictors of the vote. In 
particular, the fact that the actual metric of the thermometers proxies 
the voting decision would seem to validate the use of, say Black, who uses 
the ditJerences of the thermometers to indicate utility dit!erentlal. The 
use of thermometers as proxies for the vote in a simultaneous equation 
system by Page and Jones would likewise seem reasonable. The factor 
analysis of the thirty-four different categories of open-ended questions by 
Miller and Miller acquires new validity, for if the sum of the open-ended 
questions can be used as a proxy for the vote, then (leaving aside the 
desirability of factor analysis as a method of statistical analysis) all the 
factors should be included in the thirty-four open-ended questions. Miller 
and Miller, however, claimed that it measured the major personality 
dimensions that voters had used in evaluating the candidates (page 634). 
It would seem that it would measure more. Similarly, they interpret 
thermometer scores as affect (see their footnote 33 in "Majority Party"). 
Their table 3 ( p 771), where they tabulate thermometer scores against 
policy orientation, rather than having an interpretation as affect, have 
the simple and straightforward interpretation as a utility score. It is not 
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surprising, in that case, that Nixon would be seen "coldly" by those with a 
liberal persuasion- he provides them less utility. Of course, they may 
actually "feel" less "warmly" towards Nixon as well, but it is not clear 
what exactly that means. The results presented here seem to indicate 
that there is no difference between feel.i.ngs and utility, at least as 
measured by present instruments. 
If these results give votes of confidence for the use of thermometers 
and zcand as proxies, they must also give a vote of no confidence to the 
use of such variables as exogenous variables. It is shown in the paper the 
statistically results of using an endogenous variable as an exogenous 
variable, but what are the substantive results? The .primary one, 
following the comments by Fiorina, would simply be that there can be no 
valid substantive interpretation to such variables entered on the right-
hand side of the regression equation. Consider zcand, the sum of the 
open-ended questions. Taken as a sum, these variables proxy the vote. 
Should they not be considered separately as exogenous variables rather 
than taken as a sum? The individual comments reflect a variety of 
concerns, and taken individually, they may offer much in understanding 
about the voting decision. But taken together, they seem to indicate that 
what individuals say about a candidate is consistent with their voting 
decision. It would probably be more surprising if they were not. 
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Appendix !: 1he DerivatiDn of Qroariance Matrices of &tim.a.tars 
Derived by the Method of Maximum Iilcelihood 
For the derivation of various covariance matrices displayed in the 
exposition it is necessary to take a brief journey through maximum 
likelihood estimation theory. The joint distribution of two estimators 
derived by the method of maximum likelihood was apparently first 
considered in a general framework by Cox ( 1961), who derived in a 
heuristic manner the asymptotic covariance matrix of two maximum 
likelihood estimators based upon the same data when one of the 
estimators was derived under the true probability law and the other 
estimator was derived under some untrue probability law. Huber ( 1965) 
derived in a rigorous manner the asymptotic distribution of a maximum 
likelihood estimator when it is estimated under some untrue probability 
law, and White (1982) derived rigorously the asymptotic covariance 
matrix derived by Cox. In this section the joint asymptotic normality of 
any two maximum likelihood estimators is shown in a a heuristic manner, 
a result implicit in all of the above results but never (to the knowledge of 
this author) explicitly proven. This result then justifies the assumption 
of asymptotic multivariate normality of any two estimators derived by 
the method of maximum likelihood. 
Let there be two probability laws I (v l.:r ,fJv) and g (t I z ,(J,). where z is 
used to emphasize that the two probability laws may be conditional on 
different sets of variables. Assume 
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and 
for all 1c, l. The first part of each equality is simple an assertion that the 
law of large numbers holds, the second part that there is convergence to 
a well-defined limit. Let Q. be the matrix made up of the Q~ , while Q. 
~ ~J ~ 
is the matrix made up of the Q• . If there are k., elements in {111 , Q. will 
~~J ~ 
be It;, by k 11 , and there being k1 elements in (J,, implies that Q,, will be k1 
by k,. It is assumed that these two matrices are invertible. 
llHn I ( v, l:r, ,fJv) l Let BPv be the lc1 by 1 matrix made up of 
/Jln I (vi IZL.fJv) and imil. 1 1 t I /Jln g (t, IZL .(J,) l b th k b 1 t . IJR , s ar y, e IJR e e " y ma nx 
~"'"l ,.., 
d f 
8ln g (t, I Z-t.fJv) ( ) 






VnQ ["'p _ {J] = __ 1_~ !Bln / (ti I Zt.,fJv)] 
n ~, t t Vn .l...J BR . n ,=1 1-111 
Let Cv and c, be any two constants such that c;, is 1;, by 1 and c, is k, 
by 1. It is necessary and sufficient to show that 
is asymptotically normal for any ev and c,, for the asymptotically normal 
estimators to have a joint normal distribution. Let a, be such that 
c '11 = a. '11 Q~tl and a., such that c 't = a·, Q~,. The condition that Q~, and Q~v 
be invertible ensures that such fiv and a, may be found . Then, 
= __ l_f: {a.·vl oln I (v, l.zt..Pv)] +a·, I oln I (t,!Xi ,fJc) ]}· 
Vn i.=l 0{311 Bf3c 
This is, however, the sum of n independent random variables divided by 
the square root of n. Thus by a variant of the central limit theorem, this 
approaches a normal variate in probability. AB this is true for any c;, and 
c,, the asymptotic distribution of the two maximum likelihood estimators 
is jointly normal. 
To derive the covariance matrix of two estimators derived by the 
method of maximum likelihood, then, the above results allow the 
following asymptotic equality 
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(4.A.l) 
If v, and t, are independent of one another for all i, this may be rewritten 
as 
=lim E{-1 f; I Bln _J (v, lx,,{l11 ) ]}E{-1 f; I Bln g (t, I z..,p,) ]·}· ft... Vn i=l BPv Vn \=1 ap, 
As n ... oo both these terms approach normal variates with means zero and 
covariance matrices Q~v and Q~,. respectively. Thus the asymptotic 
expectation of the covariance is zero for maximum likelihood estimators 
derived from independent random variables. as one would have expected. 
Usually, though, t, and v, will be dependent upon one another for the 
same observation, so that one may not simply take expectations in the 
manner above. Rather, since it is assumed that the observations are 
independent of one another, write 
Note that the limit of the second sum is zero if the observations are 
independent of one another and the the expectation of the first partial 
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with respect to the parameters is zero. This will be the case if the model 
is correctly specified, or if the endogenous and exogenous variables are 
jointly independently identically distributed (instead of the exogenous 
variables being fixed, as in, say, an experimental situation). 
So let 
Q.,, =lim 1.. 2; E[ Bln I (v, lz.;../111] [ Bln g (t; I z;.Pt ]·. 
n..., n \=i 8(J11 8f3t 
where Q.,1 represents the (assumed to be defined) limit of the above sum. 
Usually the form of the expectation may be inspected to to determine 
what assumptions are necessary on the x's and z's to ensure convergence. 
Hence 
For the general linear model estimated by maximum likelihood with 
normal error terms, then 
and 
Bln I ( v, l z, ,(111 ) Bln I ( v, I :z; .!111) -7(1 ) ------------=- v· -z.R z,.~z ... · 
IJ(3 8R 4 \ \1"11 •• ~ ,\ 11l 1"11• (111 
This expression of the second partials is non-random whereas the second 
expression is random and has expectation, if "" - z1(J11 is distributed 
normally with mean zero and variance u~, 
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or the minus the value of the second partials. 
Then 
Or, using the matrix notation for the partials again, then one has 
where A.,u is diagonal with elements A.t = (v, - %;.(111 ) 2 . Then 
where Qw is the limit of the expectation, which is assumed to exist. 
So, with no misspecification, 
= u~(X X)-1, 
which is the usual estimator. To derive a consistent estimator from this 
one would replace u~ with a consistent estimator. Now, in the case of 
misspecification, one has 
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Once again, one would replace E[Avv] with a consistent estimator such as 
A.,., a diagonal matrix with elements ~ = (v, - %J.P11 ), to derive a 
consistent estimator for the above covariance matrix. An intuitive 
thought, at this point, is to test whether the model is misspecified by 
trying to discern how "close" X'~X is to X' X. Tests of that type are 
considered in White ( 1982). 
Usually the variance term u~ must be estimated, and hence it may be 
thought that the estimation of this parameter would have an etJect on 
the inverse of Q~'tl· As it turns out, this is not the case. Noting that 
and assuming that the expectation of vi is ~T, then 
will equal zero. since flu= r~xr· X': T. Hence Qfl. is of the form 
so that 
So one may ignore the covariance of Pv in the event o.f this type of 
misspecification. 
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Now, it is easy to show that 
under the assumption that v1 - Z;,(J" = u,. t, - Z;,(J, = u,. u, = u, + ~. 
E[ u,t] = 0, and the 'Ut and u, are identically distributed (note that here 
it is assumed x=z). So under no misspecification, one obtains the same 
covariance matrix that was derived in the body of the chapter, though for 
this derivation, incidentally, normality of the disturbance terms is not 
needed to show asymptotic normality. Thus 
n-1 n Q-1 = u2(X'X)-l 
~~\1 -rt.( ~, " • 
Now, under misspecification, the matrix 
=(X' X)-1 X' E[~ ]Z(Z'Z)-1, 
where a consistent estimator is derived by replacing the expectation with 
A..,, where the diagonal elements of this matrix are of the form 
(v, - z,~v)(ti - z,p,). 
For completeness, note 
where Att is diagonal with elements (ti - z,p, )2 . 
Now the covariance matrix of the estimators from a probit equation 
and the estimators from a continuous variable which is assumed to be a 
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proxy for that variable is derived. Assume both ~ and u, are normally 
distributed with means zero and variances u~ and uf, respectively. The 
assumption that t is a proxy for v translates then, in terms of this model. 
into the assumption that ul > u~. The assumption is also made that the 
additional error in the thermometer variable is normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance u~ and is uncorrelated with~. so that 
(4.8) 
The covariance of u, and u, is calculated by multiplying ( 4.8) 
through by~. taking expectations, and noting that U.: is assumed to be 
independent of 1.1,. Then 
The marginal distribution of 1.1, and u, will be normal, as they are 
distributed bivariately normally. In particular, let f denote the marginal 
distribution of 1.1, and g denote the marginal distribution of u,. Then 
and 
are distributed as normal variates with means zero and variances one. 
Let the unobserved variable v be observed as v = 2 i1 v > a. and as 
v = 1 if v ~ a. The probability density function of v; may be derived from 
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that of vi, by the following manipulations: 
= Pr ( ac > z i Pv + Uj > ex) 




Pr ( Vj = 1 lziflv) = t( J ). 
a11 
,.. 
With these results and the results of chapter II, the covariance of {111 
and Pt, where the P's are estimated by maximum likelihood, may be 
calculated. First, note that 
1Y=2 
= i1 = 1 
Bln g ( t ) _ ( t - ziP t ) . 
IJf3e - aP z, 
Bln g(t) = _j_ + (t -%;fle)2 
BC1t a, aP 
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Letting h(t,v) represent the joint distribution of t and v (which will be 
bivariately normal), one has 
a -zfl 
+- +- ,, 11 ) t R 
JJ a, -ZtJt = z~x, _ (J ( 2 )h (t ,v }d.tdv 
a _ 1 -If>( a z , } a, 
a" 
a -Z{l11 
Cl +• rp( ) f R 
f a" -z~"~' - J _ fl ( 2 }h (t ,v }d.tdv . 




Then the joint distribution of v, and v" will be bivariately normal with 
means zero and covariance matrix 
"" 
Var[::] = :v 
1 
Making the change of variables given above, one has 
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density of v, given v11 , one has, as demonstrated in any introductory text 
on probability (see Hogg & Craig, p 112 , for example), that 
C1~ u, 1111 = ------u, a11 a11 u, 
Vv =-
This implies that 
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and, as the anti-derivative of f(1111 ) is -1111 ,(11,), the above may be 
integrated directly to give 
(cp( a -uzfl, ))2 
z~:r, , = -- -----------
"' t( a -:rfl, )(1- t( a -zfl,)) 
C111 U11 
Thus, 
t El8ln I; Bln g j l 








where ~j represents the quantity in brackets. 
Calculation of the expected value of the mixed partials when the 
derivative of In g is with respect to u1 is done in the same manner. ln this 
case, one has 
=z~ 
1 vP 
(--+ --s)f(v,.v1)dv,dv1 . a, a, 
As before, rewrite f(v,.v,) as ~(v,)~(v1 I v,). Then. as before. it is well 
known (see Hogg & Craig, p 112 . again ). that 
The fact that the result of this integration does not depend upon v, 
implies directly (since E[ B~;;~:] = 0) that the expectation or the above is 
zero, since 
Or, the above may be worked out directly to provide the same result. 
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Thus one may ignore the expectation of the mixed partials involving a, 
when calculating the covariance matrix. 
Returning to the mixed partials with respect to {11111 and Pt,. as shown 
in Chapter 1, these observations may be "stacked" and then one has 
where A is a diagonal matrix with the individual "A.j 's as the elements. 
Now, the full form of the covariance matrix of~"- fJ11 • Pe - p,, as given in 
Cox (1961) or as displayed in Chapter 2, is 
Using the results of chapter one, the results above, and the well-lmown 
properties of the general linear model, this is equivalent to 
This, then, is the covariance between the two coefficients. The entire 
covariance structure may be written as 
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This is the covariance matrix that will be used in constructing the Wald 
test, following the results of Chapter 3. 
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Appendix II: 1he Wald Test fur Similarity of Coefficients 
The W ald test used here is more fully described in chapter 3. Let 
fJvi .,, . 
Uv = "Yvj and fJe1 = "Ytj 1 where Pv1 and fJe1 are the 3 coefficients from the 
models above. Then if Pv = Pe I 





This suggests rearranging this into k-1 equations of cli.fferences. Let 
g 1 ( "Y) = "Yll "Y22 - "Y 12"Y211 
9e(-r) =-rte"Yes - "Yee"Yts~ 
Under the null hypothesis (7.9) each gj is zero. Denote the covariance 
matrix of 7 by R. This covariance matrix was derived above and so 
-I (XIAX)-1 a1 (X'X)-1] 
R - u, (X' X)-1 ul(X' X)-1 
The probability structure was particularly simple in this case, thus 
allowing a theoretical derivation. It should be emphasized, however, that 
there is always a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix between 
two maximum likelihood estimators available, following the results of 
Cox. 
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The following theorem is used to construct a test. 
Theorem 
Suppose that CJn is a sequence of functions tending to ao, b is a fixed 
number, and~(~ -b) approaches in law some random variable X. Let g 
be a function of a real variable which is d.i.fierentiable and whose 
derivative g' is continuous at b. Then 
Cln[g (Zn) - g (b)] 
approaches g'(b)X in law. 
(For a proof of this, see Bickel and Doksum, p 461). 
l 
In this case, f1n = n i', the Zn = 'Yn, and the b is simply 1· Calculation 
of the matrix 
[a~;)] 
is necessary before the covariance of g (?')may be calculated. 
The derivative for any component of the vector g,(1) is simply 
Bg,("Y) 
= 12.\+1• i=j 
6"Ytj 




= "Yl.t+l• i=j 
6"Y2j 
= ll.i• i=j+l 
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= 0, otherwise 
Let the covariance matrix of g (/') calculated in the above manner be 
denoted as W. Then the statistic 
TQ = g (/')' Wg (-y) 
is distributed as>(- with k-1 degrees of freedom. This is the test statistic 
that is used in determining whether the coefficients of the linear 
regression with presther, congther, senther or zcand dependent are the 
same as the coefficients of the probit with the dependent variable being 
the vote (for president, congressman, senator or president, respectively). 
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Chapter 5: A llodel of Participatory Beha'rior: the Conditional 
lloti'vational Probit llodel1 
The modelling of individual choices among discrete alternatives has 
recently attracted much attention in econometrics. In general. the 
development of these models assumes that the individual choosing among 
these alternatives random utility maximizes. He chooses, as in 
traditional economics, the alternative which obtains for him the greatest 
utility, but that utility consists of two parts: one, a function of various 
characteristcs relating to the individual and the particular alternative, 
and two, a random error term. The random error term, which represents 
in.ftuences and factors left out of the model. allows individuals with 
identical characteristics to choose different alternatives, which would 
invalidate a traditional economic utility-maximizing consumer model. 
The function of characteristics (which includes such things as attitudes, 
cost, socio-demographic characteristics, etc.) allows a characterization of 
choice demand in terms of identifiable criteria, and is assumed to 
represent the non-stochastic portion of the utility function. The utility 
function, in turn, represents an ordering of preferences the individual 
might hold over the different alternatives. 
Explained in this manner, it is clear that the interpretation given to 
the function of individual and choice characteristics is somewhat 
arbitrary. While we are, after e.ll, observing a behavioral propensity 
1. The relationship o:f the conditional motivational probit model to the conditionallogit and 
other models derived from the hypothesis o:f random utility maximization are de.cribed 
below. 
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associated with the various characteristics, there is no general theory 
behind why we might find such a propensity. Naturally, in specific 
applications, there may very well be a theory of the choice. For example, 
if the decision is to choose between several types of water heating 
systems, there is naturally a consideration by the individual of capital 
outlays and operating cost, and there is undoubtedly a tradeot! between 
the two, indexed by a discount rate, and that being a function both of 
income and of the individual's attitudes. Thus, prediction of the discount 
rate may be important for both studies of proposed policy changes and 
an understanding of the behavioral process of the individual decision 
making. There may often, however, be no more theory than that of 
modelling a particular choice process with some "likely looking" variables 
which are assumed to be correlated with the choice decision under study. 
In particular, there is often no theory behind the relation of 
underlying psychological states to the individual's choice of a particular 
alternative. In the choice of water heating system given above, an 
understanding of an individual's underlying psychological state is of no 
doubt little interest, given the lack of emotional investment most 
individuals have regarding market decisions . In other types of behavior, 
however, an understandi.ng of how particular attitudes and 
characteristics affect motivations to perform particular behaviors may be 
of the greatest interest for the researcher. It is to a method of modelling 
those that we turn to in the next section. 
5.1 1he Conditional Motivational .Probit Model 
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Consider the individual who is faced with the following situation. 
First, there are two sides or choices of actions available to the individual 
associated with this situation, with the two actions being opposed to one 
another. Furthermore, the individual's motivation to engage in one 
action or the other lies along an underlying dimension of motivation to 
help one side or another, with neutrality lying at the zero point of 
motivation. Also, there are thresholds that must be passed by each 
individual if his underlying motivation is to be translated into action. 
An example of this would be a civil war, in which the diametrically 
opposite actions are fighting with the rebels or fighting with the 
government forces . An ·individual would lie along the underlying 
dimension, either towards the side of joining the rebels or joining the 
government forces . The thresholds that the individual would have to pass 
indicates the point that motivation is turned into action. It is presumed 
that this threshold effect occurs because at the point where action is 
chosen over no action the cost to the individual (and here cost is used in 
a broad sense, encompassing such things as psychic cost), between 
choosing the action and not choosing the action is the same. 
For our general exposition, then, we assume there exists an 
underlying dimension of motivation, and that an individual's motivation, 
y •. is distributed along this dimension. We adopt the folloWing axioms . 
A:riom 1: E:z:istence of Cost F'unctians 
Let there be two possible actions, A and B, and let there be the 
possiblity of no action, call it N. Then there exists a cost function for 
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each of the three possible actions, which are indexed by the motivation, 
y •. and by exogenous variables w. Call these functions c_. (y ·.w ), 
Cg(y ·.w ), and CN(Y •,w ). Then it is assumed that these functions are 






In addition, CN(O,w) = 0, c,.(O,w) = Ca(O,w) > 0, and 
lim c,.(y•,w) = 0, 
• 
(5.1.5) 
11 .. __ 
(5.1.6) 
The functions are displayed in Figure 5.1. 
[Put Figure 5.1 about here] 
The intuition behind these conditions on the cost functions is as 
follows. The cost of doing nothing, CN(y•,w), is zero when there is no 
motivation and increases as motivation increases in magnitude. The cost 
associated with action A is increasing as motivation moves toward the 
positive end of the underlying motivational dimension, while the cost 
Figure 5.1 Hypothesized Cost Functions Associated with Underlying Motivation 
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associated with action B is increasing as motivation moves towards the 
negative end of the underlying motivational dimension. The conditions 
on the values of the various cost functions at zero states that at no level 
of motivation, the least costly action is doing nothin.g and that there is 
some cost to doing some action. The conditions on the limits of CA as y • 
approaches -oo and CB as y • approaches +ao are the parallel conditions on 
the zero cost of doing nothing when motivation is zero, simply saying that 
when motivation approaches infinity the cost of an action becomes 
trivial. 
The next axiom gives conditions under when we may expect behavior 
based upon these cost functions. 
Axiom 2: 1he Jnd.ividual is a Cost Mi:n:imizer 
The individual, given his level of motivation y • and the levels of the 
variables w, chooses the action A,B or N which minimizes his cost. 
His cost-minimizing decision will be based on the existence of the 
cost functions CN(y•,w), CA(y•,w) and CB(y•,w} assumed by Axiom 1. 
The following lemma describes the nature of the cost-minimizing decison 
with respect to the underlying level of motivation and the conditioning 
variables w. 
Lem.m.a 1 
For any level of the conditioning variables w, there exists points 
a 1(w) and tl2(w) such that the following holds: if y• < a 1(w), action A is 
175 
the cost-minimizing decision, if y• > ae(w ), action B is the cost-
minimizing decision, and if a 1(w) < y• < a 2(w), no action is the cost-
minimizing decision. Furthermore, a 1(w) < 0 and ae(w) > 0. 
Proof 
From Axiom 1, the conditions 
BCa(y•,w) 
By. < 0, 
imply that 
Now, 
CA (O,w) - Ca(O,w) = 0, 
which implies 
so the cost of action A is always less than the cost of action Bon ( ~.o) . 
We may perform a similar calculation for the difference of the C.A (y•,w) 
and CN(y•,w), and determine that they intersect at one point less than 
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zero, below which A is the cost-minimizing action and above which (at 
least between this point and zero), N is. This point gives us our a 1(w). 
When we perform a similar proof for Cs(Y •,w) and CN(Y •,w ), we obtain 
a 1 ( w) and the theorem. 
We might note that if CA and Cs are symmetric, this implies that 
a 1(w) = a 2(w). In general, we will assume this symmetry, as there is no 
reason to believe otherwise. Note that we have assumed, with our 
conditions on the cost functions in Axiom 1, that behavior consistent with 
motivation is cheaper than behavior inconsistent with motivation. This 
makes sense from the standpoint of theories of cognitive consistency and 
also from a simple common sense point of view that an individual behaves 
in a manner which he is motivated. We may display our underlying 
dimension of motivation as follows . 
A o(, ( ~) 
We now introduce an axiom on the creation of motivation. 
A:z:iom 3: Ccm.structian of Motivation 
The individual has a motivational function (a function which 
produces his motivation on the underying motivational dimension) of the 
form 
y • = V(x ,z) + u 
where v is a non-random function of various exogenous variables % and z 
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while u is a stochastic error term, assumed to exist because of the 
omission of small infiuences uncorrelated with z and z . 
This axiom, along with the previous two axioms, will allow us to estimate 
parameters in the conditional motivational probit model. 
We assume that the form of the function V(z ,z) in the above 
motivational function may be written as 
y•=:(J+u, 
where 
fJ = (J(z ,'T), 
where 'T is some set of weights indexing z , which are assumed to affect 
the z 's. In the case which we will use for our empirical estimation, we will 
let 
and 
fJ(z,'T) = (z'T)p. 
It is also presumed that 
a 1 = a 1[ ury] 
or, in the usual case of a linear effect, 
and 
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The likelihood function for the conditional motivational probit model 
is easily written down, under our assumptions. There are three 
categories where an individual might be classified.2 For ease of notation, 
let as = +co and ao = -ao. Let y = 1 if action A is taken, y = 2 if no action 
is taken, and y = 3 if action B is taken. Let FtJ be the cumulative 
distribution function of the error term u, where F is a continuous 
distribution. Then the probability of any action y, for y = 1,2,3, is simply 
Pr ( y = c lz ,z ,w,p,;,?') = Pr ( ac > y ~ Clc-t lz ,z ,w,p,;,1 ), 
= Pr [ ac(w,.,) > .:rp(z ,;) + u 
- Pr [ z{J(z ,;) + u ~ ac(w,-y) ], 
We will assume the simpler linear interactive specification for the effects 
of the z, 's, as given above. In this case, then, 
Pr ( y = c lz ,z ,w ,p,;,)') =Fa[ (w7)ac - (z ;).:rp] 
2. There may be more than three categories, and the extension is immediate and obvious. 
For example, in our civil we.r example, there could be five catqories, ordered as follows: 
fight with the rebels, provide material aid to the rebels, do nothing, provide material ejd to 
the government, fight with the aovernment. The concept of ordering rrti&ht well be con-
mdered to exist here, and be conditional upon the ~~ame variables as the three cateaol")' 
model. A slight reworkin& of the axioms relatin& to the cost functions would be neceaary. 
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Let 
Zjc = 1, y = C 
= 0, y rt c 
The likelihood may thus be written as 
L(y ,z ,z ,w ,p,;,-y) = fi fi 
1=1 c=l 
The log of the likelihood function is then 
(l(y ,z ,z ,w ,fJ,i.'Y) = f; t Z;c 
S=lc=l 
Due to the multiplicative nature of the z 1-r1 upon the z 's and the w-y 
upon the a's, we put a constant one, with weight one, in both the z 'sand 
thew's. 
5.2 7he Rela.tionship bet'Ween &.nd.om Utility Ma.:rimiza.tion a:nd the 
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Cbndilional Motivaticm.al Probil 
In both economics and psychology, choice behavior is often modelled 
as being performed under the Random Utility Maximization (RUM) 
hypothesis (McFadden, 1973, Tversky, 1971). The basic concept behind 
RUM is that the individual, if given the choice between k alternatives, will 
choose the i'h alternative if and only if 
Here, the ~ are utility functions which are assumed to have a random 
component (by far the most popular definition is u, = ""(z ,p) + t,, where 
Jti (z ,p) is a non-stochastic function of exogenous variables z and their 
weights p, while t 1 is an error term which captures unspecified exogenous 
variables, errors in perception and optimization by the consumer, and so 
forth) . Thus the RUM hypothesis makes operational the economic 
concept of the utility-maximizing consumer. A natural question which 
arises, then, what is the relationship between the conditional 
motivational probit model introduced in this chapter and the RUM 
hypothesis? 
The first thing to note is that the conditional motivational probit as 
it is modelled does not satisfy the RUM hypothesis. One does not choose 
an action i out of k possible actions if 
~>max U.J·; 
i'*' 
rather, one chooses A if one's motivation is less than a 1, one does nothing 
if one's motivation is between a 1 and a 2 , and one chooses B if one's 
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motivation is greater than a 2 . The difference is with the conditional 
motivational probit one is modelling motivations, rather than utility. 
Utility functions would then be presumed to be a function of motivations. 
The question thus becomes, are there a set of non-random utility 
functions (call them l'A for action A, VB for action B, and VN tor no action) 
which are consistent with the hypothesis of an underlying level of 
motivation but which allow the choice process to be validly modelled by 
RUM? 
The answer is yes, such functions do exist, and a sample are 
displayed in Figure 5.2. 
(Put Figure 5.2 about here] 
Let 
XA = ~zPizP <ad. 
'X.N = f:rpjal < :rp < ~J. 
and 
Then on XA, VA must be greater than VB and VN, on XN· VN must be greater 
than Y..t and Ys, and on xs. Ys must be greater than ·l'A and VN. The 
addition of a random component is then all that is necessary. Note that 
the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives obviously cannot 
hold here; rather, a multinomial pro bit or a proximate covariance model 
is called for, rather than a multinomial logit. Also, in some sense, the 
conditional motivational probit model is more primitive, as knowledge (or 





assumption) of the form of the utility functions is not necessary. Rather. 
the assumption is that there is an underlying motivation dimension which 
gives rise to behavior, and that this underlying dimension can be 
predicted accurately. 
One factor about Figure B.l is that the utility function for the choice 
of no action, VN. cannot be linear unless it is constant across all levels of 
motivation.3 Otherwise, if VA and VB are linear, VN must be non-linear. 
The usual method in multinomial logit (or pro bit, which we will assume is 
being used here), for example, is to assume that the utility functions are 




Now, suppose both v,. and Ys are linear as described above. Then if VN 
was treated as the reference category, the assumption would be that VN is 
described as above and therefore, 
If. however, as seems clear from the above exposition, VN = H(W,fJN), 
where H is some non-linear function, then the usual device of subtracting 
S. This seems unlikely. That implies that an individual gets as much utility out of no action 
when he is hlghly motivated to act as when he is not motivated at all to act. Theories of 
cogrutive dissonance would indicate this is a hi&hlY undesirable state. 
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off the reference category coefficients will not be adequate. Rather, as 
shown in McFadden ( 1981, footnote 26) a linear approximation to VN can 
be used, which, as McFadden notes, "this justification from approximation 
theory for a linear-in-parameters form does not imply that this approach 
is efficient, or even pratical, for all applications." Whether the 
approximation is practical or not, it is clear that the coefficients on the 
exogenous variables will be difi'erent in the case of the multinomial probit 
than in the conditional motivational probit. 
5.3 &tension to S,m:ultaneous Equation Systems and "Economies to 
&ale" 
Much work has been done in recent years on simultaneous equation 
systems involving categorical dependent variables (Madd.ala ( 1983) is the 
best reference) . The conditional motivational probit model presented in 
this chapte_r may also be extended to systems of equations where more 
than one participatory behavior is being considered at a single moment 
in time. Furthermore, the situation where one behavior, once 
undertaken, makes further behaviors less costly. will also be considered 
and a model which describes that situation will be presented. 
The usual simultaneous equation system of g equations is written in 
the form 
By•+I%=u 
where y • is g by 1, B is g by g, X is k by 1, r is g by k, and u is g by 1. 
Under the assumption that B is invertible, this is equivalent to 
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=llz +v. 
Now, for any individual equation in this system of g equations, we have 
where, n1 the i'"' row of TI. For a simultaneous equation system for the 
conditional motivational probit, then, the above equation may be 
estimated conditional on z and 7', as outlined in the preceeding section. 
When done for all g equations, this will give consistent estimates of n. 
These estimates may then be used to obtain, by Am.emiya's method, 
consistent estimates of the structural parameters. Amemiya's method 
and a simple way of obtaining more efficient estimates by use of it is 
discussed in chapter 6. Computer programs for the actual calculations 
are discussed in chapter 9. 
It is important to note that the estimation of the cutpoints for the 
i" equation, ~1 and a,2 , come out of the reduced form estimation and 
are not estimated by Amemiya's method. What does come out of 
Amemiya's method are estimates of the structural parameters. Given our 
assumptions about the nature of the effect of the conditional variables z 
upon the behavioral weights (J (a simple interactive form), the original 
specification may be recovered with point estimates and standard errors 
for all parameters (the point estimates and standard errors for the e 
variables come from the first stage). More complex specifications may 
not be amenable to a procedure such as Amemiya's and may require 
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maximum likelihood methods. The modelliil8 of the case when multiple 
behaviors have "returns to scale" requires just that. 
A good example of a "returns to scale" problem is that of voting in 
American federal elections with the choice of choosing multiple 
candidates in multiple races. The main cost here is of course going to the 
polls, and once that price is paid, then voting for any candidates is simply 
a matter of pulling another lever rather than making an extra trip to the 
polls. If we retain our hypothesis of a single dimension for each behavior, 
however, with the a's retaining the interpretation of cutpoints dependent 
upon cost, it can be seen that going to the polls in order to vote for one 
candidate will make the cost of voting for other candidates much 
cheaper. Furthermore, since it is not clear which behavior motivates the 
individual to go to the polls and allows the other voting choices to be 
accomplished much more easily, the process must be modelled 
simultaneously. 
Let CX( 1 , cxt2 be the cutpoints of the i"' equation. Introduce the 
function x1 •... , 'Xsl· where 
Xi(y} = 1 if y;• < ajl or ys· > aj2· for any i ~ i. 
= 0, otherwise 
Thus, for motivational dimension i, the function Xi takes on a value of 
one if any of the other underlying motivations on the other motivational 
dimensions indicates that the behavior is to be performed. Once the 
behavior is to be performed on any other motivational dimension, the 
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cost of performing a behavior for the i"~ dimension is cheaper to some 
extent. We make this operational by including the Xi in the Zil variables, 
as 
Zit7'il = ZilTil + ~lXi(y•} 
This "dummying in" of the effects of a decision to turn out should take 
into account the "economies of scale" of the turnout problem. At 
present, the only way of estimating the likelihood is through the method 
of maximum likelihood. This limits the number of equations which may 
be estimated if the error terms are assumed normal, as maximum-
likelihood techniques become increasingly unreliable as the number of 
equations increase. 
It is sometimes desired in simultaneous equation systems to put in 
the observed dichotomous indicator of the underlying continuous 
variable as a right-hand side variable. This approach was ftrst suggested 
by Heckman (1978), and results in certain constraints for the model to be 
"internally valid". Basically, unless these constraints are met, some 
values of the underlying continuous variable will not have an observable 
response or multiple values of the observable response will be generated 
by the model. This problem is exactly the same in the use of 
simultaneous equation methods in this model. and similar restrictions 
must be observed. The most complete treatment of this type of 
restriction is given in Schmidt (1981), and the reader is referred to that. 
It may be perhaps wise at this point to quote Schmidt's warning on 
the problem of simultaneous equation systems in economics. 
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Another point worth making is that the necessity of the 
constraints discussed here may raise question of whether we 
ought to even consider simultaneous tobit and probit models at 
all . It is by no means clear that the best way to model 
truncated and/or qualitative variables is to embed them 
(essentially by analogy) into the usual simultaneous equations 
model. At this point it is not clear what the alternatives would 
be. However, the difficulties one runs into, especially in the 
probit case, do indicate that the analogy to the usual 
simultaneous equations model is not completely 
straightforward. 
Implicit in Schmidt's comments is the realization that simultaneous 
equation methods were developed in economics in order to model macro-
economic models of the economy, where existing theory predicted, 
basically, a structural system of equations . The variables were, of course, 
all continous variables and the restriction conditions that Schmidt 
derives in his article do not apply to them, but his main point is clear: 
should we model this process in this way at all? 
We think this method is reasonable for the following reasons . First, 
the processes developed here are not "essentially by analogy"; theories of 
cognitive consistency do suggest to the researcher that there are indeed 
simultaneities in the decision process. Furthermore, it is often clear that 
an individual performing an action in one sphere will indeed have e.n 
effect upon one's action in another sphere. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the example when there are clear returns to scale to performing 
both actions simultaneously, as in voting for candidates for different 
offices once one has gone to the polls . Modelling the "shared" cost is a 
necessary part of understanding voting turnout, and that simply cannot 
be done in a non-simultaneous framework. Furthermore, it is not 
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unreasonable to expect motivations for one behavior to effect 
motivations for another behavior. The presence of restrictions in a 
simultaneous system is an unfortunate fact of life . Whether or not useful 
modelling can be made in the presence of those restrictions is a decisions 
for the applied researcher to make. 
5.4 An E:rample of the Crmditianal Motivational Probit: Presidential 
Voting in 1980 
For this example of the use of the conditional motivational probit 
model we turn to the 1980 American federal election. For purposes of 
this example we will use data from the 1980 American National Election 
Study. The behavior which we have referred to as A in the previous 
sections will be voting for Ronald Reagan, the behavior which we have 
referred to as B will be voting for Jimmy Carter, and no behavior will be 
not voting. Anderson voters are excluded from this analysis. 
The use of the conditional motivational probit demands the 
specification of two types of variables: the x's, which are the variables 
which are presumed to effect the motivation of the individual, and the z's, 
which are the variables for which the relation y = z ~ + u is to be 
estimated conditionally upon. For the purposes of this example the x's 
used will be a respondent's self-placement on a scale of partisan 
Identification (seven categories, ranging from strong Democrat to strong 
Republican, with independent being the reference category), and a 
variable called cand, which is the sum of open-ended likes and dislikes 
towwards the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates4. 
4. The CAND variable was fl.rst uaed in Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954). It i8 constructed 
by using responses to the question "Is there anyt.hin.g in particular about (candidate) for 
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Candidates self-placement on the partisan scale is non-zero only if the 
value of the cand variable is zero, as it is assumed that a large proportion 
of the cand variance is explained (and is casually anetecedent to) by the 
same partisanship as is the self-placement on the partisan scale. 
For the z 's which are assumed to condition the motivational 
relationship, we use the four "Attitudes towards the voting process" 
questions which are available in the ANES survey.5 These questions ask 
whether an individual agrees or disagrees with a statement designed to 
elicit certain attitudes towards the act of voting, presumably normative 
attitudes towards the responsibility of a citizen to vote in a democracy. 
From these questions we construct a four point scale, which take a value 
of one if a person disagrees with all four statements, two if a person 
disagrees with all but one statement, three if a person disagrees with two 
statements, and four if a person disagrees with one or zero statements.6 
This scale (with which a value of one indicates the highest category of 
what is referred to in the political science literature as "citizen duty") is 
then used to create three one-zero dummy variables, one for a value of 
one on the scale, one for a vaue of two on the scale, one for a value of 
president) that nrl&ht make you want to vote (for/against) him?". The number of responses 
(there may be up to five in all SRC's lru1"Vey's during a on-year e~cept 1972, when there were 
three) for 1ilci..n8 the Democratic candidate are added to the number of responses for dislik-
ing the Republican candidate, and then the number for dislilcin& the Democratic candidate 
and liking the Republican candidate are added together and this number mbtract from the 
ftrst number. The number may thus run from-10 to 10. 
5. The questions used are 1) "It isn't .o important to vote when you know your party 
doesn't have a chance," 2) "So many other people vote in the national elections that it 
doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not," 5) ''I! a person doesn't care how an elec--
tion comes out he shouldn't vote in it,'' 4) "A good many local elections aren't important 
enough to bother with." 
6. The reason for including one or zero statements in the fourth category is the few number 
of respondents in either one of those cate£ories. Incidentally, this scale is actually a Gutt-
man acale for the vote. 
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three on the scale, with the reference category being those individuals 
who scored four on the scale. We will refer to these dummies as High 
duty, Moderately high duty, and Moderate duty, with the reference 
category being Low duty. 
The choice of z 1 and z 2 was to make both of them the three dummy 
variables listed above. This was done on the lack of previous knowledge 
on how to incorporate them into the specification. While there has been a 
massive amount of research on the determinants of turnout, none of it 
suggested any means of discerning how attitudes towards the voting 
process should enter into the conditional motivational probit model being 
tested here. Thus the inclusion of both sets of variable into both z 's . 
Additionally, r 1 was allowed to vary for this problem for both cutpoints 
(a1 and ~). so in reality there was a r 11 and r 12 . This was done primarily 
due to a suspicion that the model itselt was misspecified, so that 
variables which relate to may have been ommitted from the model. This 
would manifest itself in a asymmetry in the cutpoints about zero. The 
results in table 5.1 are thus reported with a separate set of cutpoints for 
each value of the scale, and the coefficients for the three dummies for the 
z 2 's, and the values of the coefficients for the z 's. 
The results are given in table 5.1 
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Table 5.1: Turnout Example for Conditional Motivational Probit Model (1980) 
Maximum 
Likelihood Standard Asymptotic 
Coefficient Estimate Error T-Ratio 
Alpha 1 (High Duty) 
Alpha 2 (High Duty) 
Alpha 1 (Moderately High Duty) 
Alpha 2 (Moderately High Duty) 
Alpha 1 (Moderate Duty) 
Alpha 2 (Moderate Duty) 
Alpha 1 (Low Duty) 


































































The results of Table 5.1 are in some senses gratifying. The signs on 
all of the x 's are of the "correct" sign and are of the expected magnitude. 
The ex's are somewhat asymmetric, but they have the correct sign also. 
The effects of the underlying conditional variables are clearly greatest 
upon the cutpoints in this example, effecting the threshold for which 
motivation needs to attain before being trnaslated into action, but not 
affecting the motivation itself in a substantial manner 7. The asymptotic 
t-ratio 's are given for the difi'erence of the coefficient from one, rather 
than zero. 
It might also be of interest to see how well we are predicting the 
various categories of behavior, given the underlying level of duty. These 
values are presented in Table 5.2. Given the somewhat simplistic model 
presented here, the fit is surprisingly good. 
7. The coefficient of the omitted l.Dw Duty dummy variable for the% 'a ia aasumed to be one, 
aince this is a mu1tiplicative rather than an additive specification. Thus the coefticienta for 
the other dummies need to be compared with one rather than zero. 
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Table 5.2: Prediction Versus Actual Behavior 
High Duty 
Voted for Reagan No Vote Voted for Carter 
Predicted 
Vote for Reagan 235 95 19 
No Vote 32 75 75 
Vote For Carter 9 63 122 
Moderately High Duty 
Voted for Reagan No Vote Voted for Carter 
Predicted 
Vote for Reagan 103 49 2 
No Vote 58 170 67 
Vote For Carter 3 23 32 
Moderate Duty 
Voted for Reagan No Vote Voted for Carter 
Predicted 
Vote for Reagan 6 5 0 
No Vote 18 63 23 
Vote For Carter 0 5 10 
Low Duty 
Voted for Reagan No Vote Voted for Carter 
Predicted 
Vote for Reagan 1 1 0 
No Vote 8 67 11 
Vote For Carter 0 0 0 
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Chapter 8: A Simple llethod for Constructing CoiUiistent 
Xstimates for the Covariance of Two llaiimum Likelihood Xstimators 
Obtained from the Same Set of Obsenations 
Situations often occur where it is desirable to obtain a consistent 
estimator of the covariance of two maximum likelihood estimators. Tests 
of significance involving two maximum likelihood estimates, for example, 
require the derivation of the covariance between the two estimators, as 
well as the more familiar derivation of the variance of the estimator. 
Situations where such derivations are necessary arise frequently in both 
theory and application, such as Hausman tests (1978), derivation of 
structural form coefficients from reduced form coefficients in 
simultaneous equation models (Amemiya (1978), Lee (1981)), and, as will 
be demonstrated in this chapter, in tests of consistency in ordered 
response models (Aitchison and Silvey (1957), Maddala (1983}} . It will be 
shown in this chapter that the method of calculating consistent 
estimates between two different maximum likelihood estimators derived 
from the same data is valid, under certain assumptions, even in the 
presence of misspecification and that it is computationally simple. 
6.1 Derivation of theoretical results 
We assume that either the conditions of Huber (1965) or White 
( 1982) obtain. In particular, this includes the assumption that the 
observations are independently and identically distributed (iid). We use a 




Fn = Fn(A~p>, ...• ~t>) 
and 
FAn = Fm(~tA;P> + · · · + ~~k)) 
Then Fn.,. F iff Fm ~ F,.. for all~ t ~. 
Let us consider the case of two estimators derived from the same 
data, call them P1 and p2 . Let these estimators be defined in such a way 
that 
= vk 1~1 (A1q 1Su + A2q2S2;) 
It is clear from this formulation that if sli and s2i are identically 
independently distributed, the sum above satisfies the conditions of the 
lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem, and has a limiting distribution 
which is normal. If the expectations of Sli and S2, are both zero, then 
the variance of any term in the above sum may be written as 
Va.r(~tq tSti + ~q2S2,) 
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By the theorem quoted above, since the above holds for all A, the center 
matrix is our covariance matrix for P 1 and p2 . 
Any type of estimators which are the sum of a function of 
realizations from some iid probability law follow this theorem. Usually 
instead of q 1 and q 2 , we will have functions of the observations which 
approach in probability q 1 and q2 , but these estimators will have the 
same limiting distribution, by Rao (2.c.x.b). It becomes simple to 
calculate the covariance between two estimators, then, ·when they are of 
this form, and even simpler to obtain consistent estimators. Maximum 
likelihood estimators are the prime candidate for this treatment, but 
method of moments estimators also fall into this category. 
This way of expressing the variance is important from the standpoint 
of maximum likelihood estimation, also . In maximum likelihood 
estimation in a correctly specified model. ..L = Var (Su) and 
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-1- = Var(S2i). In an incorrectly specified model. as apparently first q2 
noted by Cox (1961) and proven rigorously by Huber (1965) and White 
(1982), the diagonals of the center matrix are the correct variances for 
the individual maximum likelihood estimates. Note that the covariance 
between P1 and p2 is the same expression whether or not the probability 
laws with respect to which they were derived are correctly specified or 
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not. 
This approach may obviously be generalized to the case where 
vectors of maximum likelihood estimators are being estimated, but in 
this case the algebra in deriving the covariance matrix is extremely 
tedious. The general result is the same, however. We may state it as 
follows. 
Fhct 
The covariance between any two estimators p, and Pi derived from 
the same (tid) data by the method of maximum likelihood may be 
consistently estimated by 
where ~ and Qi are the matrices of minus the inverse of the second 
partials and ~ and SJ are matrices of the first partials. 
If there are k 1 x 1 parameters in p,, k 2 x 2 parameters in pi, and n 
observations, then Q, is k 1 x k 1, Qi is k 2 x k 2 , ~is n x k 1, and Si is n x k 2 . 
This formula holds, incidentally, even if p, and Pi are the same estimator. 
If they are the same estimator, and the model is correctly estimated, 
then the S',S;. and ~ terms cancel, leaving the familiar n~ as the 
estimator of the covariance of estimators. Tests which make use of the 
fact that these two matrices do not cancel in the presence of 
misspeciftcation are discussed in White ( 1982) . 
The above result, while existing in one form or another the maximum 
likelihood literature for years, has never, to this author's knowledge, been 
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stated in the explicit manner above. The result, though, is not surprising; 
rather, it is the utility of its applications to both previously proposed 
problems involving maximum likelihood estimation and to new 
theoretical problems which is interesting. It is to that task that we now 
turn. 
6.2 An Application to .Amemiya s Principle 
Amemiya ( 1978) suggests for estimating the a system of 
simultaneous equations the following principle. Let 
1/1 = LX1Y2 + Ztfli + U1 
and 
1/2 = ~Yt + z2P2 + u2, 
~t a reduced form regression (or probit, or tobit, or whatever) of y 1 and 
y 2 on all the exogenous variables be performed, 
1/2 = zrr2 + ve. 
and then solve 
and 
fr2 = 1rtCX2 + J2fl2, 
where J 1 and J2 solve z 1 = zJ1 and x 2 = xJ2 . 1r1 and n2 are not observed, 
but nl and fr2 (obtained from the reduced-form estimations) are, so the 
above may be rewritten as 
ft1 = fr2a1 + J1fJ1 + w 1 
and 
fte = fr1a2 + J2fJ2 + w2. 
where 
'Wt = frl - 7Tt - Clt(fr2- 7T2) 
and 
w2 = rr2 - 1T2 - a2(fr1 - 7Tt) . 
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Amemiya suggests generalized least squares applied on each equation 
separately and shows that they are more efficient than Heckman's two-
stage estimator, while Lee (1981) shows that application of Amemiya's 
principle is more efficient than two-stage procedures in a wide range of 
problems involving limited and qualitative dependent variables. 
To perform this generalized least squares, it is necessary to calculate 
the covariance matrix of w 1 and w 2 . Amemiya (and Lee) do so for the 
oases they consider, but the technique proposed in the last section can 
produce consistent estimators of the covariance matrix which allow both 
the calculation of the covariance between w 1 and w 2 , and produce 
consistent estimators of the covariances even in the presence of 
misspecification (presuming the conditions discussed earlier in this 
chapter obtain). Letting Q,-;1 be minus the inverse of second partials of 
the likelihood function for the reduced-form regression for y 1 , P,;-1 be the 
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same for y 2• and letting ~ be the matrix of first partials for y 1 and Tn be 
the same for y 2 , we have that 
and letting 
A = 11 -all -a2 1 I 
we have 
Obviously, consistent estimators of a 1 and ~ must be obtained for A. 
There are various ways of doing this, but the simplest seems to be to run 
the estimations in (6 .2.7) and (6.2.8) as ordinary least squares 
regressions. This will give consistent estimates of a 1 and a 2, which may 
then be used in A. 
The obtaining of the covariance matrix of w 1 and w 2 means that we 
may apply a generalized least squares procedure to both (6.2.7) and 
(6.2.8) simultaneously, resulting in a more efficient estimation procedure 
than generalized least squares applied to each separately. As noted 
before, these estimates are also valid estimators of the covariances even 
in the presence of misspeci.fication. The ease of numerical computation 
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with modern computers (essentially all that is happening is that 
derivatives are being multiplied together) makes this technique simple to 
program. 
6. 3 An Application to Ordered Respanse Models 
Consider a model where a variable y is observed as a three when 
some underlying variable y • ~ a 2 , observed as a 2 when a 2 > y • ~ a 1, and 
observed as a 1 when a 1 > y •. Let the various probabilities associated · 
with these events be given by 
Pr(y = 3) = 1 -F[a2 -zp], 
Pr(y = 2) = F[~ -zp]- F[a1 -zp], 
and 
Pr(y = 1) = F[a1 -zp]. 
This, of course, is simply a generalization of the probit model. for which a 
number of variations (Amemiya(1975), McKelvey and Zavoina(1975), 
Atchison and Silvey ( 1958)) have appeared. 
Now, consider a "collapsed" specification to two categories by 
creating a variable w, which has the property that w = 2 if y = 2 or 
y = 3, while w = 1 if y = 1. Then 
Pr(w = 2) = 1- F[a1 -zp], 
and 
Pr(w = 1) = F[a1 -zp]. 
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Now, w and y have a joint density as follows : 
" 1 3 
w 1 F[a:1 - zp] 0 0 
2 0 F[ a 2 - z P] - F[ a 1 - z P] 1 - F[ a 2 - z P] 
where the entries in this matrix are the probabilities of an event 
occurring . 
It should be noted that by the standard results of maximum 
likelihood theory, if F is specified correctly (it is usually the standard 
normal distribution function), the maximum likelihood estimation using 
either w or y will produce consistent estimators. The difference between 
the coefficients of the (J's using w and y may be seen as a test of 
misspecification, then, as it should go to zero under a correctly specified 
model and diverge from zero in an incorrectly specified model. In 
particular, if the distribution of the error term is correct but the 
assumptions on the order of the responses is incorrect for 11 but correct 
for w, then the difference of the two coefficients should diverge from 
zero.1 
1. A good a ample of where this type of test might be useful occurs in political science over 
the concept of partisan or party identification. or attachment or identilication with a party. 
The standard BW"Vey (American National Election Survey) used by most political scientists in 
..t.udying partisan identification creates a ..even-point scale with extreme attachment to the 
DelTlDcratic party at one end and extreme attachment to the Republican party at the other 
end. This scale is then supposed to be uni-dimensional, an interpretation which has been re-
cently challenged (Weisberg, (1980)). It has also been suggested (Wolfinger, et. e.l. (1977)) 
that categories along this scale have been "switched", so that more extreme attachment to 
one party or another is incorrectly classified as less extreme attachement. Specifically, the 
Wlofinger hypothesis is that categories 2 and 3 and 5 and 6 on this partisan identilication 
.-cale have been switched. This conjecture may also be caamined by the type of te..t. pro-
posed here, simply by estimating the full category mode] and then the model with three 
categories, collapsing categories 1, 2 and 3 into 1, 4 into 2, and 5, 6 and 7 into 3, then te..t.-
in& the difference of the coefficients obtained from each estimation. 
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Using the results of the last section, we may evaluate the covariance 
of the estimators from the three-category estimation (call them 
(p(3>,af3>,cx!3>) = 713>), and that from the two-category estimation 
((p(2>,cxf2>) = 712>). It is not known a priori whether the estimation with the 
w or the y will produce more efficient estimators, since an additional 
parameter ~ must be estimated when using y. We will show that the 
estimation of the three-category model is asymptotically more efficient 
than that of the two category, even with the estimation of the additional 
parameter. 
Now, the various derivatives with respect to the parameters are 
and 
and 
Bln prob (w=2l:r ,e2>) 
ap(2) 
Bln prob (w =liz ,92>) 
ap(2) 
Bln prob (y =31 :r , 9.5>) 
apes> 
Bln prob (y =liz ,9.3>) 
8{3(3) 
= 1 - F(cxf2> - zp(2>) x 
I (cxf2> - zP(2)) 
= F(af2> - z p(2)) x 
So, under the assumption that the model is specified correctly, we have 
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E[ Bln prob (y I z, eC3>) Bln prob ( w I z, e2>) ] 
apes> apC2> 
- f(aJ2>-z(i-2)) /(a~s>-zp(S)) 
- 1 - F( a t2> - z {3(2)) 1 - F( a~3) - z pC3>) 
Also, by a similar process, 





El Bln prob (y l:r ,eC3>) Bln prab (w lz ,eC2>) l 
Bcxf3> ap(3> 
= El Bin prab (y I :r ,£1.5>) Bln prab (w I :r ,eC2>) l 
ap'3> Bcxi2> 
We need to inspect the derivatives with respect to cx2 to complete our 
calculation of the covariances of the maximum likelihood estimators 
from the two models . We have 
and 
So, 
Bln prab (y =31 :r, e3>) _ I ( cx~S) - :r p(s)) 
8cx~3> - 1 - F( a:J3> - z p(3)) 
Bln prob (y =2]:r ,e5>) 
8cx~3 > 
8ln prob (y =liz ,e3>) = 0 aoJ3> 




Similarly, if we calculate the derivatives of ln prob ( w I z ,pC2>) with respect 
to af2>, one may follow a similar process to obtain 
El Blnprab (y lz ,eC5>) Blnprob (w !.:r ,e2>) l = 0 
8a~3) 8af2> 
Hence one over the number of observations times the matrix of the 
expectations with respect to the parameters for the cross-partials may be 
written as 
X'AX 1'AX 
0 LE[ Bin prob (y !.:r ,eC2>) Bin prab (w !.:r ,e(2))] _ --n ~ 
n afi.s> a£1.2> - 1'AX 1'A1 0 
n n 
where A is diagonal with entries ~, 1 is a n by 1 vector of ones, and X is a 
n by 1 matrix of the exogenous variables. 
1t is not hard to calculate the matrix of the expectations of the 
second partials for (af2>,p(2>).2 That matrix is simply 
2. It is stated in ~e (1961, p 350), for example (there is a typographical error in that lrta~ 
ment, incidentally). 
X'AX 1'AXI ----n n 
p = 1'AX l'A1 I 
n n 
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or the same as the matrix of the expectations of the product of the first 
partials with respect to (pC2>,af2>) and (p(5>,at5>). Call the above matrix P. 
Call Q the matrix of the expectations of the second partials for (af5>,pC5>). 
Then by the results in the first section of this chapter, 
= n[I O]Q. 
where I is a 2 by 2 identity matrix. 
Let 
This implies in particular that 
=nQ + nP- 2nQ = nP -nQ ~0. 
where ~ is used in the sense of positive definition, since P - Q is the 
variance of a random variable. This shows that the three category 
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estimation is more efficient than the two category estimation (the proof 
may easily be extended to show that Jc 1 category estimation is more 
efficient than k 2 estimation, if k 1 > k 2 and the estimation with the fewer 
categories represents a "collapsing" of the estimation with larger 
categories). It also gives us the covariance matrix for the test of 
m.isspecification. 
8. 4 Applica.tian to Ha:usm.an Tests 
One popular type of test of misspecification is what is known as the 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The test consists of supposing two 
different probability laws generating relationships among the variables 
from the same set of data, one of which is supposed under the null 
hypothesis to be both true and asymptotically efficient (achieve the 
asymptotic Cramer-Rao lower bound), while the other one is consistent 
under the alternative hypothesis. In practice this consists of estimating 
two sets of parameters from the same data, with Po being efficient under 
the null hypothesis and p 1 being consistent for fJo under both hypothesis.3 
The null hypothesis of no misspeciftcation may then be tested by 
examining the statistic q = Po - P 1 = 0 
The advantage of the Hausman procedure is the simple calculation of 
the covariance matrix of q. To quote Hausman (p 1253) 
3. AB Nelson (1981, footnote B) points out, the condition that P 1 be consistent for fJo under 
the alternative hJjothe~ is not necessary for the logical consistency of the test; what i• 
necessary ia that P1 and fJo approach di.fterent limits under the alternative hypothesis. 
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In constructing tests based on q, an immediate problem comes 
to mind. To develop tests not only is the probability limit of q 
rE!_guired, but the variance of the asymptotic distribution of 
-..rt'fj, Y( q), must also be determined. Since Po and P 1 use the 
same data, they will be correlated which could lead to a messy 
calculation for the variance of V'fq .... Luckil;y, this problem is 
resolved easily and, in fact, Y(q) = Y(fJ1> - V(fJo = V1 - V0 under 
the null hypothesis of no misspecification. Thus, the 
construction of specification error tests is simplified, since the 
estimators may be considered .... sep~rately because the variance 
of the difference VTq = ....rt (P1 -Po) is the difference of the 
respective variances. 
As is pointed out in the first section, however, consistent estimators of 
the asymptotic covariance of two estimators derived from the same set of 
data are (usually) easily obtained. Furthermore, one would want to use 
consistent estimators of the variance for q, for the matrix Y1 - Yo may 
not be positive definite under the alternative hypothesis, which could lead 
to erroneous inferences when the Wald test is applied. 
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